Let us not over state all this. the process of compaction has now clearly stalled. The long fifty year run up is over as we have run into real fundamental limits.
This will allow a horizontal expansion to mature and there are many elephants in the room. We may well have the necessary tools to create the Holodec. I want to use my cloud cosmology to simulate particle physics and the derived curvature. It this is our true operational limit, then it is no trick to establish a maximum resolution. All this leads to a deeply understood and visualized physics with actual limits we can then test.
In fact it may all be good news until we discover how to create photon processors hung on the architecture of dark matter. Certainly it allows us to identify an achievable scaling factor for all empirical and theoretical work.
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We’re not prepared for the end of Moore’s Law
It has fueled prosperity of the last 50 years. But the end is now in sight.
Gordon
Moore’s 1965 forecast that the number of components on an integrated
circuit would double every year until it reached an astonishing 65,000
by 1975 is the greatest technological prediction of the last
half-century. When it proved correct in 1975, he revised what has become
known as Moore’s Law to a doubling of transistors on a chip every two
years.
Since then, his prediction has defined the trajectory of technology and, in many ways, of progress itself.
Moore’s
argument was an economic one. Integrated circuits, with multiple
transistors and other electronic devices interconnected with aluminum
metal lines on a tiny square of silicon wafer, had been invented a few
years earlier by Robert Noyce at Fairchild Semiconductor. Moore, the
company’s R&D director, realized, as he wrote in 1965, that with
these new integrated circuits, “the cost per component is nearly
inversely proportional to the number of components.” It was a beautiful
bargain—in theory, the more transistors you added, the cheaper each one
got. Moore also saw that there was plenty of room for engineering
advances to increase the number of transistors you could affordably and
reliably put on a chip.
Soon
these cheaper, more powerful chips would become what economists like to
call a general purpose technology—one so fundamental that it spawns all
sorts of other innovations and advances in multiple industries. A few
years ago, leading economists credited the information technology made
possible by integrated circuits with a third of US productivity growth
since 1974. Almost every technology we care about, from smartphones to
cheap laptops to GPS, is a direct reflection of Moore’s prediction. It
has also fueled today’s breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and
genetic medicine, by giving machine-learning techniques the ability to
chew through massive amounts of data to find answers.
But
how did a simple prediction, based on extrapolating from a graph of the
number of transistors by year—a graph that at the time had only a few
data points—come to define a half-century of progress? In part, at
least, because the semiconductor industry decided it would.
Moore
wrote that “cramming more components onto integrated circuits,” the
title of his 1965 article, would “lead to such wonders as home
computers—or at least terminals connected to a central
computer—automatic controls for automobiles, and personal portable
communications equipment.” In other words, stick to his road map of
squeezing ever more transistors onto chips and it would lead you to the
promised land. And for the following decades, a booming industry, the
government, and armies of academic and industrial researchers poured
money and time into upholding Moore’s Law, creating a self-fulfilling
prophecy that kept progress on track with uncanny accuracy. Though the
pace of progress has slipped in recent years, the most advanced chips
today have nearly 50 billion transistors.
Every
year since 2001, MIT Technology Review has chosen the 10 most important
breakthrough technologies of the year. It’s a list of technologies
that, almost without exception, are possible only because of the
computation advances described by Moore’s Law.
For
some of the items on this year’s list the connection is obvious:
consumer devices, including watches and phones, infused with AI;
climate-change attribution made possible by improved computer modeling
and data gathered from worldwide atmospheric monitoring systems; and
cheap, pint-size satellites. Others on the list, including quantum
supremacy, molecules discovered using AI, and even anti-aging treatments
and hyper-personalized drugs, are due largely to the computational
power available to researchers.
But
what happens when Moore’s Law inevitably ends? Or what if, as some
suspect, it has already died, and we are already running on the fumes of
the greatest technology engine of our time?
RIP
“It’s
over. This year that became really clear,” says Charles Leiserson, a
computer scientist at MIT and a pioneer of parallel computing, in which
multiple calculations are performed simultaneously.
The newest Intel fabrication plant, meant to build chips with minimum feature sizes of 10 nanometers, was much delayed, delivering chips in 2019, five years after the previous generation of chips with 14-nanometer features. Moore’s Law, Leiserson says, was always about the rate of progress, and “we’re no longer on that rate.” Numerous other prominent computer scientists have also declared Moore’s Law dead in recent years. In early 2019, the CEO of the large chipmaker Nvidia agreed.
The newest Intel fabrication plant, meant to build chips with minimum feature sizes of 10 nanometers, was much delayed, delivering chips in 2019, five years after the previous generation of chips with 14-nanometer features. Moore’s Law, Leiserson says, was always about the rate of progress, and “we’re no longer on that rate.” Numerous other prominent computer scientists have also declared Moore’s Law dead in recent years. In early 2019, the CEO of the large chipmaker Nvidia agreed.
In
truth, it’s been more a gradual decline than a sudden death. Over the
decades, some, including Moore himself at times, fretted that they could
see the end in sight, as it got harder to make smaller and smaller
transistors. In 1999, an Intel researcher worried that the industry’s
goal of making transistors smaller than 100 nanometers by 2005 faced
fundamental physical problems with “no known solutions,” like the
quantum effects of electrons wandering where they shouldn’t be.
For
years the chip industry managed to evade these physical roadblocks. New
transistor designs were introduced to better corral the electrons. New
lithography methods using extreme ultraviolet radiation were invented
when the wavelengths of visible light were too thick to precisely carve
out silicon features of only a few tens of nanometers. But progress grew
ever more expensive. Economists at Stanford and MIT have calculated
that the research effort going into upholding Moore’s Law has risen by a
factor of 18 since 1971.
