Monday, April 29, 2024

MSG and Free Glutamate: Lurking Everywhere




What this tells us is that you are getting too much too quickly and some of us do not do do well.

Sadly, most canned goods lose a lot of flavor through the heating process mandated.  Thus depend on frozen goods.

In fact presume all canned goods are at least suspect to just revese flavor loss.  Campbell soup uses MSg and without the flavor is likely all over.

Easy to avoid if you are intolerant.


MSG and Free Glutamate: Lurking Everywhere


By Sally Fallon Morell


April 26, 2024



Some time ago, on a trip to British Columbia, I ate in a local restaurant. When eating out, I always try to order something simple, without a gravy or sauce, since these sauces are bound to contain MSG.

So, I ordered a plain crab cake with rice and vegetables — no sauce, no mayo. Boy, did that crab cake taste good! About midnight I knew why. I woke up with a dry mouth, a terrible thirst and a headache. The next day I felt sore all over, like I’d been in a fight. My hands felt like they had arthritis.

Fortunately, since I don’t eat food containing MSG very often, the symptoms cleared by the next day. Unfortunately, I attended a reception that evening, and since I had skipped lunch and was hungry, I ate things I shouldn’t have, including a peanut sauce I am sure came from a can. That night, the same thing happened, and the next day I was stiff and sore from head to toe.

Of course, I knew the reason why and just resolved to be more careful going forward. But suppose I was a person who ate a lot of processed or restaurant food and didn’t know about the dangers of MSG. I would feel awful all the time: headache, dry mouth, excessive thirst, and aches and pains like arthritis.

I might be told I had the disease du jour: fibromyalgia. But there is no treatment for fibromyalgia so I would probably be treated for the runner-up disease du jour: Lyme’s disease. The treatment for Lyme’s disease is courses of antibiotics, which would probably make my condition worse.

If I complained to the doctor about the dry mouth and thirst, I would be tested for diabetes; and if I sought treatment for headaches, I’d end up on some pretty powerful pain killers.

Which brings us to the question: could all these conditions, especially the rheumatism-like achiness that plagues so many people, be due to MSG and similar substances added to virtually all processed food?

Glutamine Versus Glutamate

For example, MSG allows food manufacturers to make something that resembles gravy — which we make at home with good drippings, flour and genuine bone broth — with water, a thickener, artificial coloring and artificial flavors, especially MSG.

Apologists for MSG point out that it derives from glutamine, an amino acid needed for protein synthesis, immunity, liver health, detoxification and maintenance of acid-alkaline balance, among many other roles.

Our bodies can make glutamine; however, in times of rapid growth or healing — especially healing of the gut — we need more glutamine than we can make and must get it from food. Homemade bone broth is an excellent source, one explanation for bone broth’s reputation as a healing food.

Glutamine is a precursor to glutamate, an important neurotransmitter, for which we have receptors in the brain and all over the body. Apologists for MSG argue that the additive is not really different from glutamate (or its cousin glutamic acid).

For example, journalist Liz Roth-Johnson writes, “Despite their different names, glutamate, glutamic acid, and monosodium glutamate are essentially the same molecule and behave the same way in our bodies.” She provides the following diagram.


Roth-Johnson notes that ripe tomatoes and aged cheese contain high levels of glutamate, so what could be the problem with MSG? The problem is that most people don’t get headaches and arthritis-like symptoms when they eat ripe tomatoes and aged cheese.

One explanation is that the sodium molecule added to glutamate makes it a very different molecule — after all, adding chlorine to sodium to make nutritious salt makes chlorine very different from poisonous chlorine gas! Small differences in molecules can make huge differences in the body.

Free Glutamate Can Overload Your System

Free glutamate is formed during fermentation — of milk into cheese, of soybeans into soy sauce, etc. That’s what gives these foods their delicious meat-like umami taste. Most people can eat small amounts of slowly and naturally fermented soy sauce without problem, but react strongly to cheap soy sauce made by rapid protein hydrolysis with added MSG.

Another difference: most of the glutamate in our body does not come from free glutamate in our food but from the breakdown of protein into its separate amino acids. It’s a good assumption that these enter the bloodstream more slowly than MSG added to food, or even to glutamate naturally formed in food, so that their transformation into neurotransmitters is more controlled.

Eating foods containing MSG or a lot of added free glutamate, can overwhelm the system, so to speak. And free glutamate is everywhere, I mean everywhere, usually not labeled but lurking in other food additives.

