In the end, the Eastern border must be
stabilized and the stability of profound Russian weakness has run its
course. As argued here, it is time for
the Border States to ally and properly rearm to produce enough muscle to at
least defer adventurism.
I also think that a formal border
commission needs to be established in order to make obvious and useful
adjustments to accommodate facts on the ground.
It may also entail significant parts of the population experiencing dual
citizenship for a sustained period of time as the border properly
coalesces. This type of innovation
seems appropriate.
It certainly is superior to clawing each
other eyes out and attempting to draw others into the fray.
The Russian empire disintegrated for
rather good reasons, not least because it was a result of Russian military
aggression over centuries and never truly Russified to the extent that non
Russians felt at home. This is not the
USA melting pot. That can change but it
begins with friendly borders.
Borderlands: The New Strategic Landscape
TUESDAY,
MAY 6, 2014
I will be leaving this week
to visit a string of countries that are now on the front line between Russia and
the European Peninsula: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and
Azerbaijan. A tour like that allows you to look at the details of history. But
it is impossible to understand those details out of context. The more I think
about recent events, the more I realize that what has happened in Ukraine can
only be understood by considering European geopolitics since 1914 -- a hundred
years ago and the beginning of World War I.
In The Guns of August, Barbara Tuchman
wrote a superb and accurate story about how World War I began. For her it was a
confluence of perception, misperception, personality and decisions. It was
about the leaders, and implicit in her story was the idea that World War I was
the result of miscalculation and misunderstanding. I suppose that if you focus
on the details, then the war might seem unfortunate and avoidable. I take a
different view: It was inevitable from the moment Germany united in 1871. When it
happened and exactly how it happened was perhaps up to decision-makers.
That it would happen was a geopolitical necessity. And understanding that
geopolitical necessity gives us a framework for understanding what is happening
in Ukraine, and what is likely to happen next.
The German Problem
The unification of Germany
created a nation-state that was extraordinarily dynamic. By the turn of the
20th century, Germany had matched the British economy. However, the British
economy pivoted on an empire that was enclosed and built around British
interests. Germany had no such empire. It had achieved parity through internal
growth and exports on a competitive basis. This was just one of the
problems Germany had. The international economic system was based on a system
of imperial holdings coupled with European industrialism. Germany lacked those
holdings and had no politico-military control over its markets. While its economy was equal to Britain's, its risks were much
higher.
Economic risk was
compounded by strategic risk. Germany was on the North European Plain,
relatively flat, with only a few north-south rivers as barriers. The Germans
had the Russians to the east and the French to the west. Moscow and Paris had
become allies. If they were to simultaneously attack Germany at a time of their
choosing, Germany would be hard-pressed to resist. The Germans did not know
Russo-French intentions, but they did know their capabilities. If there was to
be war, the Germans had to strike first in one direction, achieve victory there
and then mass their forces on the other side.
When that war would be
fought, which strategy the Germans chose and ultimately whether it would
succeed were uncertainties. But unlike Tuchman's view of the war, a war that
began with a German strike was inevitable. The war was not the result of a
misunderstanding. Rather, it was the result of economic and strategic realities.
The Germans struck against
the French first but failed to defeat them. They were therefore trapped in the
two-front war that they had dreaded, but they were at least fully mobilized and
could resist. A second opportunity to implement their strategy occurred in the
winter of 1917, when an uprising took place against the Russian czar, who
abdicated on March 15, 1917. (Germany actually set the revolution in
motion in March by repatriating Lenin back to Russia via the infamous sealed
train car.) There was serious concern that the Russians might pull out of the
war, and in any case, their military had deteriorated massively. A German
victory there seemed not only possible, but likely. If that happened, and if
German forces in Russia were transferred to France, it was likely that they
could mass an offensive that would defeat the British and French.
