After reading this, one cannot help but be optimistic for China. The Credit bubble is focused and external to the internal cash flow of the country and a complete write down would produce far less damage than thought. The whole country could go chapter eleven and do just fine.
The slow down has come because the excess building is
presently curtailed. Yet this releases manpower back into the
economy which is now operating at close to full utilization since
about three years ago.
At the same time, wages are actually now rising
everywhere and this is warming up the internal economy and we have a
seriously stable manufacturing sector.
Looking at the Middle Kingdom with Fresh Eyes
BY JOHN MAULDIN
MAY 31, 2014
I am writing this
introductory note from London during a layover on my way to Rome, and
I’ll append a personal ending tonight after I finally make my way
back from dinner to the hotel
.
One
of the few consensus ideas that I took away from the
Strategic Investment
Conference is that China has the potential to become a real
problem. It seemed to me that almost everyone who addressed the topic
was either seriously alarmed at the extent of China’s troubles or
merely very worried. Perhaps it was the particular group of speakers
we had, but no one was sanguine. If you recall, a few weeks back I
introduced my young colleague and protégé Worth Wray to you; and
his inaugural Thoughts from the Frontlinefocused on China, a
topic on which he is well-versed, having lived and studied there. Our
conversations often center on China and emerging markets
(and we tend to talk and write to each other a lot). While
I’m on the road, Worth is once again visiting China in this week’s
letter, summing up our research and contributing his own unique style
and passion. I think regular TFTF readers are going to enjoy Worth’s
occasional missives and will want to see more of them over time. Now,
let’s turn it over to my able young Cajun friend.
Editors’ note: With John up to his eyeballs in
prosecco and peaches there on the patio in Trequanda this morning and
with Worth just getting the sleep out of his eyes in Houston, we are
hereby making an executive decision to split this
22-page beast masterpiece right up its middle and bring you
the second half next week … which will give both these guys some
well-earned rest! – Charley & Lisa Sweet
Looking at the Middle Kingdom with Fresh Eyes
By Worth Wray (Houston, TX)
In my Thoughts from
the Frontline debut this past March (“China’s Minsky
Moment?”), I highlighted the massive bubble in Chinese
private-sector debt
and explored the near-term prospects for either (1) a
reform-induced slowdown or (2) a crisis-induced recession.
Unfortunately, it was not an easy or straightforward analysis,
considering the glaring inconsistencies between “official”
state-compiled data and more concrete measures of real economic
activity.
More Questions Than Answers
Although John and I spend hours every week
searching for the truth in a murky stream of official and unofficial
reports, we always reach the same conclusion about the People’s
Republic: There is really no way to know what is happening in
China today, much less what will happen tomorrow, based on widely
available data. The primary data is flawed at best and manipulated at
worst. Sometimes the most revealing insights lie in the disagreement
between the official and unofficial reports… suggesting that
official data is useful only to the extent that we think about it as
state-sanctioned propaganda. In other words, it tells us what Chinese
policymakers want the world to believe.
This shortfall in
credible and actionable data from one of the global economy’s
largest and most interconnected members leaves us with more questions
than answers – especially in the presence of a massive Chinese
credit
bubble, with clear signs of overinvestment and unsustainably high
debt-service ratios. These are troubling signs for all investors, in
every asset class, everywhere in the world today… and everyone
should be paying close attention.
(I should note that John
has access to a massive amount of research from a very wide
variety of both traditional and nontraditional sources… and I say
that after having extraordinary access myself as the portfolio
strategist for an $18B Texas money manager. I am seeing and reading
things every day that I could only imagine before, and the
information flow is addictive. John’s sources give us a big, if
sometimes overwhelming, head start on thinking through all the
implications for investing
around the constant collisions of macroeconomic forces.
While we legally and ethically cannot share some of the best research
we see, we can share a lot of the core ideas and do our best to give
you a head start, too. That’s what this letter is about.)
