This article provides an excellent review of Israel's strategic
position and needs and clearly informs us of what could be reasonable
in terms of legitimate peace settlements.
It may not be too obvious, but Israel's strategic position has
improved steadily and this includes recent events with the collapse
of dictatorships in Egypt and Syria. It takes a combination of
military capacity and internal political consensus to launch a war.
The existential threat of the Muslim Brotherhood is presently engaged
in adapting to the new demos imposed by the Arab public. In the
process even threats of war must be tamed. Unless the demos succumbs
to authoritarianism a la Iran, I suspect there is little to really
fear.
If anything, Israel needs a short war in order to complete the work
in progress in a quick time only. The work of seizure and
consolidation has been ongoing and is not going to stop. Even Arab
resistance to the presence of a powerful Israeli state is slowly
crumbling through the cumulative effect of old enemies simply dying
out. Israel can wait.
The eventual emergence of a healthy growing economy in Jordan would
evacuate the West Bank naturally and is actually inevitable since
both economies will continue to be stifled until this happens.
The only remaining creditable Islamic threat is Iran. That can
change, but that seems from this point to be a declining possibility.
The threat will end decisively once the oil industry begins its long
and inevitable contraction and as I have posted, this appears close
upon us.
I personally think that Iran can be delayed past their tipping point.
Israel: Why Land
Matters
Posted by Yedidya
Atlas on May 14th, 2012
In the years that
followed the 1967 Six Day War a prevailing conventional wisdom
developed among Western policy makers – especially in Washington —
that simultaneously contends that a “strong and secure Israel”
should have, as per UN Resolution 242, “secure and recognized
boundaries” or simply “defensible borders,” yet nonetheless
calls on Israel to make unilateral territorial concessions (today’s
PC term is a return to the pre-’67 lines with “mutually agreed
land swaps”) as part of an ultimate peace settlement with its Arab
neighbors.
Strangely few perceive
the inherent contradiction between the call for a “strong and
secure Israel” and the call to give up the very territory that
would – at minimum – comprise said strength and security.
This was the case with
Egypt, for example. More than 30 years ago, Israel gave up the entire
Sinai Peninsula, including its vast strategic depths and bottleneck
passes as well as the Abu Rodeis oil fields, which supplied Israel
more than half its energy needs and would have made Israel energy
independent within a few short years more than 30 years ago. And this
is also the case today with the Palestinian Arabs. As long as there
are Palestinian Arabs willing to take territory from Israel even
without any quid pro quo from their side, Israel is expected to
unilaterally give up its most strategically critical territory.
Israel, without the
administered territories, is a strategically crippled country. These
areas, known historically as Judea and Samaria and labeled “the
West Bank” following the Jordanian occupation of said territories
in 1949, are the key to Israel’s strategic strength against any
attack from the east (Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, et al.). An Israel
with control of these territories is a strategic asset to the West in
defense against radical Islamic expansionism no less, if not more,
than during the Cold War period when Israel was the West’s reliable
bulwark against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East.
Up until the late
1980s, following the outbreak of the so-called “Palestinian
uprising” or “first intifada,” everyone viewed the security
threat to Israel to be solely by conventional Arab armies who, to
quote the late Egyptian President Nasser, wished to “drive the Jews
into the sea.” In the following two decades, with the vast increase
of terrorist attacks and the introduction to the missile age, it
appeared that conventional war no longer threatened Israel’s
existence per se. And if the threat was primarily terrorism and
missiles fired from afar, territory with its high ground and
strategic depth no longer seemed as important. From the standpoint of
Israel’s national security, however, this is a misconception.
Territory is not only still vital for national defense, it is even
more so than previously.
There is a basic
premise: Israel’s security can be discussed only in terms of
national survival. It is necessary to understand the price Israel
pays if she unilaterally gives up more of these territories and what
she benefits by their retention.
Given the three
potential threats of missile attacks, terrorism, and conventional
warfare, Israel must retain a safety zone with the aforementioned
high ground and strategic depth to deal with any potential future
threats — even if political agreements are signed with its Arab
neighbors. Israel cannot afford to bet its survival on signed
agreements while giving up critical tangible physical strategic
assets. Israel needs to maintain the ability to defend itself under
any and all possible circumstances. (Given the Muslim/Arab history
for not keeping agreements with non-Muslims, this is not mere
whimsy.)
The key question
Israeli policy makers must ask themselves: If Israel were attacked by
a combination of a conventional Arab army, ballistic missiles, and
terrorist bands, would a truncated border with its lack of strategic
depth be sufficient for the IDF’s small standing army to
successfully repel the invaders and do so with minor damage to
Israel’s national infrastructure? Or to be blunt: Could Israel
survive such an attack in the event of an all-out war?