In April 1917, the
United States declared war on Germany. There were multiple reasons, including
the threat that German submarines might close the Atlantic to American
shipping, but also the fear that events in Russia might defeat the allies. The
United States had a deep interest in making certain
that the Eurasian landmass would not fall under the control of any single
nation. The manpower, resources and technology under the control of the Germans
would more than outmatch the United States. It could not live with a German
victory, and therefore within a year it had sent more than a million men to
Europe and helped counter the German offensive after the October
1917 Russian Revolution pulled Russia from the war. The peace treaty ceded
Ukraine to the Germans, placing Russia in danger if the Germans defeated
the Anglo-French alliance. Ultimately, the American intervention defeated the
Germans, and the Russians regained Ukraine.
The American intervention
was decisive and defined American strategy in Eurasia for a century. It would
maintain the balance of power. As the balance shifted, Washington would
increase aid and, if absolutely necessary, intervene decisively in the context
of an existing and effective military alliance.
World War II was fought
similarly. The Germans, again in a dangerous position, made an alliance with
the Soviets, assuring a single-front war, and this time defeated France. In due
course, Germany turned on Russia and attempted to dominate Eurasia decisively.
The United States was first neutral, then provided aid to the British and
Russians, and even after entering the war in December 1941 withheld its
main thrust until the last possible moment. The United States did invade North
Africa, Sicily and the rest of Italy, but these were marginal operations
on the periphery of German power. The decisive strike did not occur
until June 1944, after the German military had been significantly weakened
by a Soviet army heavily supplied by the United States. The decisive campaign
in northern Europe lasted less than a year, and was won with limited U.S.
losses compared to the other combatants. It was an intervention in the context
of a powerful military alliance.
In the Cold War, the Soviet
Union positioned itself by creating deep buffers. It held the Baltics, Belarus
and Ukraine as its first line of defense. Its second defensive tier consisted
of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the
Soviet buffer moved to the center of Germany on the North German Plain. Given history, the Soviets needed
to create as deep a buffer as possible, and this line effectively precluded an
attack on the Soviet Union.
The American response was
more active than in the first two wars, but not as decisive. The United States
positioned forces in West Germany in the context of a strong military
alliance. This alliance was likely insufficient to block a Soviet attack. The
United States promised the delivery of additional troops in the event of war
and also guaranteed that if needed, it
was prepared to use nuclear weapons to stop a Soviet attack.
The model was in that sense
similar. The hope was to maintain the balance of power with minimal American
exposure. In the event the balance broke, the United States was prepared to
send substantially more troops. In the worst case, the United States claimed to
be prepared to use decisive force. The important thing to note was that the
United States retained the option to reinforce and go nuclear. The Soviets
never attacked, in part because they didn't need to -- they were not at risk --
and in part because the risk associated with an attack was too high.
Thus, the United States
followed a consistent strategy in all three wars. First, it avoided
overexposure, limiting its presence to the minimum needed. The United States
wasn't present in World War I until very late. In World War II, America's
presence consisted of peripheral operations at relatively low cost. In the Cold War, it positioned a force sufficient to convince
the Soviets of American intent, but always under its control and always poised
for full intervention at the latest opportune time, with minimal losses,
in the context of an effective military alliance.
The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the revolutions of 1989 stripped away the buffers that the
Soviets had captured in World War II. Their strategic position was worse than
it was before the world wars or even since the 17th century. If the inner
buffer, the Baltics, Belarus or Ukraine, were to become hostile and part of a
Western alliance system, the threat to Russia would be overwhelming. The
Baltics were admitted to NATO and the alliance was now less than 100 miles
from St. Petersburg. If Ukraine and Belarus went the same route, then the city
of Smolensk, once deep in the Soviet Union and the Russian empire, would be a
border town, and the distance to Moscow from NATO territory would be 250 miles.
The mitigating factor was
that NATO was weak and fragmented. This was not much of a consolation for the
Russians, who had seen Germany transform from a weak and fragmented country in
1932 to a massive power by 1938. Where there is an industrial base, military
capability can be rapidly generated and intentions can change overnight.
Therefore, for Russia, preventing the Western alliance system from absorbing
Ukraine was critical, as the events of previous months have shown.
