We are entering a dangerous period in which general's dreams are
gaining popular currency. Do recall our discussion on the dreams of
the Russian generals before WWI. That informed us that it only takes
one to tango to produce a disaster.
Rather than switching over to a war time economy, they are instead
switching over to a hyper urbanization model which will move
250,000,000 people into highrises. This shoves many more into their
labor pool. This also means serious depopulating of the country
side.
The good news is that China has no creditable unresolved border
issues nor the capacity to truly project force across geography.
That does not stop generals from dreaming.
My real concern is the popularity of this type of dreaming amount the
Chinese. It can trigger adverse public behavior which would be
unfortunate.
Any imaginable war would be fought in the skies over China and out of
many potential beachheads.
The Threat of a
Declining China
By Mark A.
DeWeaver| June 18, 2013
Many Americans view China’s emergence as the world’s second largest economy with trepidation. The United States, it seems, is in decline. China is a “rising power” destined to take over America’s role as global hegemon sometime in the not-too-distant future.
Recently, however,
China’s prospects are looking less rosy. First quarter GDP grew
only 7.7 percent, down from an already subpar 7.9 percent in the
fourth quarter of 2012. Exports are slowing and the investment-led
growth upon which the country has relied in the past is clearly
unsustainable. Beijing is hoping to keep the economy on track by
transitioning to a new “growth model” based on consumption and
productivity gains. Yet so far there is little evidence to suggest
that this strategy is working. Indeed, there is really no reason to
believe that such a transition can be achieved under the country’s
current political-economic system.
As the Chinese
juggernaut starts to lose momentum, should Americans be breathing a
collective sigh of relief? Not really. Unfortunately, China’s
decline is likely to be a lot less peaceful than its rise.
Slower growth will
pose an existential problem for the Chinese Communist Party. Ever
since the end of the Maoist era in 1978, economic development has
been the Party’s primary source of legitimacy. A prolonged slowdown
will weaken its hold on power in much the same way that crop failures
during imperial times undermined the emperor’s claim to the
“mandate of heaven.” If China is not going to be “No. 1”
after all, some other justification for Party rule will be urgently
needed.
The Party’s best bet
will be to play the nationalist card, making the defense of the
motherland its primary mission. This will not be difficult. It will
be easy to blame China’s economic failures on the machinations of
foreign powers, even as Mao Zedong did in his famous speech
proclaiming the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. The fact
that China had “fallen behind,” he said, was “due entirely to
oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic
reactionary governments.”
It will also be
easy to put the Chinese economy on a war footing. China’s central
planning institutions are well suited to the mobilization of
resources for defense industries. A military buildup would also
help to alleviate excess capacity problems in heavy industry. Total
excess capacity in the steel sector, for example, already exceeds
total U.S. capacity. Arms manufacturing is likely to be seen as a
good way to put idle plants back online.
The implications for
China’s neighbors are already evident in Beijing’s increasingly
bellicose insistence on irredentist territorial claims. There have
been escalating tensions with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, spats
in the South China Sea involving areas claimed by Vietnam, and even a
Chinese incursion into an Indian-controlled Himalayan region claimed
by both Beijing and New Delhi.
Such incidents are
often described as competitions for the control of natural resources
such as the South China Sea’s oil and natural gas. They are,
however, better understood as consequences of the Party’s domestic
agenda. And as public relations exercises they have been
remarkably successful. Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment is now at
fever pitch, with many of China’s netizens expressing strident
support for military action against Japan to recover lost
territories, right historical wrongs, and avenge past
humiliations.
U.S. policymakers need
to realize that this type of nationalist sentiment is going to be the
Party’s ace in the hole once the economy slows. Beijing can
therefore be expected to prefer that international disputes remain
unresolved. Its objective will be to keep the Chinese public
distracted by possible foreign threats to China’s national security
and economic development.
China, not the United
States, is fated to be the “declining power” for the remainder of
this decade. This means that Washington’s preferred policy of
“engagement” will not work. Beijing will be unable to give ground
in disputes with its neighbors because doing so will weaken the Party
domestically. Events like the recent summit between President Obama
and General Secretary Xi Jinping are not going to improve U.S.–China
relations when the Party’s survival depends on escalating tensions.
Given that dialogue is
likely to be ineffective, the United States must focus instead on
defending its strategic interests in the Pacific. It must continue to
strengthen ties with its regional partners, particularly Japan and
Taiwan, which are likely to be the main targets of Chinese military
adventurism. Most importantly, the United States must avoid helping
the Party stifle demands for political reforms at home by handing it
easy victories abroad.
Dr. Mark A. DeWeaver
manages the emerging markets fund Quantrarian Asia Hedge and is the
author of Animal Spirits with Chinese Characteristics: Booms and
Busts in the World’s Emerging Economic Giant.
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