As anyone can understand using mere common sense,
something is seriously wrong in the US financial system. Massive printing of fresh currency has been
ongoing to patch up the losses, and these are all losses in which the money has
long been spent.
In the meantime we are struggling to finance new
capital investments in the face of a contracting credit bubble.
When a credit bubble blossoms, it is far too easy
to paper over past mistakes by simply rolling them forward as has
happened. When the reversal comes, all
the weak crap comes home to roost.
My point in all this is that everyone who ever
signed off on this garbage did so knowingly and was by any definition guilty of
treason. Restoration of trust will need
to see all these folks incarcerated and sent through the criminal justice
system for the capital crime of treason.
It will obviously need a new president to call the
boys to account.
Prosecuting Wall Street Fraud: The US Economy is A Giant
Ponzi Scheme
By Washington 's
Blog
URL of this article:
Bill Gross, Nouriel Roubini, Laurence Kotlikoff, Steve Keen, Michel
Chossudovsky and the Wall Street Journal all say that the U.S.
economy is a giant Ponzi scheme.
Virtually all independent economists and financial experts say that rampant fraud was largely responsible for the financial crisis. See this and this.
But many on Wall Street and in D.C. - and many investors - believe that
we should just "go with the flow". They hope that we can restart our
economy and make some more money if we just let things continue the way they
are.
But the assumption that a system built on fraud can continue without
crashing is false.
In fact, top economists and financial experts agree that - unless fraud
is prosecuted - the economy cannot recover.
Fraud Leads to a Break Down in Trust and Instability in the Markets
As Alan Greenspan said recently:
Fraud creates very considerable instability in competitive markets. If
you cannot trust your counterparties, it would not work
Similarly, leading economist Anna Schwartz - co-author of the leading book on the Great Depression with Milton Friedman - told the Wall Street journal in 2008:
"The Fed ... has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of
liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the
balance sheets of financial firms are credible."
So even though the Fed has flooded the credit
markets with cash, spreads haven't budged because banks don't know who is still
solvent and who is not. This uncertainty,
says Ms. Schwartz, is "the basic problem in the credit market. Lending
freezes up when lenders are uncertain that would-be borrowers have the
resources to repay them. So to assume that the whole problem is inadequate
liquidity bypasses the real issue."
Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their ledgers --
"all these exotic securities that the market does not know how to
value."
"Why are they 'toxic'?" Ms. Schwartz asks. "They're
toxic because you cannot sell them, you don't know what they're
worth, your balance sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don't know whom to lend to because we
don't know who is sound. So if you could get rid of them, that would be an
improvement."
And economics professor and former Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich wrote in 2008:
The underlying problem isn't a liquidity problem. As I've noted
elsewhere, the problem is that lenders and investors don't trust they'll get
their money back because no one trusts that the numbers that purport to value
securities are anything but wishful thinking. The trouble, in a nutshell, is that the
financial entrepreneurship of recent years -- the derivatives, credit default
swaps, collateralized debt instruments, and so on -- has undermined all notion
of true value.
Robert Shiller - one of the top housing experts in the United States
- said recently that
failing to address the legal issues will cause Americans to lose faith in
business and the government:
Shiller said the danger of foreclosuregate -- the scandal in which it
has come to light that the biggest banks have routinely mishandled
homeownership documents, putting the legality of foreclosures and related sales
in doubt -- is a replay of the 1930s, when Americanslost faith that institutions such as business and
government were dealing fairly.
Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz says about the
failure to prosecute Wall Street fraud:
The legal system is supposed to be the codification of our norms and
beliefs, things that we need to make our system work. If the legal system is
seen as exploitative, then confidence in our whole system starts eroding. And that's really the problem that's going
on.
***
I think we ought to go do what we did in the S&L [crisis] and actually put many of these guys in prison. Absolutely. These are not just white-collar crimes or little accidents. There were victims. That's the point. There were victims all over the world.
***
Economists focus on the whole notion of incentives. People have an incentive sometimes to behave badly, because they can make more money if they can cheat. If our economic system is going to work then we have to make sure that what they gain when they cheat is offset by a system of penalties.
***
I think we ought to go do what we did in the S&L [crisis] and actually put many of these guys in prison. Absolutely. These are not just white-collar crimes or little accidents. There were victims. That's the point. There were victims all over the world.
***
Economists focus on the whole notion of incentives. People have an incentive sometimes to behave badly, because they can make more money if they can cheat. If our economic system is going to work then we have to make sure that what they gain when they cheat is offset by a system of penalties.
Wall Street insider and New York Times columnist Andrew Ross
Sorkin writes:
“They will pick on minor misdemeanors by individual market
participants,” said David Einhorn, the hedge fund manager who was among the
Cassandras before the financial crisis. To Mr. Einhorn, the government is “not
willing to take on significant misbehavior by sizable” firms. “But since there have been almost no
big prosecutions, there’s very little evidence that it has stopped bad actors
from behaving badly.”
