This item actually sets the record straight. not every unit is brilliantly led in war. that would be impossible.
At best, best units are paired with best units. thus the highly rated Canada Corp drew the Waffen SS and the Hitler youth all the way back to Bremen. Notice neither broke off to support any other fight.
Instead, as this chap makes clear, it was far more mixed as could be expected. Afterall proper training is a huge investment in men and material desperately wanted at the front.
Brit historian Max Hastings has exposed the incompetence of the Brit WW2 military in many books and articles. Is he not given the attention he deserves because Brits care only about flagshagging, not about facts?
Richard Meakin ·
MA (Oxon) in History, University of Oxford (Graduated 1981)
I would say that Max Hastings is certainly one of the most widely read popular historians in the UK and he definitely produces a prodigious output. I don’t think that you can say that he doesn’t get the attention he deserves.
I have read most of Sir Max’s books and generally enjoyed then - although I have to say that I found Operation Pedestal a bit indigestible. It should be remembered that Sir Max is primarily a journalist rather than a historian and that he uses teams of researchers to help with his books - as, indeed, did Churchill, so there’s nothing very wrong with that.
As a result, I consider Sir Max’s books as good general introductions to subjects that I don’t know very much about. However, they start to come across as a little superficial when you have some knowledge about the subject.
The book that is probably being referred to is Overlord - D-Day and the Battle for Germany. It is worth noting that this is an old book now, being first published in 1984, and so does not represent the latest scholarship on the matter. If I remember correctly, Sir Max does rhapsodise somewhat about German equipment.
Using first-hand reminiscences in historical works certainly makes them more immediate and compelling, but it does mean that your work is shaped by a very few voices. Allied soldiers were certainly cautious in the face of dug-in 88s and Spandaus (machine guns) - and who wouldn’t be - but that doesn’t reflect an inferiority of tactics or equipment. Where the Germans probably had an advantage was in their more flexible task oriented tactics, Auftragstaktik, which moved decision making further down their command structure.
All military forces, of all nations, make mistakes all the time, large and small. These mistakes should not be ignored and swept under the carpet because, if that happens, no learning can take place. However, it is necessary to maintain context and realise that mistakes are also constantly being made by the enemy.
At the end of the day, the Allies met and defeated the Germans at all levels: tactical, operational, and strategic on land, by sea, and in the air.
I’ve just spent the last few minutes ferreting around for my copy of 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary. This is the story of a rifle platoon of the 4th Battalion Somerset Light Infantry and its fighting advance - not without losses - from Normandy to Bremen, as written by its platoon commander. Recommended reading. In it, Jary notes:
It has become the custom for some of our younger military writers to extol the professional ability of the Wehrmacht whilst decrying that of our own fighting arms, particularly our armour and infantry. This has perplexed me because it runs contrary to my experience. My 18 Platoon were better soldiers than any we fought. So was "D" Company and the whole 4th Battalion, The Somerset Light Infantry. Admittedly it was a good battalion but I find it hard to believe that it was unique.
This tendency among writers is understandable. They are too young to have taken part in the operations about which they write and therefore they have had to rely mainly on official records and personal interviews with those who were present. Sadly, interviews with all but a few ex-infantrymen must necessarily be of limited assistance because very few of them survived long enough to have much to contribute.
Although they lost, the German soldiers and their families are proud of their exploits, many of which were considerable. It is, of course, very much in their own interest to encourage the theory and myth that, although superior as fighting men, they were beaten only by numerically superior forces and firepower. In my experience this was not so. In many attacks the prisoners we took outnumbered our attacking force and German units who would continue to resist at close quarters were few indeed. Unlike us, they rarely fought at night, when they were excessively nervous and unsure of themselves. Where we patrolled extensively, they avoided it. I can remember only one successful German patrol and not one successful night action.
If our positions had been reversed, I doubt if they would have performed better than we did. Without doubt, some Wehrmacht formations were extremely professionally competent but many were not. Some of the enemy infantry fought with fanaticism but most did not.
Churchill inspects the men of the 4th Somerset Light Infantry in May 1944
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