Read the Tea Leaves Carefully & Expect
Miscues
Most China economists –
who do the best they can to read the economic tea leaves by focusing
on a handful of economic indicators ranging from gross domestic
product (GDP), purchasing managers’ indices (PMI),
consumer/producer inflation (CPI/PPI), total social finance, and
industrial production – end up expressing a rather bipolar view on
Chinese economic activity, with wild swings in their outlooks from
quarter to quarter. On this front, I was particularly impressed by
an explosive letter (viewable by Over My
Shoulder subscribers
only) from our friends at Political Alpha, which
remains one of the elite political intelligence/analysis firms on the
Street. While China watchers tend to trade reactively around official
and unofficial manufacturing PMI releases as monthly proxies for the
broader economy, very few investors realize that “not only is
manufacturing no longer the bellwether of the [Chinese] economy, more
often than not it now performs counter-cyclically.”
Although China is the
world’s largest producer of value-added manufactured goods, it has
not been an export-led economy for a very long time. As I
detailed in last month’s letter, China’s growth has largely
relied on extraordinarily high levels of fixed investment,
supported by even higher levels of domestic savings and an
unsustainable rise in private-sector credit
.
Even so, industry experts often fall into the trap of
extrapolating flash manufacturing readings into forecasts for the
broader economy.
Our friends at Political Alpha describe one such
situation where HSBC’s China team (which puts out the unofficial
monthly PMI each month in partnership with MarkIt) “was forced to
backpedal from its September 23rd announcement that the flash
PMI data was ‘further evidence [of] China’s ongoing growth
rebound’ to a much more somber conclusion just seven days
later: ‘There are still a lot of structural headwinds ahead.
This is as good as it gets for the time being…. [D]on’t expect
too sharp an acceleration from here.’”
Feel free to compare the clips yourself:
- HSBC release on 9/23: http://www.cnbc.com/id/101053388
- HSBC release on 9/29: http://www.cnbc.com/id/101071631
On a side note, I don’t mean to disparage the
China research team at HSBC or question their competency by
reprinting the comments above. I’m sure they get up each morning
(just like I do) with a genuine intent to understand changing
economic conditions as best they can and to help their clients
protect and grow their savings. If anything, this example is a
broader indictment of investors’ widespread reliance on a handful
of flawed or misunderstood data points in the absence of credible
Chinese economic data.
I don’t mean to be cute
or coy on this issue. The lack of transparency of the Chinese economy
is not just a problem for individual and institutional investors who
make the choice every day to put their money
at risk; it also carries enormous policy implications for
central bankers and elected politicians in a highly unstable global
system where total debt-to-GDP has risen across the world’s major
economies by nearly 35% since 2008… and continues to rise.
###
As you can see in the table above (which Dr. Lacy Hunt was kind enough to share with us at this year’s Strategic Investment Conference), China has seen its total debt-to-income ratio jump by more than 100% (another full turn of GDP) in the last five years… more debt growth than any other major economy on the planet, including Japan.
Pulling Back the Bamboo Curtain
Fortunately, my last
letter on China’s debt build-up sparked a flurry of introductions
and fresh conversations with investors, economists, and policymakers
from around the world – in places like London, Spain, South Africa,
Singapore, Dubai, Australia, Hong Kong, and Finland. Of course, John
has also eagerly introduced me to many of his close friends (who
happen to be serious A-list economists and money managers
)… so needless to say, it has been an incredibly fun and
enlightening couple of months.
But John introduced me to one man, in particular,
who was able to pull back the curtain on the Chinese economy in a way
I had not imagined… and it feels like I am looking at the Middle
Kingdom with fresh eyes.
Meet Leland
Miller, President of China Beige Book International. Along with
Dr. Craig Charney, who oversees the firm’s vast research efforts,
Leland spearheads the effort to supply the world’s elite
institutions (from central banks and heads of state to
multinationals, mega-banks, and hedge funds
) with a comprehensive look into China’s economy, by applying
the same survey methodology employed by each of the regional US
Federal Reserve Banks in preparing their submissions for the
national Beige Book
.