Likewise,
the fabs that make the most advanced chips are becoming prohibitively
pricey. The cost of a fab is rising at around 13% a year, and is
expected to reach $16 billion or more by 2022. Not coincidentally, the
number of companies with plans to make the next generation of chips has
now shrunk to only three, down from eight in 2010 and 25 in 2002.
Nonetheless,
Intel—one of those three chipmakers—isn’t expecting a funeral for
Moore’s Law anytime soon. Jim Keller, who took over as Intel’s head of
silicon engineering in 2018, is the man with the job of keeping it
alive. He leads a team of some 8,000 hardware engineers and chip
designers at Intel. When he joined the company, he says, many were
anticipating the end of Moore’s Law. If they were right, he recalls
thinking, “that’s a drag” and maybe he had made “a really bad career
move.”
But
Keller found ample technical opportunities for advances. He points out
that there are probably more than a hundred variables involved in
keeping Moore’s Law going, each of which provides different benefits and
faces its own limits. It means there are many ways to keep doubling the
number of devices on a chip—innovations such as 3D architectures and
new transistor designs.
These
days Keller sounds optimistic. He says he has been hearing about the
end of Moore’s Law for his entire career. After a while, he “decided not
to worry about it.” He says Intel is on pace for the next 10 years, and
he will happily do the math for you: 65 billion (number of transistors)
times 32 (if chip density doubles every two years) is 2 trillion
transistors. “That’s a 30 times improvement in performance,” he says,
adding that if software developers are clever, we could get chips that
are a hundred times faster in 10 years.
Still,
even if Intel and the other remaining chipmakers can squeeze out a few
more generations of even more advanced microchips, the days when you
could reliably count on faster, cheaper chips every couple of years are
clearly over. That doesn’t, however, mean the end of computational
progress.
Time to panic
Neil
Thompson is an economist, but his office is at CSAIL, MIT’s sprawling
AI and computer center, surrounded by roboticists and computer
scientists, including his collaborator Leiserson. In a new paper, the
two document ample room for improving computational performance through
better software, algorithms, and specialized chip architecture.
One
opportunity is in slimming down so-called software bloat to wring the
most out of existing chips. When chips could always be counted on to get
faster and more powerful, programmers didn’t need to worry much about
writing more efficient code. And they often failed to take full
advantage of changes in hardware architecture, such as the multiple
cores, or processors, seen in chips used today.
Thompson
and his colleagues showed that they could get a computationally
intensive calculation to run some 47 times faster just by switching from
Python, a popular general-purpose programming language, to the more
efficient C. That’s because C, while it requires more work from the
programmer, greatly reduces the required number of operations, making a
program run much faster. Further tailoring the code to take full
advantage of a chip with 18 processing cores sped things up even more.
In just 0.41 seconds, the researchers got a result that took seven hours
with Python code.
That
sounds like good news for continuing progress, but Thompson worries it
also signals the decline of computers as a general purpose technology.
Rather than “lifting all boats,” as Moore’s Law has, by offering ever
faster and cheaper chips that were universally available, advances in
software and specialized architecture will now start to selectively
target specific problems and business opportunities, favoring those with
sufficient money and resources.
Indeed,
the move to chips designed for specific applications, particularly in
AI, is well under way. Deep learning and other AI applications
increasingly rely on graphics processing units (GPUs) adapted from
gaming, which can handle parallel operations, while companies like
Google, Microsoft, and Baidu are designing AI chips for their own
particular needs. AI, particularly deep learning, has a huge appetite
for computer power, and specialized chips can greatly speed up its
performance, says Thompson.
But
the trade-off is that specialized chips are less versatile than
traditional CPUs. Thompson is concerned that chips for more general
computing are becoming a backwater, slowing “the overall pace of
computer improvement,” as he writes in an upcoming paper, “The Decline
of Computers as a General Purpose Technology.”
At
some point, says Erica Fuchs, a professor of engineering and public
policy at Carnegie Mellon, those developing AI and other applications
will miss the decreases in cost and increases in performance delivered
by Moore’s Law. “Maybe in 10 years or 30 years—no one really knows
when—you’re going to need a device with that additional computation
power,” she says.
The
problem, says Fuchs, is that the successors to today’s general purpose
chips are unknown and will take years of basic research and development
to create. If you’re worried about what will replace Moore’s Law, she
suggests, “the moment to panic is now.” There are, she says, “really
smart people in AI who aren’t aware of the hardware constraints facing
long-term advances in computing.” What’s more, she says, because
application--specific chips are proving hugely profitable, there are few
incentives to invest in new logic devices and ways of doing computing.
Wanted: A Marshall Plan for chips
In
2018, Fuchs and her CMU colleagues Hassan Khan and David Hounshell
wrote a paper tracing the history of Moore’s Law and identifying the
changes behind today’s lack of the industry and government collaboration
that fostered so much progress in earlier decades. They argued that
“the splintering of the technology trajectories and the short-term
private profitability of many of these new splinters” means we need to
greatly boost public investment in finding the next great computer
technologies.
If
economists are right, and much of the growth in the 1990s and early
2000s was a result of microchips—and if, as some suggest, the sluggish
productivity growth that began in the mid-2000s reflects the slowdown in
computational progress—then, says Thompson, “it follows you should
invest enormous amounts of money to find the successor technology. We’re
not doing it. And it’s a public policy failure.”
There’s
no guarantee that such investments will pay off. Quantum computing,
carbon nanotube transistors, even spintronics, are enticing
possibilities—but none are obvious replacements for the promise that
Gordon Moore first saw in a simple integrated circuit. We need the
research investments now to find out, though. Because one prediction is
pretty much certain to come true: we’re always going to want more
computing power.
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