Both the Ukraine and Belorussia have had a difficult transition into the post-soviet
dispensation. A large part of that came
from having been originally part of the original Czarist dispensation. The institutions never existed. It is noteworthy that the countries otherwise
affected, made a transition into EU membership fairly quickly. They have not and they are also continuing to
struggle.
We have also forgotten that Putin’s Czarism is masking a deeply
problematic Russian transition also.
After him we will have Czarism without talent and that usually leads to serious
stagnation.
All this makes the machinations inside the Ukraine problematic and
potentially dangerous if Putin or a successor ever decides to gamble to absorb the
state once again. The arguments for
doing so are far too good.
What is needed is a massive Marshall plan for the Ukraine that swiftly
integrates the whole country into the EU with massive infrastructure improvements
and open capital markets supported by foreign capital. Let us recall that those millions of jobs
created in China could as easily have been created in the Ukraine.
A thriving Ukraine is certain to draw reformers throughout the former
Soviet Union and end the bottom fishing presently underway.
New Dimensions of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Russia
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11,
2014
The struggle for some of
the most strategic territory in the world took an interesting twist this
week. Last week we discussed what appeared to be a significant shift in German
national strategy in which Berlin seemed to declare a new doctrine
of increased assertiveness in the world -- a
shift that followed intense German interest in Ukraine. This week, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, in a now-famous cell phone
conversation, declared her strong contempt for the European Union and its weakness and counseled
the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine to proceed quickly and without the
Europeans to piece together a specific opposition coalition before the
Russians saw what was happening and took action.
This is a new twist not
because it makes clear that the United States is not the only country
intercepting phone calls, but because it puts U.S. policy in Ukraine in a new
light and forces us to reconsider U.S. strategy toward Russia and
Germany. Nuland's cell phone conversation is hardly definitive, but it is
an additional indicator of American strategic thinking.
Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Shifts
U.S. foreign policy has
evolved during the past few years. Previously, the United States was
focused heavily on the Islamic world and, more important, tended to regard the
use of force as an early option in the execution of U.S. policy rather than as
a last resort. This was true not only in Afghanistan and
Iraq, but also in Africa and elsewhere. The strategy was
successful when its goal was to destroy an enemy military force. It proved far
more difficult to use in occupying countries and shaping their internal and
foreign policies. Military force has intrinsic limits.
The alternative has been
a shift to a
balance-of-power strategy in which the United States relies
on the natural schisms that exist in every region to block the emergence of
regional hegemons and contain unrest and groups that could threaten U.S.
interests. The best example of the old policy is Libya, where the United States
directly intervened with air power and special operations forces on the ground
to unseat Moammar Gadhafi. Western efforts to replace him with a
regime favorable to the United States and its allies have not
succeeded. The new strategy can be seen in Syria, where rather than
directly intervening the United States has stood back and allowed the warring factions
to expend their energy on each other, preventing either side from diverting
resources to activities that might challenge U.S. interests.
Behind this is a schism
in U.S. foreign policy that has more to do with motivation than actual action.
On one side, there are those who consciously support the Syria model for the
United States as not necessarily the best moral option but the only
practical option there is. On the other, there are those
who argue on behalf of moral interventions, as we saw in Libya, and removing
tyrants as an end in itself. Given the outcome in Libya, this faction is on the
defensive, as it must explain how an intervention will actually
improve the moral situation. Given that this faction also tended to oppose
Iraq, it must show how an intervention will not degenerate into
Iraqi-type warfare. That is hard to do, so for all the rhetoric, the United
States is by default falling into a balance-of-power model.
The Geopolitical Battle in Ukraine
Russia emerged
as a problem for the United States after the Orange Revolution in 2004, when
the United States, supporting anti-Russian factions in Ukraine,
succeeded in crafting a relatively pro-Western, anti-Russian government. The
Russians read this as U.S. intelligence operations designed to create an
anti-Russian Ukraine that, as we have written, would directly
challenge Russian strategic and economic interests. Moreover, Moscow saw the
Orange Revolution (along with the Rose Revolution) as a dress rehearsal
for something that could occur in Russia next. The Russian
response was to use its own covert
capabilities, in conjunction with economic pressure from natural gas
cutoffs, to undermine Ukraine's government and to use its war with Georgia
as a striking reminder of the resurrection of Russian military capabilities. These
moves, plus disappointment with Western aid, allowed a more pro-Russian
government to emerge in Kiev, reducing the Russians' fears and
increasing their confidence. In time, Moscow became more effective and
assertive in playing its cards right in the Middle East -- giving rise to the
current situations in Syria and Iran and elsewhere.
Washington had two
options. One was to allow the balance of power to assert itself, in this case
relying on the Europeans to contain the Russians. The other was to continue to
follow the balance of power model but at a notch higher than pure
passivity. As Nuland's call shows, U.S. confidence in Europe's will for and
interest in blocking the Russians was low; hence a purely passive model would
not work. The next step was the lowest possible level of involvement to contain
the Russians and counter their moves in the Middle East. This meant a very
limited and not too covert support for anti-Russian, pro-European
demonstrators -- the re-creation of a pro-Western, anti-Russian
government in Ukraine. To a considerable degree, the U.S. talks with
Iran also allow Washington to deny the Russians an Iranian card, although
the Syrian theater still allows the Kremlin some room to maneuver.