Let’s review the
potential threats. First, the recent upheaval in the Arab countries
that surround Israel – both the inside and outside strategic
circles – has brought back the high potential of conventional
warfare involving armored units, mobile artillery, and fighter/bomber
planes. (Witness for example, the recent IDF emergency reserve
call-ups to deal with potential incursions from Egypt and Syria.)
Second, either separately or as an extension of said conventional
warfare, the threat of long-range missiles – with both conventional
and non-conventional warheads. And third, the expansion of terrorist
attacks, including suicide bombers, shoulder-launched missiles, and
ground-to-ground fire (mortars, short-range rockets and medium-range
missiles) that use a steep trajectory (meaning it is fired from
beyond and over a border defensive line towards internal targets –
e.g. from inside Lebanon to hit Haifa).
It must be understood
that the determination of what are “strong and secure” or simply
“defensible borders” is predicated on what potential long-term
strategic threats Israel faces. And even though the last 20 years
have seen an expansion of missiles and non-conventional weapons by
Israel’s Arab neighbors, they also continued procurement of
conventional weapons for their armies.
Some of those who want
Israel to give up parts or all of Judea and Samaria attempt to
neutralize the still existent threat of conventional Arab invasion
forces by proffering “advanced technology” as a strategic
solution to lack of territory with its commensurate strategic
advantages. They claim that the IDF can employ advanced technological
capabilities, including precision-guided weapons systems, to replace
any loss of territorial superiority by Israel after conceding control
of the aforementioned administered territories.
The fallacy in that
argument is the fact that Israel’s enemies will inevitably also
equip themselves with similarly advanced technological capabilities.
Moreover, topography is directly relevant for the use of
precision-guided weapons systems that require ground-based laser
indicators. The old infantry saying regarding the importance of
holding the high ground in battle – “it is easier to shoot down
than to shoot up” – is even more critical in regards to the
employment of high-tech weaponry.
The concept of
strategic depth is not an advantage to national defense; it is
imperative, and as weapons systems improve, it becomes even more so.
With the advent of new military technologies the range of effective
fire has increased considerably. US Army planners, for example, have
doubled the distance of their definition of required minimal
defensive depth. In Germany, during the Cold War, NATO planners
defined their required defensive depth to be 125 miles (or three
times what Israel has even with Judea and Samaria included). In a
defensive battle, this distance would allow an area for retreat,
permitting a line of containment to be stabilized closer to the
border.
Israel’s
post-disengagement-from-Gaza experience has established that the
terrorists’ weapons of choice for attacking Israel from their own
territory are weapons with curved-trajectory fire (mortars, rockets,
etc.). Why? Because it is impossible to stop the attacks without
Israeli forces striking the territory from where the terrorists’
weapons were fired. So the only limiting factor preventing
significant harm to Israeli population centers is sufficient distance
– or strategic depth. And if a terrorist has penetrated a security
fence, the greater the distance he has to cover before carrying out
his intended attack, the greater the chances of stopping him.
Conceding Israeli
control of the 34-mile-wide area known as Judea and Samaria to any of
Israel’s actual or even potential enemies means a return to the
pre-1967 nine-mile waistline across Israel’s coastal strip and a
security border of 223 miles to patrol and defend. Retention of said
territories means a mere 62 miles of security border to patrol and
defend. It also means Israeli control of vital mountain passes, the
4,200-foot high ground overlooking the Jordan Rift Valley, and the
minimal strategic depth between the Jordan River and Israel’s
highly populated and industrialized coastal plain.
To comprehend why this
is so important to Israel’s security, it is necessary to understand
the difference between Israel before mass mobilization and
afterwards.
When Israel fights a
war, it must take into account many factors: weapons technologies,
tactical knowledge, motivation and education of the soldiers, etc.
However, the prime factor is still numbers. The best equipped and
most superiorly trained army cannot win if it is hopelessly
outnumbered. This has always been an issue for Israel.
The IDF, as every
responsible army, must be prepared for every eventuality. Israel
cannot afford to lose a war. According to reports, the latest annual
IDF General Staff exercises dealt with various combinations of
possible attacks from different fronts including south (Gaza and
Egypt), north (Lebanon and Syria) and east (Iran). Other
possibilities were also taken into account, but those were the major
ones.
In each of these
possibilities, strategic depth is a critical factor. In the south,
Israel has already given up its strategic buffer areas, and if the
IDF were to fail to take the battle into enemy territory (basic IDF
doctrine), the fighting would be within easy range of major Israeli
population centers.
In the north, the
Golan Heights are, as always, critical, and in the northeast and
east, Judea and Samaria are not only vital for defense, but would
also serve as passage ways for mobilization and logistics. (The
Cross-Samarian Highway, for example, was originally planned by the
IDF General Staff following the 1967 Six Day War as the major
connecting artery to the Jordan Valley from the coastal plain.)
