US Navy is Opening the Strait of Hormuz

This makes sense in order to preserve general shipping. Of course all Iranian cargoes need not apply.

The oil will now flow as if nothing is happening.

The mullahs are at war and you can be sure that much of the military is sitting on their hands.

US Navy is Opening the Strait of Hormuz

March 3, 2026 by Brian Wang

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2026/03/us-navy-is-opening-the-strait-of-hormuz.html#more-208946

President Trump announced today (March 3) that the Navy will begin escorting tankers through the Strait if needed, and the U.S. government will provide political-risk insurance so commercial ships can operate. This is modeled directly on the 1987–88 Operation Earnest Will tanker convoy system during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War.

The US military is determining what can and can’t be done. Trump just approves or disapproves. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are positioned in the Persian Gulf right at the northern entrance to the strait (ships such as USS Canberra and USS Tulsa have been confirmed in the area). They are flying over it. They have damage assessment. They will pass US ships through it to see it is clear. U.S. Navy minesweepers / mine countermeasures (MCM) assets currently in the Persian Gulf / Strait of Hormuz area are three Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) with specialized MCM mission packages.

• USS Canberra (LCS-30)

• USS Tulsa (LCS-16)

• USS Santa Barbara (LCS-32)

These are forward-based in Bahrain and equipped with MH-60 Seahawk helicopters, unmanned surface vessels, towed sonars, and remote mine-hunting systems.

When GPS lies, ships stop moving.

GNSS spoofing, the deliberate manipulation of satellite navigation signals, has been confirmed in the Gulf. Ships can’t trust where they are, so many are choosing not to go at all.

The result: a sharp drop in vessel traffic through the Strait… pic.twitter.com/RQrmvbjdBg

— Kpler (@Kpler) March 1, 2026

Step-by-step how it would work (standard doctrine + current assets)

1 Pre-transit clearance (MCM phase): LCS minesweepers (with helicopters and unmanned drones) sweep and clear a safe channel ahead of any convoy. Unmanned systems go first so no manned ship takes the initial risk.

2 Convoy formation: Tankers grouped into small convoys (usually 2–6 ships) to reduce exposure. Transit timed for optimal conditions.

3 Escort screen

• LCS or Arleigh Burke destroyers (e.g., USS Mitscher, USS Michael Murphy already nearby) on close escort.

• One or more LCS often leads the formation as the mine-hunter vanguard.

4 Air cover & overwatch:

• F/A-18s, F-35s, and E-2 Hawkeyes from the Abraham Lincoln and Gerald R. Ford carrier strike groups provide 24/7 combat air patrol.

• Land-based Air Force fighters, drones, and surveillance aircraft from regional bases add extra layers.

5 Threat suppression

Any Iranian boat, missile site, or drone detected is immediately struck by air or ship-launched weapons (already proven in the first 48 hours of Operation Epic Fury).

6 Command & control: U.S. 5th Fleet coordinates everything from Bahrain, with real-time intelligence.

How safe can they make it?

Extremely safe — near 100% success rate for escorted, U.S.-insured tankers.

Iran’s surface navy is already gutted (9–11 warships sunk in the first days). They have almost no air cover left.

The U.S. has total air and sea superiority in the Strait.

The only realistic remaining threats are sporadic drones or coastal missiles, which U.S. escorts and fighters are already shooting down routinely. Insurance + Navy escort removes the commercial risk that caused the current pause in shipping.

There would be a “lead escort” that could take any mine hit

The LCS with MCM packages (or unmanned vehicles they deploy) would lead. These ships are specifically designed with low magnetic signatures, shock-resistant hulls, and standoff systems so the manned ship itself is rarely the first thing to trigger a mine. In a worst-case scenario the lead LCS is the one that might absorb damage — not the commercial oil tanker behind it.

Why the Houthi Red Sea effort had problems (and why this is different)

Against the Houthis (2023–2025), the U.S./UK coalition:

• Could not fully eliminate hundreds of mobile, cheap drone/missile launchers hidden on land.

• Faced constant low-level attacks that drove insurance rates sky-high.

• Ships rerouted around Africa anyway because even one hit was too risky for insurers and owners.

This situation is fundamentally different:

• Iran’s threats were mostly sea-based (boats, coastal batteries, larger missiles) and have already been heavily destroyed.

• The Strait is a narrow, confined waterway where U.S. forces now dominate both the air and the surface.

• No endless supply of unsuppressible land-based attackers like the Houthis.

• U.S. response is far more aggressive and decisive (full carrier groups + ongoing strikes vs. limited airstrikes in Yemen).