It is an ugly story having to do with political expediency. What it certainly needed from an administrative point of view is a true regional authority able to properly capitalize and collect contribution from the State down. That authority would find it in its interest to promote full development at the stations and this can drive revenues as well in a beneficial partnership with the municipalities.
We have gone through a similar experience in Vancouver that works because matching funds are supplied by the Province and the Federal levels for the builds. Now we are hearing of a possible sub or even a rail connection to the north shore and general planned utility has served to eliminate plenty of automobile commuting.
I do think a regional authority that properly manages the general bus service can be a good start as is clearly shows us were the opportunities lie.
.. .
Why New York City Stopped Building Subways
Nearly 80 years ago, a construction standstill derailed the subway’s progress, leading to its present crisis. This is the story, decade by decade.
by Jonathan English
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
In
the first decades of the 20th century, New York City experienced an
unprecedented infrastructure boom. Iconic bridges, opulent railway
terminals, and much of what was then the world’s largest underground and
rapid transit network were constructed in just 20 years. Indeed, that
subway system grew from a single line in 1904 to a network hundreds of
miles long by the 1920s. It spread rapidly into undeveloped land across
upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs, bringing a wave of apartment
houses alongside.
Then
it stopped. Since December 16, 1940, New York has not opened another
new subway line, aside from a handful of small extensions and
connections. Unlike most other great cities, New York’s rapid transit
system remains frozen in time: Commuters on their iPhones are standing
in stations scarcely changed from nearly 80 years ago.
Indeed,
in some ways, things have moved backward. The network is actually
considerably smaller than it was during the Second World War, and
today’s six million daily riders are facing constant delays,
infrastructure failures, and alarmingly crowded cars and platforms.
Why
did New York abruptly stop building subways after the 1940s? And how
did a construction standstill that started nearly 80 years ago lead to
the present moment of transit crisis?
Three
broad lines of history provide an explanation. The first is the postwar
lure of the suburbs and the automobile—the embodiment of modernity in
its day. The second is the interminable battles of control between the
city and the private transit companies, and between the city and the
state government. The third is the treadmill created by rising costs and
the buildup of deferred maintenance—an ever-expanding maintenance
backlog that eventually consumed any funds made available for expansion.
To
see exactly how and why New York’s subway went off the rails requires
going all the way back to the beginning. What follows is a 113-year
timeline of the subway’s history, organized by these three narratives
(with the caveat that no history is fully complete). Follow along
chronologically or thematically for the historical context of the
system's sorry state, or use a playful “map” of the subway's decline.
1904: First subway opens
The
private Interborough Rapid Transit company opened the first underground
subway line in 1904, stretching from West Harlem to Grand Central.
After taking over the existing elevated railways, it created a
near-monopoly on rapid transit in Manhattan and the Bronx. The Brooklyn
Rapid Transit company dominated the elevated transit business in that
borough, as well as its connections to Manhattan.
1913: The “Dual Contracts”
In
an agreement called the “Dual Contracts,” the city entrusted the two
private subway companies with a radical expansion of the system. Almost
immediately, municipal leaders regretted the decision. Many were
dissatisfied with the financial return from the investment of over $200
million—more than half the total cost of construction.
The
dispute went beyond mere finance, however: The subway became a symbol
of the battle between public and private interest, and a populist
touchstone for a succession of mayors. Their most important leverage was
control of the subway fare: By refusing to let the private companies
charge more than a nickel for decades, inflation meant that in 1948
riders were effectively paying less than half what they had been paying
in 1904.
1922: Independent Subway
Opposition
to the private transit duopoly was the centerpiece of Mayor John
Hylan’s administration. He announced a vast new “Independent” subway
system, to be built and owned by the municipal government. Unlike
earlier subway lines, which pushed deep into undeveloped territory, many
of the IND lines closely paralleled existing private routes in order to
compete with them.
The real estate industry was one of the most important
constituencies supporting the development of the subway system in the
early years. Developers enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the
subway, which was extended into empty fields that were then swiftly and
profitably blanketed with apartment houses whose residents then filled
the trains. With the construction of the IND, that bargain began to
break down—they saw new subways as more of a tax burden than a generator
of big speculative profits.
1939: World’s Fair
As visitors to New York’s 1939 World’s Fair gazed on General
Motors’ vision of the world to come at its Futurama exhibit, they
didn’t see new trains and subways. Instead, they saw cars traveling
quickly on wide new superhighways to bungalows in a bucolic landscape.
The car was viewed as the height of modernity; many dismissed public
transit as a grimy relic of an earlier age. The postwar federal
government would spend what it took to make the suburban dream come
true.
1940: City takes over the private subways
Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia took advantage of the disastrous
finances of the BMT and IRT, ravaged by the Depression and the ban on
fare increases, to acquire both companies. That strained the city’s
resources, with a total cost of $326,248,000. The cost was not much
lower than that of building the entire IND network, and while it did
unify the system, it didn’t produce a single additional mile of subway.
