The effect of energy has been grossly underestimated almost from the beginning, mostly because it disappears as a line element in every step of hte production process. It is the one persuasive element used everywhere and represent at least an eigth of our measured economic throughput.
The real question today is what does adjustment look like when all energy costs essentially disappear and the economy suddenly recieves a ten percent cash relief on all costs. This continues to sound impossible to most, but we are demonstrating it now.
What it does means is that the costs of all inputs will drop at not just by ten percent either. .
Correctly factoring
in the more important role of energy corrects economic predictions -
Energy has Ten times bigger role than cost
http://nextbigfuture.com/2014/12/correctly-factoring-in-more-important.html
A paper shows that the failure to describe modern economies adequately
is not due to the introduction of calculus into economic theory by the
so-called 'marginal revolution' during the second half of the 19th
century, when the mathematical formalism of physics decisively
influenced economic theory. Rather, the culprit is the disregard of the
first two laws of thermodynamics and of technological constraints in the
theory of production and growth of industrial economies.
Energy is ten times more important than its cost
If one foregoes cost-share weighting and determines the output
elasticities of capital, labor, energy, and creativity econometrically,
one gets for energy economic weights that exceed energyʼs cost share by
up to an order of magnitude, and the Solow residual disappears. The
production factor energy accounts for most, and creativity for the rest
of the growth that neoclassical economics attributes to 'technological
progress'.
According to the cost-share theorem, reductions of energy inputs by up
to 7%, observed during the first energy crisis 1973–1975, could have
only caused output reductions of 0.35%, whereas the observed reductions
of output in industrial economies were up to an order of magnitude
larger. Thus, from this perspective the recessions of the energy crises
are hard to understand. In addition, cost-share weighting of production
factors has the problem of the Solow residual. The Solow residual
accounts for that part of output growth that cannot be explained by the
input growth rates weighted by the factor cost shares. It amounts to
more than 50% of total growth in many countries. Standard neoclassical
economics attributes the discrepancy between empirical and theoretical
growth to what is being called 'technological progress' or, sometimes,
'Manna from Heaven.' The dominating role of technological progress 'has
lead to a criticism of the neoclassical model: it is a theory of growth
that leaves the main factor in economic growth unexplained', as the
founder of neoclassical growth theory, Robert A Solow, stated himself.
Growth in Germany, Japan, and the USA
The reproduction of economic growth in Germany, Japan, and the USA
during the second half of the 20th century. Their left parts exhibit the
empirical growth (squares) and the theoretical growth (circles) of the
dimensionless output , and the right parts present the empirical time
series of the dimensionless factors capital , labor , and energy . The
base year t0 is 1960 for Germany and the USA, and 1965 for Japan. Note
the variations of inputs and outputs in conjunction with the oil price
explosions. The price of a barrel of crude oil in inflation-corrected
was driven by the OPEC boycott in response to the Yom-Kippur war from
15$ in 1973 to 53$ in 1975, and by the war between Iraq and Iran from
48$ in 1979 to 100$ in 1981. Then the oil price plummeted to 30$ in 1986
(with dramatic consequences for the Soviet Union). Between 1997 and
2011 it has risen again, from 18$ to 110$.
(Left) Economic growth and (right) contributions of the three main
production factors to economic growth in Germany in the late 20th
century. Credit: R. Kümmel. The Second Law of Economics: Energy,
Entropy, and the Origins of Wealth. Growth in the total economy of the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) between the years 1960 and 2000. The
five coefficients, shown below the output graph, model the time
dependence of the LinEx–function parameters a and c. They reproduce the
drastic structural break at German reunification in 1990.
Growth in the total US economy between 1960 and 1996.
Summary and outlook
Energy-dependent production functions, with output elasticities that are
for energy much larger and for labor much smaller than the cost shares
of these factors, reproduce economic growth in Germany, Japan, and the
USA with small residuals and good statistical quality measures—even
during the downturns and upswings in the wake of the first and the
second oil-price explosion. This does not contradict the usual
behavioral assumptions that entrepreneurs maximize profit or that
society maximizes overall welfare, because real-world economic actors
are aware of the technological and the related 'virtually binding'
constraints on the combinations of capital, labor, and energy. 'Soft'
constraints from legal and social obligations may also matter. The
barriers from the constraints on capacity utilization and automation
prevent modern industrial economies from reaching the neoclassical
optimum of mainstream economics, where output elasticities would be
equal to factor cost shares.
Since in industrially advanced countries cheap energy is economically
much more powerful than expensive labor, there has been the long-time
trend toward increasing automation, which replaces expensive labor by
cheap energy-capital combinations. In the G7 countries, this trend has
drastically reduced the number of people employed in the sectors
agriculture and industries during the last four decades, and the
contribution of these sectors to GDP as well. Now, in the service
sector, electricity-powered computers with appropriate software kill
more and more jobs, too. The resulting danger of unemployment in the
less qualified part of the labor force is enhanced by the trend toward
globalization, where goods and services produced in low-wage countries
can be delivered at small cost to high-wage countries thanks to cheap
energy and increasingly sophisticated, highly computerized
transportation systems.
The nearly unanimous social and political response to this danger is the
call for strategies to stimulate economic growth. But these strategies
face obstacles from entropy production, which is coupled to energy
conversion and its pivotal role in economic growth:
(1) there are thermodynamic limits to the improvement of energy
efficiency at unchanged energy services, because entropy production
destroys exergy;
(2) emissions associated with entropy production, especially the ones of
carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels, threaten climate
stability.
The question is, whether society will be willing and able to finance the
huge investments that are necessary for the transition to a highly
efficient production system powered by non-fossil fuels.
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