This is a pretty level headed analysis an surely
will inform the US as we go forward.
The strategic problem we face with the Ukraine is
actual relevance. We cannot politically
put boots on the ground, either ours or NATOs without the agreement of the
Ukraine itself.
Such boots will inevitably insult the Russians of
course and it is difficult to see a scenario in which all this can take place.
The long term problem is that Russia remains an autocracy
clearly prone to behave like a South American Junta. Putin may well hold off and consider it all
well enough done. That will not hold
true for successors so it still becomes necessary to move NATO itself forward
into Romania in strategic force. That
way those traditional opportunities look way more dicey. It also acts as a threat to Iran.
What Russia needs is a comprehensive treaty with all
its neighbors that clearly addresses mutual historical grievances and strongly
promotes an emergent Russia as a senior partner and best friend. This can be also be used as a platform for
additional political rationalization and serious free trade initiatives as
well.
U.S. Defense Policy in the Wake of the
Ukrainian Affair
TUESDAY,
APRIL 8, 2014 - 02:59
Ever since the end of the
Cold War, there has been an assumption that conventional warfare between
reasonably developed nation-states had been abolished. During the 1990s, it was
expected that the primary purpose of the military would be operations other
than war, such as peacekeeping, disaster relief and the change of oppressive
regimes. After 9/11, many began speaking of asymmetric warfare and "the
long war." Under this model, the United States would be engaged in
counterterrorism activities in a broad area of the Islamic world for a very
long time. Peer-to-peer conflict seemed obsolete.
There was a profoundly
radical idea embedded in this line of thought. Wars between nations or dynastic
powers had been a constant condition in Europe, and the rest of the world had
been no less violent. Every century had had systemic wars in which the entire
international system (increasingly dominated by Europe since the
16th century) had participated. In the 20th century, there were the
two World Wars, in the 19th century the Napoleonic Wars, in the
18th century the Seven Years' War, and in the 17th century the Thirty
Years' War.
Those who argued that
U.S. defense policy had to shift its focus away from peer-to-peer and systemic
conflict were in effect arguing that the world had entered a new era in which
what had been previously commonplace would now be rare or nonexistent. What warfare there was would not involve nations but
subnational groups and would not be systemic. The radical nature of this
argument was rarely recognized by those who made it, and the evolving American
defense policy that followed this reasoning was rarely seen as inappropriate.
If the United States was going to be involved primarily in counterterrorism
operations in the Islamic world for the next 50 years, we obviously needed a
very different military than the one we had.
There were two reasons
for this argument. Military planners are always obsessed with the war they are
fighting. It is only human to see the immediate task as a permanent task.
During the Cold War, it was impossible for anyone to imagine how it would
end. During World War I, it was obvious that static warfare dominated by
the defense was the new permanent model. That generals always fight the last
war must be amended to say that generals always believe the war they are
fighting is the permanent war. It is, after all, the war that was the
culmination of their careers, and imagining other wars when they are fighting
this one, and indeed will not be fighting future ones, appeared frivolous.
The second reason was
that no nation-state was in a position to challenge the United States
militarily. After the Cold War
ended, the United States was in a singularly powerful position. The United
States remains in a powerful position, but over time, other nations will
increase their power, form alliances and coalitions and challenge the United
States. No matter how benign a leading power is -- and the United States is
not uniquely benign -- other nations will fear it, resent it or want to shame
it for its behavior. The idea that other nation-states will not challenge
the United States seemed plausible for the past 20 years, but the fact is that
nations will pursue interests that are opposed to American interest and by
definition, pose a peer-to-peer challenge. The United States is potentially
overwhelmingly powerful, but that does
not make it omnipotent.
Systemic vs. Asymmetric War
It must also be
remembered that asymmetric warfare and operations other than war always existed
between and during peer-to-peer wars and systemic wars. The British fought an
asymmetric war in both Ireland and North America in the context of a
peer-to-peer war with France. Germany fought an asymmetric war in Yugoslavia at
the same time it fought a systemic war from 1939-1945. The United States
fought asymmetric wars in the Philippines, Nicaragua, Haiti and other places
between 1900-1945.