The U.S. Approach
The American strategy in Europe
remains the same as it was in 1914: to allow the European balance of power to
manage itself. Public statements aside, the United States was comfortable with
the weakness of European powers so long as the Russians were also weak. There
was no threat of a hegemon emerging. The American strategy was, as always, to
let the balance maintain itself, intervene with any aid needed to maintain the
balance and intervene militarily in the context of a robust alliance at the
decisive moment and not before.
It follows from this that
the United States is not prepared to do more than engage in symbolic efforts
right now. The Russian military may be able to capture Ukraine, although the
logistical challenges are serious. But the United States is not in a position to
deploy a decisive defensive force in Ukraine. The shift in the European balance
of power is far from decisive, and the United States has time to watch the
situation develop.
At this point, the United
States is likely prepared to increase the availability of weapons to the
countries I will visit, along with Bulgaria and the Baltics. But the United
States' problem is that its historical strategy relies on the existence of a
significant military force, and where multiple countries are involved, a
working alliance. It is pointless for the United States to provide weapons to
countries that will not cooperate with each other and are incapable of fielding
sufficient force to use these weapons.
Since the events in
Ukraine, many European countries have discussed increased defense spending and
cooperation. It is not clear that NATO is a vehicle for this cooperation. As we
saw during the meetings between U.S. President Barack Obama and German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany's willingness to engage in assertive action
is limited. In southern Europe, the economic crisis still rages. The appetite
of the British and French or the Iberians to become involved is limited. It is
hard to see NATO playing an effective military role.
The United States looks at
this as a situation where the exposed countries must take decisive steps. For
the United States, there is no emergency. For Poland, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania, Serbia and Azerbaijan, along with the other countries along the buffer
line, there is not yet an emergency. But one could materialize with surprising
speed. The Russians are not intrinsically powerful, but they are more powerful
than any of these countries alone, or even together. Given American strategy,
the United States would be prepared to begin providing aid, but substantial aid
requires substantial action on the part of the buffer countries.
The first and second world
wars were about the status of Germany in Europe. That was what the Cold War was
about as well, although framed in a different way. We are once again discussing
the status of Germany. Today it has no western threat. The eastern threat
is weak, far away and potentially more of an ally than a threat. The force that
drove Germany in two world wars is not there now. Logically, it has little reason
to take risks.
The American fear of a
Eurasian hegemon is also a distant one. Russia is far from being able to pose
that kind of threat. It is still struggling to regain its buffers. Just as
Germany is not prepared to engage in aggressive actions, the United States
will continue its century-old strategy of limiting its exposure for as
long as possible. At the same time, the buffer countries face a potential
threat that prudence requires they prepare for.
However, it is not clear
that the Russian threat will materialize, and it is not clear that, rhetoric
aside, the Russians have the political will to act decisively. The buffer
states' optimal solution would be a massive NATO intervention. That won't
happen. The second best would be a massive American intervention. That
won't happen either. The buffer states want to shift the cost of their defense
to others -- a rational strategy if they can achieve it.
The impersonal forces of
geopolitics are driving Russia to try to retake its critical borderland. Having done that, the nations bordering Russian power will not
know how far the Russians will try to go. For Russia, the deeper the buffer,
the better. But the deeper the buffer, the higher the cost of maintaining it.
The Russians are not ready for any such move. But over time, as their strength
and confidence grow, their actions become less predictable. When facing a
potential existential threat, the prudent action is to overreact.
The buffer states need to arm and ally. The United States will provide a degree of support, regardless of
what the Germans, and therefore NATO, do. But the basic decision is in the
hands of the Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Serbians and Azerbaijanis,
along with those in the other buffer states. Some, like Azerbaijan, have
already made the decision to arm and are looking for an alliance. Some, like
Hungary, are watching and waiting. Mark Twain is supposed to have said,
"History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme." There is a rhyme
that we can hear. It is in its early stages and few are yet locked into a
course as Germany was in 1914. The forces are beginning to gather, and if they
do, they will not be controlled by good will.
I will be listening for
that rhyme on this trip. I need to see if it is there. And if it is, I need to
see if those most at risk to its verses hear it too. I will let you know what I
hear.
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