Fraud at big corporations
surely dwarfs by orders of magnitude the shareholders’ losses of $8 billion
that Mr. Holder highlighted. If the government spent half the
time trying to ferret out fraud at major companies that it does tracking
pump-and-dump schemes, we might have been able to stop the financial crisis, or
at least we’d have a fighting chance at stopping the next one.
Economics professor James Galbraith says:
There will have to be full-scale investigation and cleaning up of the
residue of that, before you can have, I think, a return of confidence in the financial
sector. And that's a process which needs to get underway.
No wonder Galbraith says that
economists should move into the background, and "criminologists to the
forefront"
Failure to Stop Fraud and Prosecute Criminals Causes a Loss of Trust in
Government, Which Makes Government Less Effective
As Shiller stated in the quote above, the failure of government
officials to stop fraud and prosecute the financial fraudsters has caused a
lack of trust in government itself.
A psychologist wrote an essay published by the Wharton School
of Business arguing that
restoring trust is the key to recovery, and that trust cannot be restored until
wrongdoers are held accountable:
According to David M. Sachs, a training and supervision analyst at the Psychoanalytic Center
of Philadelphia , the crisis today is not one of confidence, but one of trust. "Abusive
financial practices were unchecked by personal moral controls that prohibit individual
criminal behavior, as in the case of [Bernard] Madoff, and by complex financial
manipulations, as in the case of AIG." The public, expecting to be
protected from such abuse, has suffered a trauma of loss similar to that after 9/11.
"Normal expectations of what is safe and dependable were abruptly
shattered," Sachs noted. "As is typical of post-traumatic states,
planning for the future could not be based on old assumptions about what is
safe and what is dangerous. A radical reversal of how to be gratified
occurred."
People now feel
more gratified saving money than spending it, Sachs suggested. They have
trouble trusting promises from the government because they feel the government
has let them down.
He framed his argument with a fictional patient named Betty Q. Public,
a librarian with two teenage children and a husband, John, who had recently
lost his job. "She felt betrayed because she and her husband had invested
conservatively and were double-crossed by dishonest, greedy businessmen, and now
she distrusted the government that had failed to protect them from corporate
dishonesty. Not only that, but she had little trust in things turning around
soon enough to enable her and her husband to accomplish their previous goals.
"By no means a sophisticated economist, she knew ... that some
people had become fantastically wealthy by misusing other people's money --
hers included," Sachs said. "In short, John and Betty had done
everything right and were being punished, while the dishonest people were going
unpunished."
Helping an individual recover from a traumatic experience provides a
useful analogy for understanding how to help the economy recover from its own
traumatic experience, Sachs pointed out. The public will need to "hold the perpetrators of the economic
disaster responsible and
take what actions they can to prevent them from harming the economy
again." In addition, the public will
have to see proof that government
and business leaders can behave responsibly before they will trust
them again, he
argued.
Government regulators know this - or at least pay lip service to it -
as well. For example, as the Director of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's enforcement division told Congress:
Recovery from the fallout of the financial crisis requires important
efforts on various fronts, and vigorous enforcement is an essential component,
as aggressive and even-handed enforcement will meet the public's fair
expectation that those whose violations of the law caused severe loss and
hardship will be held accountable. And vigorous law enforcement efforts will
help vindicate the principles that are fundamental to the fair and proper
functioning of our markets: that no one should have an unjust advantage in our
markets; that investors have a right to disclosure that complies with the
federal securities laws; and that there is a level playing field for all
investors.
If people don't trust their government to enforce the law, government
will become more and more impotent in addressing our economic problems. If
government leaders take action, the market will not necessarily respond as
expected. When government leaders make optimistic statements about the economy,
people will no longer believe them.
Trying to Cover Up the Truth Extends Financial Crises
Elizabeth Warren, William Black and others say that attempting
to cover up the truth extended Japan 's
financial problems into an entire "Lost Decade".
As Joseph Stiglitz said about Wall
Street fraud:
So the whole strategy of the banks has been to hide the losses, muddle
through and get the government to keep interest rates really low.
As long as we keep up this strategy, it's going to be a long time before the economy recovers ....
Pam Martens - who worked on Wall Street for 21 years - writes:
The massive losses by big Wall Street firms, now topping those of the
Great Depression in relative terms, have yet to be adequately explained. Wall
Street power players are obfuscating and Congress is too embarrassed or
frightened to ask, preferring to just throw money at the problem and hope it
goes away. But as job losses and foreclosures mount and pensions and 401(k)s
shrink, public policy measures to address the economic stresses require a full
set of unembellished facts...
It was four years after the crash of 1929 before the major titans of Wall Street were forced to give testimony under oath to Congress and the full magnitude of the fraud emerged. That delay may well have contributed to the depth and duration of the Great Depression. The modern-day Wall Street corruption hearings in Congress ... must now resume in earnest and with sworn testimony if we are to escape a similar fate.