Asymmetric wars and operations
other than war are far more common than peer-to-peer and systemic wars. They
can appear overwhelmingly important at the time. But just as the defeat of
Britain by the Americans did not destroy British power, the outcomes of
asymmetric wars rarely define long-term national power and hardly ever define
the international system. Asymmetric warfare is not a new style of war; it is a
permanent dimension of warfare. Peer-to-peer and systemic wars are also
constant features but are far less frequent. They are also far more important.
For Britain, the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars was much more important than
the outcome of the American Revolution. For the United States, the outcome of
World Was II was far more important than its intervention in Haiti. There are a
lot more asymmetric wars, but a defeat does not shift national power. If you
lose a systemic war, the outcome can be catastrophic.
A military force can be
shaped to fight frequent, less important engagements or rare but critical wars
-- ideally, it should be able to do both. But in military planning, not all
wars are equally important. The war that defines power and the international
system can have irreversible and catastrophic results. Asymmetric wars can
cause problems and casualties, but that is a lesser mission. Military leaders
and defense officials, obsessed with the moment, must bear in mind that the war
currently being fought may be little remembered, the peace that is currently at
hand is rarely permanent, and harboring the belief that any type of warfare has
become obsolete is likely to be in error.
Ukraine drove this lesson
home. There will be no war between the United
States and Russia over Ukraine. The United States does
not have interests there that justify a war, and neither country is in a
position militarily to fight a war. The Americans are not deployed for war, and
the Russians are not ready to fight the United States.
But the events in Ukraine
point to some realities. First, the power of countries shifts, and the Russians
had substantially increased their military capabilities since the 1990s.
Second, the divergent interests between the two countries, which seemed to
disappear in the 1990s, re-emerged. Third, this episode will cause each side to
reconsider its military strategy and capabilities, and future crises might well
lead to conventional war, nuclear weapons notwithstanding. Ukraine reminds us
that peer-to-peer conflict is not inconceivable, and that a strategy and
defense policy built on the assumption has little basis in reality. The human
condition did not transform itself because of an interregnum in which the
United States could not be challenged; the last two decades are an exception to
the rule of global affairs defined by war.
U.S. national
strategy must be founded
on the control of the sea. The oceans protect the
United States from everything but terrorism and nuclear missiles. The greatest
challenge to U.S. control of the sea is hostile fleets. The best way to defeat
hostile fleets is to prevent them from being built. The best way to do that is
to maintain the balance of power in Eurasia. The ideal path for this is to
ensure continued tensions within Eurasia so that resources are spent defending
against land threats rather than building fleets. Given the inherent tensions
in Eurasia, the United States needs to do nothing in most cases. In some cases
it must send military or economic aid to one side or both. In other cases, it
advises.
U.S. Strategy in Eurasia
The main goal here is to
avoid the emergence of a regional hegemon fully secure against land threats and
with the economic power to challenge the United States at sea. The U.S.
strategy in World War I was to refuse to become involved until it appeared, with
the abdication of the czar and increasing German aggression at sea, that the
British and French might be defeated or the sea-lanes closed. At that point,
the United States intervened to block German hegemony. In World War II, the
United States remained out of the war until after the French collapsed and it
appeared the Soviet Union would collapse -- until it seemed something had to be
done. Even then, it was only after Hitler's declaration of war on the United
States after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that Congress approved
Roosevelt's plan to intervene militarily in continental Europe. And in spite of
operations in the Mediterranean, the main U.S. thrust didn't occur until 1944
in Normandy, after the German army had been badly weakened.
In order for this
strategy, which the U.S. inherited from the British, to work, the United States
needs an effective and relevant alliance structure. The balance-of-power
strategy assumes that there are core allies who have an interest in aligning
with the United States against regional enemies. When I say effective, I mean
allies that are capable of defending themselves to a great extent. Allying with the impotent achieves little. By relevant, I mean
allies that are geographically positioned to deal with particularly dangerous
hegemons.