Aside from the fact that
Leland is an Oxford-educated China historian, a brilliant economist,
and a genuinely nice guy, what first caught my attention was his
remarkable track record of contrarian calls since the inaugural issue
of the China Beige Book in Q1 2012… from the initial
slowdown; to unexpected bounces in economic activity; and even
the June 2013 cash crunch where interbank interest rates
spiked dramatically in a matter of weeks, signaling that a
wave of defaults was on the way. (I should note that John has sat on
China Beige Book International’s advisory board and has worked
closely with Leland for most of the firm’s history.)
Before
we proceed, here is a short but important description of the history
and methodology behind the China Beige Book
. Although survey data
has its limits in any economy, this is as good as it
gets for a semi-closed economy like China’s.
Beginning in early 2010, our team set out to
craft a Chinese analogue of the US Federal Reserve’s Beige
Book. Over the next twelve months, we conducted a study of
the Beige Book and the methods used to prepare it,
including contact with officials at each of the regional Federal
Reserve Banks involved in its preparation. We then worked to develop
a method that would be similar, but more comprehensive and
systematic, in its approach to the world’s second largest economy –
a Beige Book “with Chinese characteristics.”
Our approach
triangulates three methods, repeated every quarter: a
quantitative survey
of over 2,000 leading firms from key sectors across the
country; qualitative one-on-one in-depth discussions with C-Suite
executives in the same industries across every region; and a
separate, targeted banker survey of loan officers and branch
managers, designed to home in on the complexities of both
the official and shadow economies. With the data from this approach,
we are able to compare regions and industries within a quarter, as
well as track changes over time, both in near and real time.
The result of these
efforts is the largest and most comprehensive survey
series ever conducted on a closed or semi-closed economy…
I cannot share the
report in its entirety or reveal too much of its contents, but Leland
did give me permission to share part of the regional overviews and
research highlights from the Q1 2014 report. If you are able and
willing to pay the six-figure annual subscription fee, Leland’s work
will blow your mind and dramatically change your
perspective. For the rest of us, the following excerpt can at least
point us in the right direction… and I am discovering that
Leland’s media interviews and tweets (@ChinaBeigeBook)
are quite telling, as well. (You can also follow John and me on
Twitter at @JohnFMauldin and@WorthWray, respectively.)
Region 1: Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
Growth slowed – retail
& real estate gains weakening sharply – despite
stability in manufacturing and pickups
in services, transport, and agriculture. Borrowing was
stable with rates down at banks and up at non-bank lenders. Hiring
slowed, as did margin growth. On-quarter weakness was modest, but the
on-year drop was worrisome.
Region 2: Guangdong, Fujian
Despite the national
slowdown, Guangdong’s pickup continued, driven
by manufacturing and transport. Growth was steady in retail, off in
services and property. Wage growth remained high but
costs inflation eased, boosting margins. Borrowing ticked up,
with bank rates
steady and shadow rates up. The export power-house found an
encouraging second wind.
Region 3: Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Hebei
The capital region saw
Q1’s worst results, due to trouble in services and
manufacturing. Property and mining were stable, retail
slightly better. Margin growth suffered. Borrowing was stable and
moved to banks, on the country’s lowest interest rates
. Beijing is leading the national economic slowdown.
Region 4: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning
The Northeast slowed as mining contracted and
manufacturing, property, and farming growth eased. Services was
stable and retail saw a pick-up. Hiring and wages
strengthened, while pricing weakened, pressuring
margins. Borrowing ticked up, rates easing. Rebalancing does not look
easy in this old industrial region.
Region 5: Hubei, Henan, Chongqing, Sichuan,
Anhui, Jiangxi
Growth slowed
sharply, slipping in retail, services, property, farming,
and mining, with only manufacturing stable. Hiring was steady but
input costs grew faster, narrowing margin gains. Borrowing slid
again, with lower interest rates
in both formal and shadow finance – not an encouraging
trend.
Region 6: Shaanxi, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia,
Ningxia
Growth took a hit, gains slowing in this crucial
mining sector. Manufacturing, real estate and, especially,
retail weakened. Services and transport were the bright
spots. Hiring and margin growth both eased. Borrowing was flat as
rates went up. The North remains dependent on struggling
mining.
