Security for Chinese workers in Pakistan will always be elusive

This gives us a snapshot of just how wonderful the bromance between Pakistan and China happens to be.  both are authoritarian in nature by way of either the CCP or the Pakistan Army, which drives militant opposition in some form or the other.

So all the radical hardcases take on available chinese nationals.  CCP enthusuasm for Pakistan is looking misplaced and will be understood as neocolonialism which it is of course.

And i do think that tribals there still know how to deal with that. 

China really needs to enter into a mutual joint venture with India to jointly develop all of Western China.  This sounds crazy and completely unlikely, but would change everything for both countries.  Yet a massive capital investment on the mountain tops to induce a cloud column would plausibly waterr it all, challenging as the idea is.

Security for Chinese workers in Pakistan will always be elusive

Closeness between neighbors remains somewhat superficial

Ayesha SiddiqaApril 23, 2024 17:00 JST

Volunteers carry the casket of a Chinese engineer killed in a suicide bombing in March in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. © AP

Ayesha Siddiqa is a senior fellow with the department of war studies of King's College London and was previously director of naval research for the Pakistan Navy.

Like his predecessors, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has repeatedly promised China that he will protect its workers and investments in his country.

Yet deadly attacks continue to occur as frequently as ever. A suicide attacker rammed his explosive-laden car into a bus last month killing five Chinese engineers. Another attack last week hit a convoy of Japanese workers who police believe had been misidentified as Chinese.

Beijing wants foolproof security for its 1,200 workers building critical infrastructure and teaching in Pakistan. In the face of persistent attacks, Beijing has asked Islamabad to allow it to deploy its own security personnel, but Pakistan has yet to agree.

I have been told that Islamabad came close to accepting Beijing's demand around 2016 during Nawaz Sharif's third term as prime minister, but the Pakistan Army blocked the plan. Raheel Sharif, then the military chief, instead created new army and naval units with around 12,000 personnel with the ostensible mission of protecting China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects.

Yet these forces have failed to end deadly attacks against Chinese workers in Pakistan in any way. When a suicide bomber killed three Chinese language teachers at Karachi University in 2022, Islamabad made the concession of permitting Beijing to send in its own investigators for the first time while making more promises to provide better protection.

Officials in Islamabad are certainly well aware of the importance of protecting Chinese workers given that Beijing's support remains critical for Pakistan's own financial and military security. The country has accumulated about $67 billion in debt with China and Beijing's forbearance about repayment has so far been vital in keeping Islamabad from defaulting on its international obligations.

But the military's special CPEC security units are not well managed and lack the proper wherewithal to address sensitivities involving Chinese workers' security. Although the CPEC army division is run by military officers, much of its ranks has been filled with civilian police lacking sufficient training.

As with other police in Pakistan, these personnel have often been deployed on domestic political missions, such as providing security for local officials, raiding the homes and offices of opposition politicians or suppressing the activities of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party of ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan.

This has resulted in a loss of focus, as seen with last month's killing of the Chinese engineers. Investigators have found that contrary to security protocols, the workers were being transported in an unsecured bus, vulnerable to bullets and bombs.

In a broader sense, Islamabad's focus has drifted away from the CPEC and China's ongoing projects -- and China has also become increasingly wary.

Domestic political and economic crises in Pakistan have consumed attention in Islamabad in recent years despite recurrent references by the leaders in power to the importance of the CPEC.

It simply no longer appears to be a top priority. The emerging reality is that while rhetoric about Pakistan's deep friendship with China is still frequently heard, officials are increasingly signaling an interest in making room for other foreign investors, even in areas that had been informally reserved for Chinese use.

In particular, Islamabad seems keen to attract Saudi investment and American assistance for mining projects in southern areas, including Balochistan province, long a center of Chinese attention.

Pakistani officials are believed to have held discussions with the Saudi sovereign Public Investment Fund (PIF) about taking over state-owned shares in Reko Diq, a huge planned copper and gold mine in Balochistan.

Gwadar, the province's main seaport, which was previously almost a no-go area for Western diplomats and is home to what some have suggested is a nascent Chinese naval base, has been visited several times in recent years by British and American diplomats while China's top local envoys have not been seen.

These developments certainly do not mean that China has become unimportant to Pakistan. Beijing is now the only major source of weapon systems for Pakistan and key to its defense industrial infrastructure.

Yet Qamar Javed Bajwa, who succeeded Raheel Sharif as army chief in 2016, often spoke privately about feeling more affinity with the West than with China. At a private briefing at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 2019, he remarked that Pakistan has "genetic ties with the West" that could supersede its links with China.

Gen. Asim Munir, who replaced Bajwa in 2022, seems even keener to engage with the U.S., especially to enlist its support in securing financial relief for Pakistan from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral aid donors. Munir's first visit to Washington in December led to U.S. promises of support in areas including agriculture and mining as well as combating insurgents.

Gen. Asim Munir, center, visits a man wounded in a suicide attack in Peshawar in 2023: The army chief seems especially keen to engage with the U.S. (Pakistan Prime Minister's Office via Reuters)

It seems conceivable that Beijing could begin to feel a sense of envy regarding other nations' activities in Pakistan.

Canada's Barrick Gold, which operates and owns half of Reko Diq, has come under relatively little criticism from Baloch nationalist groups nor suffered physical attacks, in stark contrast to Chinese companies operating in Balochistan. It seems possible the Saudi PIF might be similarly tacitly accepted at Reko Diq.

From the point of view of Baloch nationalists, Chinese state companies and workers are in cahoots with what they see as an oppressive Pakistani state apparatus. Other foreign companies like Barrick generally operate with a much lighter physical presence, making them less of a target for criticism or attack. Additionally, as home to members of the Baloch diaspora, Western countries are seen as much more potentially sympathetic to the Baloch cause than Beijing is. Saudi Arabia also is home to a Baloch community that may translate into a degree of a goodwill.

For now, China and Pakistan will remain closely tied. Yet suspicions of each other's motives and intentions seem bound to fester.