To the extent that the government tries to cover up - instead of openly
discuss - financial fraud, it will only extend America 's economic malaise.
Failing to Prosecute Fraud Encourages Financial Players to Take Bigger
and More Blatantly Illegal Actions
Nobel prize winning economist George Akerlof has demonstrated that
failure to punish white collar criminals - and instead bailing them out-
creates incentives for more economic crimes and further destruction of the
economy in the future. Joseph Stiglitz, Professor Black, and many others agree.
See this, this and this.
It was largely fraud which brought down the financial system in 2008.
Unless we prosecute the fraudsters, they will do even bigger, stupider and more
blatantly illegal things in the future which will lead to even bigger crises.
Failure to Prosecute Fraud Exacerbates the Sovereign Debt Crisis
The governments of the world have spent trillions trying to paper over
the fraud and prop up the big, insolvent banks, instead of forcing them to
restructure and forcing bondholders and shareholders to take a haircut.
A study of 124 banking crises by the International Monetary Fund found that propping
banks which are only pretending to be solvent drives up the costs to the
country:
Existing empirical research has shown that providing assistance to
banks and their borrowers can be counterproductive, resulting in increased
losses to banks, which often abuse
forbearance to take unproductive risks at government expense. The
typical result of forbearance is a deeper hole in the net worth of banks, crippling tax burdens to finance bank bailouts, and
even more severe credit supply contraction and economic decline than would have
occurred in the absence of forbearance.
Cross-country analysis to date also shows that
accommodative policy measures (such as substantial liquidity support, explicit
government guarantee on financial institutions’ liabilities and forbearance
from prudential regulations) tend to be fiscally
costly and
that these particular policies do not necessarily accelerate the speed of
economic recovery.
All too often, central banks privilege stability over cost in the heat
of the containment phase: if so, they may too liberally extend loans to an illiquid bank which is almost certain to
prove insolvent anyway.
Also, closure of a nonviable bank is often delayed for too long, even when
there are clear signs of insolvency (Lindgren, 2003). Since bank closures face
many obstacles, there is a tendency to rely instead on blanket government
guarantees which, if the government’s fiscal and political position makes them
credible, can work albeit at the cost of placing the
burden on the budget,
typically squeezing future provision of needed public services.
The American banks and government have certainly pretended that all of
the big banks are solvent. As ABC wrote in October
2009:
The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve lied to
the American public last fall when they said that the first nine banks to
receive government bailout funds were healthy,
[the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program]
states in a new report released today.
Similarly, the stress tests were a complete and utter sham.
The government has given the giant banks huge amounts in loans and
guarantees based upon their false representations about their financial health.
The Fed has larded up its balance sheet with toxic assets from the banks.
Debt levels are also getting dangerously close to the level that they
become a drag on the economy. See this and this. When Keynesian
economists argue that debt does not harm the economy, they are talking about
debt incurred to pay for stimulus and
productive things for the economy. Butthrowing trillions at the giant
banks - who are mainly using the money to gamble - is not stimulus. It helps the executives of the big
banks and their shareholders and bondholders, but not the broader economy.
Indeed, attempting to prop up big, insolvent banks is preventing stimulus
from getting out into the economy.
Fraud Causes Growing Inequality, Which Undermines the Economy
Growing inequality is very harmful to our economy. Indeed, if wealth is
concentrated in too few hands, the "poker game" ends, as only too few
fat cats are left with all of the chips. See this, this, this and this.
Fraud benefits the wealthy more than the poor, because the big banks
and big companies have the inside knowledge and the resources to leverage fraud
into profits. Joseph Stiglitz noted in September
that giants like Goldman are using their size to manipulate the market. The
giants (especially Goldman Sachs) have also used high-frequency program trading
(making up between 40- 70% of all stock trades) which not only distorts the markets,
but which also lets the program trading giants take a sneak peak at what the
real traders are buying and selling, and then trade on the insider information.
See this, this, this, this and this.
Similarly, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America , Goldman Sachs, Citigroup,
and Morgan Stanley together hold 80% of the country's derivatives
risk, and 96% of the
exposure to credit derivatives. They use their dominance in the
market to manipulate the market.
Fraud disproportionally benefits the big players (and helps them to become big
in the first place), increasing inequality and warping the market.
Fraud Increases the Severity of Boom-Bust Cycles
More and more people - such as the Bank of International Settlements and Barons - are saying
that bubbles inevitably lead to busts, thus destabilizing the economy.
Professor Black says that fraud is
a large part of the
mechanism through which bubbles are blown.
Without strong laws against fraud, bubble after bubble will be blown,
guaranteeing that the financial system cannot be stabilized in a fundamental
sense.
Failure to Prosecute Fraud Is Worsening the Housing Crisis
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