Despite the immense
security risks Israel faces, the Jewish State’s small population
means it doesn’t have the security of a large standing army despite
the immense security risks it faces. For that reason, soldiers who
have completed their mandatory service, continue in the reserves –
especially in combat units – well into their forties, contributing
up to over a month or more of service each year for both training and
active-duty assignments. In short: the army reserves constitute the
backbone of the IDF’s manpower needs.
IDF doctrine
encompasses a number of basic security truths. Among them are that
Israel cannot afford to lose a single war, we must have a credible
deterrent posture including territorially, and that the outcome of
war must be determined quickly and decisively. Proper preparation
means Israel’s small standing army must be equipped with an
early-warning capability, coupled with an efficient reserve
mobilization and deployment system.
Israel, prior to
mobilization, is basically a relatively weak country militarily in
terms of all out war with more than one front involved – which is a
distinct possibility that the IDF planners seriously take into
account. Post-mobilization Israel, on the other hand, is an entirely
different story.
Israel has the
potential to mobilize hundreds of thousands of reserves which more
than triples the manpower of the Israeli army. This considerably
alters the ratio against the enemy. While exact figures are
classified, suffice to say the combined Arab armies outnumber
Israel’s standing army by a ratio of approximately 15 to 1. Whereas
after a full scale call-up of Israel’s reserves, the ratio is
reduced to less than 4 to 1.
While these are still
great odds against the Jewish State, it is necessary to add into the
mix the Israeli army’s strength: superior weapons systems,
intelligence and logistics, better training, higher education and
motivation (being in a “no alternative” situation where losing
means national annihilation is a major factor in superior
motivation). The result is an army with a better than even chance of
winning a war.
As noted, current
Israeli defense doctrine must take into account the vulnerability of
its national infrastructure to enemy missile attack. This means
reserves deployment locations must be sufficiently dispersed and
distant from one another and from the border itself, to increase the
chances of completing the mobilization and deploying the reserve
forces to the war zone, even in the event of a missile attack. If the
reserve mobilization were delayed by a barrage of ballistic missiles,
then initial terrain conditions for Israel’s small, numerically
inferior, standing army units would become all the more critical.
Judea and Samaria’s
mountain ridge is also crucial to Israel’s air defenses. Israel
deploys its air defense facilities along the mountain ridge to enable
the interception of enemy aircraft from forward positions instead of
from the heavily populated coastal plain. Short-range radar and
early-warning systems situated in the coastal plain would have their
line-of-sight blocked by the Judea and Samaria mountain ridge.
Without control of this high ground Israel would have no warning time
to intercept attacking aircraft. It takes only three minutes for an
enemy fighter bomber to cross the Jordan River and fly the 42 miles
to Tel Aviv. If Israel’s strategic depth were 34 miles less (i.e.:
without Judea and Samaria), enemy planes could leave Arab air space
and reach Tel Aviv in under one minute or less than minimum Israeli
“scramble time,” not to mention ground defenses’ reaction time.
But to win the war
with the aforementioned better than even chance, another agonizing
problem must be solved. As noted, Israel requires 48 hours to fully
mobilize. It is economically unfeasible for the IDF to be in a state
of constant mobilization. The productivity of the country would grind
to a standstill. No nation could survive such conditions
indefinitely. In fact, it was due to this factor that the Soviet
Union was able to orchestrate the 1967 Six Day War.
The Soviets informed
the Egyptians that Israel was mobilizing on its northern borders
opposite Syria. Although untrue, it caused the Egyptians to pull
their troops out of Yemen and mass them on the Israeli lines. This in
turn forced Israel to truly mobilize – this time opposite Egypt.
Realizing the consequences of long-term mobilization, Israel sent
word to Egypt proposing a mutual de-escalation of troops. Nasser’s
response was to close the Straits of Tiran, which was an act of war.
Israel, faced with the task of waiting for Egypt to attack, while
forced to maintain an unending full-scale mobilization with the
consequences of impending national economic disaster, had no choice
but to act. Hence, Israel’s preemptive attack on the morning of
June 5, 1967.
While conventional
warfare, Israel’s main threat up until the late 1980s, subsequently
became less probable, the threat of terrorist attacks together with
missiles, from short-range rockets to large ballistic missiles,
appear to have become the primary threats Israel faces. However, the
political upheaval in the Arab world in the last few years cannot
rule out – especially with the rise in prominence of radical
Islamic elements in Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, among others –
the potential return of regular Arab armies facing Israel in the near
future.
Even in the missile
age, wars are still ultimately decided by the movement of armies and
not just by air strikes. As long as conventional ground forces remain
the decisive element in determining the outcome of wars, then such
issues as territory and strategic depth are crucial. Despite the
proliferation of missiles and the use of terrorism as a strategic
weapon, most of Israel’s Arab neighbors still stress the role of
heavy armor in their order of battle, thus conventional warfare
remains a significant potential threat.
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