1940: Sixth Avenue subway opens
The Sixth Avenue line was one of the core segments of the
IND’s Manhattan network. It was to be followed soon after by the Second
Avenue line, but New Yorkers ended up waiting over 70 years for even a
tiny segment of that project to be completed. The Sixth Avenue subway
was an astonishing engineering achievement: The work had to weave around
both the PATH train tunnel and the supports for the busy elevated line
above. Such wizardry did not come cheaply, and it was emblematic of the
high standards—and costs—on all the new IND lines.
The IND lines built by the municipal government cost an
average of $9 million per mile, which was 125 percent higher than the
earlier “Dual Contracts” lines. The cost per mile of Sixth Avenue was
about four times as high as the original subway. This pattern of high
construction cost persists to the present day.
1946: Subway ridership peaks
Subway ridership has never been as high as it was in 1946,
and a precipitous decline began in the late 1940s as automobiles became
widely available. The busiest station in the system, Times Square, saw
its ridership drop from 102,511,841 riders in 1946 to 66,447,227 riders
in 1953. Subway expansion would become increasingly difficult to justify
as New Yorkers were abandoning the existing system—even though outward
expansion was just what was needed to keep the subway as the region’s
primary mode of transportation.
1947: End of the five-cent fare
With the subways now in municipal hands, a doubling of the
fare was finally negotiated. Years of deferred maintenance by the
cash-strapped private companies had become increasingly evident. But by
then, fare hikes only exacerbated the problem of declining ridership.
Photo by Jonathan English/Madison McVeigh//MTA/CityLab
1951: Transit Bond issue
After 1945, the City of New York found itself in constrained
financial circumstances. The growth and modernization of its
infrastructure necessitated substantial borrowing, but the city was
already burdened by an enormous Depression-era debt and faced a
state-mandated debt limit. In November 1948, the Board of Transportation
recommended that the city seek a $500 million exemption from the debt
limit to permit the revival of the Second Avenue Subway plan, along with
several outer-borough projects like the Utica Avenue line that mayors
since have continued to tout, most recently Bill de Blasio.
(Indeed, the wish list for subway construction has changed little to
the present day.) The request passed in a statewide referendum on
November 6, 1951.
But rather than being used as promised to continue the
prewar pattern of expansion, most of the money was instead diverted to
eroding the mountain of deferred maintenance that had built up during
the war and the Depression.
1953: Creation of the Transit Authority
To ensure that fare policy never again became captive to
electoral politics, many civic leaders advocated for the creation of an
independent state authority to administer the city’s transit system,
comparable to the Port Authority or Robert Moses’ Triborough authority.
The subways were thus handed over to the state-created Transit
Authority.
But the institutional reshuffle did not resolve the
fundamental financial problems of a system; ridership continued to
decline and maintenance remained deferred. The state and municipal
governments were both unwilling to provide the subsidy that would have
been needed to adequately sustain the system. Unlike highways, transit
was still seen as a business that should make a profit, and not as a
public service.
1956: The Interstate Highway Act
With the encouragement of President Eisenhower, Congress
passed an act providing lavish federal funding for a cross-country
network of expressways. The 1950s saw the construction of over a dozen
major expressways and bridges in the New York region. This construction
program rivaled or even exceeded the earlier subway boom. And unlike the
subways, all of it benefited from federal largesse. Celebrating the
completion of the Bruckner Expressway in the Bronx, Mayor Robert Wagner
boasted, “This two and one-half mile stretch of elevated expressway cost
more than $34 million, of which 90 percent was put up by the federal
government.”
1950s: Growth of the suburbs
By the postwar period, the majority of population growth in
the New York region was taking place outside of the five boroughs. New
York City no longer dominated the region to the same extent that it once
had, and the growing political power of the suburbs hindered funding
requests for subway projects that many suburbanites believed did not
benefit them. Manhattan and Brooklyn shrank from 1940 to 1960, while
Nassau and Suffolk counties essentially tripled in population.
Yet New York City still planned subway projects as if the
suburbs didn’t exist. In the postwar period, most greenfield real estate
development shifted out of the city entirely and into the surrounding
counties. Instead of being built around transit, new developments were
centered on expressways.
1965: Creation of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
In an effort to address the geographic and financial
limitations of the Transit Authority, Governor Nelson Rockefeller
created a new regional authority that would ultimately control the
subways and commuter railways. It was given the toll revenue from the
Triborough Authority’s bridges and tunnels, which had been the financial
basis of Robert Moses’ bureaucratic empire, to provide the revenue
needed to subsidize the transit system.
But while the new authority’s service area stretched beyond
the five boroughs for the first time, it never made efforts to turn the
subway and commuter railroads into a combined regional transit system.
(For such a model, consider Paris’ Regional Express Network).