If we assume Russians to
be dangerous hegemons, then the relevant allies are those on the periphery of
Russia. For example, Portugal or Italy adds little weight to the equation. As
to effectiveness, the allies must be willing to make major commitments to their
own national defense. The American
relationship in all alliances is that the outcome
of conflicts must matter more to the ally than to the United States.
The point here is that
NATO, which was extremely valuable during the Cold War, may not be a
relevant or effective instrument in a new
confrontation with the Russians. Many of the members are not geographically
positioned to help, and many are not militarily effective. They cannot balance the Russians. And since the goal of an
effective balance-of-power strategy is the avoidance of war while containing a
rising power, the lack of an effective deterrence matters a great deal.
It is not certain by any
means that Russia is the main threat to American power. Many would point
to China. In my view, China's ability
to pose a naval threat to the United States is limited, for the time being, by the geography of the South and East
China seas. There are a lot of choke points that can be closed. Moreover,
a balance of land-based military power is difficult to imagine. But still, the
basic principle I have described holds; countries such as South Korea and
Japan, which have a more immediate interest in China than the United States
does, are supported by the United States to contain China.
In these and other
potential cases, the ultimate problem for the United States is that its
engagement in Eurasia is at distance. It takes a great deal of time to deploy a
technology-heavy force there, and it must be technology-heavy because U.S.
forces are always outnumbered when fighting in Eurasia. The United States must
have force multipliers. In many cases, the United States is not choosing the
point of intervention, but a potential enemy is creating a circumstance where
intervention is necessary. Therefore, it is unknown to planners where a war
might be fought, and it is unknown what kind of force they will be up against.
The only thing certain is that it will be far away and take a long time to
build up a force. During Desert Storm, it took six months to go on the
offensive.
American strategy
requires a force that can project overwhelming power without massive delays. In
Ukraine, for example, had the United States chosen to try to defend eastern
Ukraine from Russian attack, it would have been impossible to deploy that force
before the Russians took over. An offensive against the Russians in Ukraine
would have been impossible. Therefore,
Ukraine poses the strategic problem for the United States.
The Future of U.S. Defense Policy
The United States will
face peer-to-peer or even systemic conflicts in Eurasia. The earlier the United
States brings in decisive force, the lower the cost to the United States.
Current conventional war-fighting strategy is not dissimilar from that of World
War II: It is heavily dependent on equipment and the petroleum to power that
equipment. It can take many months to field that force. That could force the
United States into an offensive posture far more costly and dangerous than a
defensive posture, as it did in World War II. Therefore, it is essential that
the time to theater be dramatically reduced, the size of the force reduced, but
the lethality, mobility and survivability dramatically increased.
It also follows that the
tempo of operations be reduced. The United States has been in constant warfare
since 2001. The reasons are understandable, but in a balance-of-power strategy
war is the exception, not the rule. The force that could be deployed is seen as
overwhelming and therefore does not have to be deployed. The allies of the
United States are sufficiently motivated and capable of defending themselves.
That fact deters attack by regional hegemons. There need to be layers of
options between threat and war.
Defense policy must be
built on three things: The United States does not know where it will fight. The
United States must use war sparingly. The United States must have sufficient
technology to compensate for the fact that Americans are always going to be
outnumbered in Eurasia. The force that is delivered must overcome this, and it
must get there fast.
Ranges of new
technologies, from hypersonic missiles to electronically and mechanically
enhanced infantryman, are available. But the mindset that peer-to-peer conflict
has been abolished and that small unit operations in the Middle East are the
permanent features of warfare prevent these new technologies from being
considered. The need to rethink American strategy in the framework of the
perpetual possibility of conventional war against enemies fighting on their own
terrain is essential, along with an understanding that the exhaustion of the
force in asymmetric warfare cannot be sustained. Losing an asymmetric war is
unfortunate but tolerable. Losing a systemic war could be catastrophic. Not
having to fight a war would be best.
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