Region 7: Guizhou, Guangxi, Yunnan, Hainan,
Hunan
Again out of sync with the rest of China, the
Southwest sped up. Manufacturing, transport, and mining improved, but
retail, services, and real estate saw growth slow. Hiring
and input costs picked up, but so did pricing and margins. Borrowing
ticked up, as shadow lenders’ rates moved back above banks’
rates.
Region 8: Xinjiang, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai
The West again boasted China’s best overall
growth, though manufacturing, retail, and services slowed. Only
property picked up, with mining and transport stable. Hiring and
input cost growth were steady, but pricing and margin growth eased.
Borrowing remained China’s least frequent as rates jumped.
The pace of Chinese
economic expansion has painfully slowed. Revenue, sales, profit
, and wage growth are all weaker than a year ago. The
slowdown is particularly steep in the North [region 6] and Northeast
[region 4] and also pronounced in Beijing [region 3] and Central
China (region 5).
By sector, stable first-quarter growth in
manufacturing confirms our long-standing thesis that it is no longer
the economy’s bellwether...
A bounce-back later this year is possible
The worst performer according to CBB figures,
both on-quarter and on-year, is real estate and construction.
While property companies are getting crushed, the sector is also
notoriously unstable for both structural and political reasons. It
would be no surprise if real estate were to rally before the end of
the year.
More immediate reason for optimism: Growth in new
domestic orders was solid (save in the Northeast), and domestic
orders and export orders were both stronger in powerhouse
Guangdong. The results do not indicate a boom later in 2014, but
they do suggest that linear forecasts of continued deterioration are
overly simplistic.
Financial segmentation is profound
The ongoing debates
about monetary policy assume that anticipated loosening or tightening
applies across the spectrum of borrowers. CBB data say otherwise, and
in multiple ways. First, while the number of firms reporting that
they borrowed stabilized in Q1, it did so at a very low level.
Shoving more liquidity at the credit market will have limited effects
until participation
expands. This includes RRR cuts – though of course these
may occur for political reasons.
Second, shadow finance
may be revving up for a comeback. CBB numbers show a recovery in the
sales of wealth management
products (WMPs), likely due to competition from online
banking. This is cash leaving the traditional banking sector and,
while non-bank lending did not pick up in the first quarter, the
groundwork is being laid for it to do so.
Online lenders
are typically viewed as a force for liberalization, as well
as a potentially healthier alternative to unregulated shadow finance.
Yet our data show their proliferation would impart significant costs
as well…
What appears to be
happening is the higher returns available in online banking are
forcing banks to move more transactions off-balance sheet, in order
to avoid the interest rate cap. While this may accommodate policy
goals in the short term, an uptick in off-balance sheet funding
portends more shadow bank lending down the line.
Interest rate spread between banks & shadow
banks highest in a year
Bank loan
rates and bond yields eased slightly this quarter, but the
cost of capital increased again for those borrowing from non-bank
lenders. While the shifts were not dramatic, the spread between bank
and non-bank loan rates nationwide is now the largest since Q1 2013.
This highlights the still more challenging road for those firms,
principally domestic private entities that are pushed outside formal
lending channels.
Growth Is Slowing But Not Collapsing (So Far…)
After reading through the latest
report, consulting with friends who are also familiar with the
research, and bombarding Leland with a never-ending stream of
questions for the last month, John and I still cannot claim to have
enough information to make a directional call on the world’s most
powerful (and least understood) macro force… but we know more about
the inner workings of China’s economy than we did when we wrote to
you a couple of months ago.
Great data often has
that effect – it’s like shining a light into the shadows
(including China’s shadow banks). We can see the nuanced regional
contrast in economic activity, the modest (but still insufficient)
rebalancing between sectors, and pressure points in the
credit markets
that suggest last summer’s interbank volatility may
return in 2014.
We also see a far more
mixed picture of economic activity than a lot of the widely followed
headline data suggests. The overall pace of Chinese economic growth
is clearly slowing but not collapsing. The credit transmission
mechanism is obviously broken, as you can see in the chart below
(with government and government-sponsored borrowers in
zombie industries consuming the majority of the country’s credit…
in turn forcing households to borrow through shadow banks at massive
risk premiums); but so far, the credit bubble is not imploding.