New York may be an extraordinarily transit-oriented city, but once the
municipal boundary is crossed into Nassau and Westchester,
transit—especially other than commutes to Manhattan—is near as foreign a
concept as it is in a wealthy Los Angeles suburb.
1968: Program for Action
The new MTA announced the last of its comprehensive plans to
expand the network on the pharaonic scale of prewar construction. It
proposed a number of new lines in the outer boroughs, a full Second
Avenue subway, and a “superexpress” line along the LIRR in Queens.
Construction began on several of the projects, but even those were only
completed in truncated form or abandoned entirely. Never again would the
MTA seriously plan major network expansion. Instead, the only
discussion is of projects like the new Second Avenue line or 7 train
extension, which are of a scale that would barely have registered on the
city’s consciousness in the 1910s and ‘20s.
1973: Closure of the Third Avenue Elevated
As transit ridership dropped from prewar level, segments of
the city’s subway and elevated system were abandoned entirely. While
elevated lines had previously been closed to be replaced with adjacent
subway lines, they were now closed without their promised replacements
ever being built, including, infamously, the Second Avenue elevated line in Manhattan. The Bronx segment of the Third Avenue Elevated was the last major segment of the system to be shut down without replacement.
1975: Fiscal crisis and Second Avenue abandonment
The centerpiece of the Program for Action, the Second Avenue
Subway, had begun construction in the early 1970s. But with the
complete disintegration of the city’s finances, construction simply
could no longer be supported. The disconnected tunnel segments have lain
underused beneath the streets ever since. Several bond issues intended
to finance subway expansion had also been defeated, and the limited
funds that were available ended up being diverted to the system’s
dilapidated trains and stations.
1988: Opening of three-stop Jamaica extension
The 1968 Program for Action proposed a number of projects
intended to improve subway service in some of the neighborhoods that had
sprouted up in the postwar years, particularly in Queens.
Unfortunately, few of the projects were built. One small remnant was the
extension of the E train to Jamaica; the J and Z trains were also moved
off a nearby elevated line into the new tunnel along Archer Avenue. But
a combination of limited funds and community opposition derailed more
substantial expansion plans. Even simple extensions along existing rail
corridors had become out of reach.
Photo by Jonathan English/Madison McVeigh/CityLab
2017: First phase of the Second Avenue subway opens
The Second Avenue Subway has been part of the city’s transit
plans since the creation of the IND in the 1920s. It was intended to
replace two elevated lines that shut down in the 1940s and 1950s
respectively. An attempt to begin construction was abandoned due to the
financial crisis of the 1970s and only a few tunnel segments were built.
Over the years, plans were scaled down, and its length was trimmed to
only three stops on the Upper East Side. The prospect for future phases
remains unknown.
Beyond: The high cost of forgotten history
Many other world cities also slowed their pace of subway
construction in the early postwar years. They, too, succumbed to the
appeal of the automobile, or struggled with debt and destruction
accumulated during the Depression and Second World War. But by the
1960s, this had changed. London opened two new Underground lines in the
1960s and 1970s. Paris began its vast RER project to connect all of its
commuter rail lines, linking the rapidly growing suburbs with the
historic core.
By contrast, New York’s subway system had deteriorated to
such a dismal state that nearly all available funds had to be diverted
to basic maintenance and overhaul. The city’s declining population and
fiscal troubles made expansion nearly impossible.
Now, New York’s economy has turned around, the population is
growing, and the city is in a relatively good financial position.
Still, the maintenance backlog is devouring capital spending. Staggering
subway construction costs—by far the highest in the world—mean that
whatever funding is available does not go very far at all. Old problems
that precluded subway construction in the past echo in the present day:
There is still no meaningful integration between the subway and suburban transit, the mayor and governor carry on the same types of jurisdictional battles, and the subway has not managed to step off the treadmill of deferred repairs. These problems have deep roots, and overcoming them will not be a simple matter.
Most challenging of all is the shockingly high cost of
subway construction. Anyone would expect costs to have risen since the
early days of the system, but the cost of the proposed Second Avenue
line is nearly eight times what a comparable project cost in the 1980s,
when adjusted for inflation.* Procurement problems and labor relations
issues are partial explanations, but the most important factor may be
the wholesale loss of experience resulting from the decade-long gaps in
construction. One of the distinct characteristics of European systems
with much lower building costs is continuous construction: Every time
they complete a new line, they are able to apply the lessons from the
one previous. But in New York, from the opening of the Archer Avenue
Line in 1988 to the construction of the 7 train extension and Second
Avenue lines in the 2010s, virtually all the experience and knowledge
that had been built up in subway construction had atrophied.
The same situation risks repeating itself, as the Second
Avenue construction has been completed with no new construction
immediately on the horizon. The subway’s cost-induced construction
paralysis becomes more severe with every passing decade. We must learn
from history in order to break it.
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