I had never appreciated that Lee had had nothing but success up to this point in the war, which was two years on. And then convinced himself that the union center had been weakened as well. Yet the ground he then attempted to cross was at best tactically impossible without disrupting the federal lines. that is something I have always had problems with in multiple situations.
I suspect that you will find even Napoleon used his artillery to make a frontal charge possible. He was an artillery man first. In the end at Gettysburg they charged into massed grapeshot and effectively volley fire backed by ample replacements. And he was even told that this is a bad idea.
Yet this happens over and over again, including the first two years of the first war. And still occasionally.
Probably.
The Army of Northern Virginia was, until July 1, 1863 completely undefeated in the field. They had consistently fought off larger Union armies and sent them running back to free territory.
For example, the previous September, at Antietam (Sharpsburg), Lee’s army of 30,000 fought an army under George McLellan of 53,000 with more artillery to a draw. McClellan’s forces included a division led by George Meade, who would receive a promotion the week before Gettysburg to lead the entire army. The Union action was characterized by most of the units just sitting there doing nothing, allowing Lee’s forces to concentrate against any Union attack against his position.
Similarly, at Gettysburg, Meade played defensively, doing very little to try to take on the Confederates facing him, preferring to let them come at him. To Lee, who preferred movement, he switched to his favourite tactic - flanking maneuvers to try to bring superior numbers to bear on a weak point of the Union lines.
But Meade had chosen a good position with high ground on both sides and low ground on the middle. He expressed to his subordinates the importance of not abandoning the high ground to chase the Confederates. On Day 1, his subordinate in that position ignored that advice and nearly lost the hill to the south, only to be saved by a unit, thought destroyed, that was instead hiding behind a low wall and took advantage of a surprise textbook maneuver that pushed back the Confederates and restored Union momentum. On Day 2, Lee tried attacking the north hill, but the Union troops held firm.
It was at this point that Lee convinced himself the reason why the attacks failed is because Meade had fortified his flanks to prevent such an attack and this must have meant Meade had weakened the middle of his line. Nothing was further from the truth as the Union middle contained pretty much all the Union artillery and the bulk of Meade’s men. Moreover, it appeared to Lee that Meade had absolutely no interest in trying to take the Confederate position. That was completely true but Meade was being careful as the site of the battle was not of his choosing and he felt his primary responsibility was to prevent a Confederate breakthrough which would leave the road to Washington wide open. He guessed, correctly, if he held his ground, Lee would be forced to retreat.
But a retreat posed problem. With the Union likely to pursue, the larger Union force would most likely be able to pick off Lee’s units at leisure before they could re-organize. Lee, with his supplies and supply lines being stretched and a history of not thinking strategically became convinced of his own invincibility and against the advice of his immediate subordinates started making plans to attack the Union center despite a lack of reconnaissance.
And it was a disaster of epic proportions. To be fair, Lee blamed no-one but himself, but his army was decimated as they tried to advance on a Union position over open ground with no cover. The Union simply blasted the advancing Confederate infantry and cavalry to pieces with grapeshot and rifle volleys. None of the Confederate personnel even got close.
At the end of the day, both sides suffered about the same number of casualties, but the Confederates had smaller numbers to begin with and most of their units had been torn apart. As Lee figured, the retreat left them disorganized and it was nearly a disaster as their escape route was blocked by the swollen Potomac. However, Meade was slow to pursue and they were able to escape. Meade called it a day but Lincoln was not impressed and started looking for Meade’s replacement when he got some good news the same day from Vicksburg, Mississippi that General Grant had closed the last Confederate outpost on the river, cutting the Confederacy in half and preventing communication and trade over the river. Meade kept his rank for the rest of the war, but he soon had a new boss with a higher rank.
No comments:
Post a Comment