The United States is not
prepared to intervene in the former Soviet Union. Russia is not a global power,
and its military has many weaknesses, but it is by far the
strongest in the region and is able to project power in the former Soviet
periphery, as the war with Georgia showed. At the moment, the U.S.
military also has many weaknesses. Having fought for more than a decade in
the core of the Islamic world, the U.S. military is highly focused on
a way of war not relevant to the former Soviet Union, its alliance structure
around the former Soviet Union is frayed and not supportive of war, and the
inevitable post-war cutbacks that traditionally follow any war the United
States fights are cutting into capabilities. A direct intervention, even
were it contemplated (which it is not), is not an option. The only correlation
of forces that matters is what exists at a given point in time in a given
place. In that sense, the closer U.S. forces get to the Russian homeland, the
greater the advantage the Russians have.
Instead, the United
States did the same thing that it did prior to the Orange Revolution: back the
type of intervention that both the human rights advocates and the
balance-of-power advocates could support. Giving financial and psychological
support to the demonstrators protesting Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's
decision to reject a closer relationship with Europe, and later protesting the
government's attempt to suppress the demonstrations, preserved the
possibility of regime change in Ukraine, with minimal exposure and risk to the
United States.
Dissatisfaction with the German Approach
As we said last week, it
appeared that it was the Germans who
were particularly pressing the issue, and that they were the ones virtually
controlling one of the leaders of the protests, Vitali Klitschko. The
United States appeared to be taking a back seat to Germany. Indeed, Berlin's
statements indicating that it is prepared to take a more assertive role in
the world appeared to be a historic shift in German foreign policy.
The statements were
even more notable since, over the years, Germany appeared to have
been moving closer to Russia on economic and strategic issues. Neither
country was comfortable with U.S. aggressiveness in the Middle East and
Southwest Asia. Both countries shared the need to create new economic
relationships in the face of the European economic crisis and the need to
contain the United States. Hence, the apparent German shift was startling.
Although Germany's move
should not be dismissed, its meaning was not as clear as it seemed. In her
cell phone call, Nuland is clearly dismissing the Germans, Klitschko and
all their efforts in Ukraine. This could mean that the strategy was
too feeble for American tastes (Berlin cannot, after all, risk too big a
confrontation with Moscow). Or it could mean that when the Germans said they
were planning to be more assertive, their new boldness was meant to head off
U.S. efforts. Looking at this week's events, it is not clear what the
Germans meant.
What is clear is that
the United States was not satisfied with Germany and the European
Union. Logically, this meant that the United States intended to be
more aggressive than the Germans in supporting opponents of the
regime. This is a touchy issue for human rights advocates, or should be.
Yanukovich is the elected president of Ukraine, winner of an election that
is generally agreed to have been honest (even though his constitutional
amendments and subsequent parliamentary elections may not have been). He
was acting within his authority in rejecting the deal with the European Union.
If demonstrators can unseat an elected president because they disagree with his
actions, they have set a precedent that undermines constitutionalism. Even
if he was rough in suppressing the demonstrators, it does not nullify his
election.
From a balance of power
strategy, however, it makes great sense. A pro-Western, even ambiguous, Ukraine
poses a profound strategic problem for Russia. It would be as if Texas became
pro-Russian, and the Mississippi River system, oil production, the Midwest
and the Southwest became vulnerable. The Russian ability to engage in Iran
or Syria suddenly contracts. Moscow's focus must be on Ukraine.
Using the demonstrations
to create a massive problem for Russia does two things. It creates a real
strategic challenge for the Russians and forces them on the
defensive. Second, it reminds Russia that Washington has capabilities and
options that make challenging the United States difficult. And it can be framed
in a way that human rights advocates will applaud in spite of the
constitutional issues, enemies of the Iranian talks will appreciate and Central
Europeans from Poland to Romania will see as a sign of U.S. commitment to the
region. The United States will re-emerge as an alternative to Germany and
Russia. It is a brilliant stroke.
Its one weakness, if we
can call it that, is that it is hard to see how it can work. Russia has
significant economic leverage in Ukraine, it is not clear that
pro-Western demonstrators are in the majority, and Russian covert capabilities
in Ukraine outstrip American capabilities. The Federal Security Service
and Foreign Intelligence Service have been collecting files on Ukrainians
for a long time. We would expect that after the Olympics in Sochi,
the Russians could play their trump cards.
On the other hand, even
if the play fails, the United States will have demonstrated that it
is back in the game and that the Russians should look around their
periphery and wonder where the United States will act next. Putting someone in
a defensive crouch does not require that the first punch work. It is
enough for the opponent to understand that the next punch will come when
he is least expecting it. The mere willingness of the United States to engage
will change the expectations of Central Europe, cause tensions between the
Central Europeans and the Germans and create an opening for the
United States.
The Pressure on Russia
Of course, the question
is whether and where the Russians will answer the Americans, or even if they
will consider the U.S. actions significant at all. In a sense,
Syria was Moscow's move and this is the countermove. The Russians can
choose to call the game. They have many reasons to. Their economy is under
pressure. The Germans may not rally to the United States, but they will
not break from it. And if the United States ups the ante in Central
Europe, Russian inroads there will dissolve.
If the Russians are now
an American problem, which they are, and if the United States is not going to
revert to a direct intervention mode, which it cannot, then this strategy makes
sense. At the very least it gives the Russians a problem and a sense of
insecurity that can curb their actions elsewhere. At best it could create a
regime that might not counterbalance Russia but could make pipelines and ports
vulnerable -- especially with U.S. help.
The public interception
of Nuland's phone call was not all that embarrassing. It showed the world
that the United States, not Germany, is leading the way in Ukraine. And it
showed the Russians that the Americans care so little, they will express
it on an open cell phone line. Nuland's obscene dismissal of the
European Union and treatment of Russia as a problem to deal with confirms a
U.S. policy: The United States is not going to war, but passivity is over.
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