On that note, China
Beige Book
International is the only independent research firm in the
world that tracks the non-bank (shadow) lending rates not just
nationally, or by region, but for every sector
in every region over time. Leland and his team have
essentially solved the most difficult China puzzle of all: what is
true cost of capital in the Chinese economy, and who is able to
actually access it?
Of course – and Leland
was emphatic on this point – China’s greatest challenge will lie
in deleveraging the economy
while also rebalancing toward a
consumption-driven growth model for the first time in modern history.
That cannot happen as long as households remain repressed by unequal
access to credit markets or intentionally suppressed exchange rates,
which essentially represent a transfer of household wealth from
workers to state-favored firms. But reforming the system
will require a greater slowdown than China’s policymakers are
letting on. And, Leland warns, Beijing runs the risk of blowing its
credibility and instigating capital flight if the divergence between
official forecasts and China’s actual economic experience grows too
large.
To be continued next week
Trequanda, Nantucket, New York, and Maine
It is very early
Saturday morning here in Rome (still late Friday night in the US) as
I finish this letter, or at least my part of it. Worth is still up
and reworking this piece (I really can’t keep up with him); then
the editors
, Charley and Lisa Sweet, will do their final runs; and then a
whole team will make sure you get your letter. A far cry from the
early days when your humble analyst did everything. And the mistakes
I made showed up in print far more often. I am grateful to have a
whole group of dedicated people working to keep the machine humming.
In a few hours I will
meet George Gilder at the train station. I will buy a few local
phones (I already have local sim cards
for the iPads from the airport yesterday), find some cash,
and have lunch before we hop the train to Chiusi with my daughter
Melissa and some friends and then meet Tiffani and Lively, who are
already there with the cars. We’ll drive to Sinalunga to shop for
groceries and other stuff for the week before going the last short
leg to Trequanda.
Other guests will come
and go over the next few weeks, using the villa as a base to explore
the Tuscan region; but I will probably stay “home,” reading and
thinking and working out, doing some preliminary writing on my
next book
, and trying to take the speed of life down a gear or two.
Vacation for me is being in the same place for an extended period.
And getting to talk with Gilder in the evenings about our books is
such a treat. He is one of the finest
philosophical/sociological/economic/technological minds in the world
(in my opinion), and having him to talk with in the evening will help
me lay the proper intellectual framework for my book, though I have
to work on not distracting him too much.
Last night I had dinner
arranged here in Rome with my friend Steve Cucchiaro, his daughter
(who was celebrating her birthday), and his son. My group was running
late, even though our driver
from the airport was driving like we were in a Formula One
race. That is typical, but it was not long before we realized he was
also drunk and half mad, talking and gesturing to himself the entire
time. Obviously, we survived. When we got to our hotel, I was busy
getting people to get ready ASAP so we would not be too late. I asked
the concierge for directions, and he gave them to me but then said,
“Signor Mauldin, you cannot wear that to the Imago restaurant. It
is a very nice place.” I pointed out that I had not brought a tie,
and he offered me one. So I went to the room and called Steve to tell
him we would be a little late. He said jackets were required but no
ties.
It turned out he had
booked one of the finest places in Rome and got the corner window
table overlooking the Spanish Steps and St. Peter’s, with a
spectacular sunset/nighttime view. Another special night for
the memory book
.
It is time to hit the send button, as trains will
not wait. I will report from Tuscany next week, by which time Worth
and I should have China all figured out – not! But we’ll keep
after it. Also, I hope to summarize the speech I did in San Diego.
Until then have a great week!
Your thinking I need to get to China analyst,
John Mauldin
subscribers@mauldineconomics.com
1 comment:
A country that has systematically poisoned its land, air and water for the past 1/2 century. More or less corrupt from top to bottom.
They are also hierarchical from top to bottom. IE little meaningful feedback of useful information to the decision makers, and people get promoted by how much dick they suck. This is a recipe for focusing stupid.
They also have the highest young male to female ratio in the world.
How could one not see a coming disaster?
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