Ingredients That Contain Free Glutamate

Here’s a list of ingredients that contain free glutamate in one form or another:


And these are foods that can contain a lot of free glutamate formed during processing:


And these are foods that extremely sensitive people have reacted to:


Fermented Foods May Trigger Reactions if You’re Sensitive

Furthermore, these sensitive souls need to avoid anything fermented, including natural cheese, naturally fermented soy sauce and homemade sauerkraut, and even tomato paste.1

Interestingly, the late Jack Samuels, creator of truthinlabeling.org (which created the above lists), told me that he could eat cheese made with old-fashioned animal rennet without problem, but reacted strongly to cheese made with vegetarian rennet (which is produced by genetically modified bacteria).

I always purchase organic herbs and spices, often not reading the labels. But I looked carefully at the label of some organic chili powder I recently bought and was shocked to read that it contained “organic rice concentrate.”

Rice concentrate is not in any of the above lists, but it is obviously a processed ingredient and why would the company add it to chili powder unless it contributed some kind of zip to the flavor? Just shows you can’t be too careful! Always read labels!

But back to the main point: if you are suffering from any kind of chronic pain or discomfort, try limiting yourself exclusively to whole natural foods that you have prepared yourself. I’m betting you will see an improvement without taking any drugs.

Security for Chinese workers in Pakistan will always be elusive



This gives us a snapshot of just how wonderful the bromance between Pakistan and China happens to be.  both are authoritarian in nature by way of either the CCP or the Pakistan Army, which drives militant opposition in some form or the other.

So all the radical hardcases take on available chinese nationals.  CCP enthusuasm for Pakistan is looking misplaced and will be understood as neocolonialism which it is of course.

And i do think that tribals there still know how to deal with that. 

China really needs to enter into a mutual joint venture with India to jointly develop all of Western China.  This sounds crazy and completely unlikely, but would change everything for both countries.  Yet a massive capital investment on the mountain tops to induce a cloud column would plausibly waterr it all, challenging as the idea is.


Security for Chinese workers in Pakistan will always be elusive

Closeness between neighbors remains somewhat superficial

Ayesha SiddiqaApril 23, 2024 17:00 JST

Volunteers carry the casket of a Chinese engineer killed in a suicide bombing in March in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. © AP

Ayesha Siddiqa is a senior fellow with the department of war studies of King's College London and was previously director of naval research for the Pakistan Navy.

Like his predecessors, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has repeatedly promised China that he will protect its workers and investments in his country.

Yet deadly attacks continue to occur as frequently as ever. A suicide attacker rammed his explosive-laden car into a bus last month killing five Chinese engineers. Another attack last week hit a convoy of Japanese workers who police believe had been misidentified as Chinese.

Beijing wants foolproof security for its 1,200 workers building critical infrastructure and teaching in Pakistan. In the face of persistent attacks, Beijing has asked Islamabad to allow it to deploy its own security personnel, but Pakistan has yet to agree.

I have been told that Islamabad came close to accepting Beijing's demand around 2016 during Nawaz Sharif's third term as prime minister, but the Pakistan Army blocked the plan. Raheel Sharif, then the military chief, instead created new army and naval units with around 12,000 personnel with the ostensible mission of protecting China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects.

Yet these forces have failed to end deadly attacks against Chinese workers in Pakistan in any way. When a suicide bomber killed three Chinese language teachers at Karachi University in 2022, Islamabad made the concession of permitting Beijing to send in its own investigators for the first time while making more promises to provide better protection.

Officials in Islamabad are certainly well aware of the importance of protecting Chinese workers given that Beijing's support remains critical for Pakistan's own financial and military security. The country has accumulated about $67 billion in debt with China and Beijing's forbearance about repayment has so far been vital in keeping Islamabad from defaulting on its international obligations.




But the military's special CPEC security units are not well managed and lack the proper wherewithal to address sensitivities involving Chinese workers' security. Although the CPEC army division is run by military officers, much of its ranks has been filled with civilian police lacking sufficient training.

As with other police in Pakistan, these personnel have often been deployed on domestic political missions, such as providing security for local officials, raiding the homes and offices of opposition politicians or suppressing the activities of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party of ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan.

This has resulted in a loss of focus, as seen with last month's killing of the Chinese engineers. Investigators have found that contrary to security protocols, the workers were being transported in an unsecured bus, vulnerable to bullets and bombs.

In a broader sense, Islamabad's focus has drifted away from the CPEC and China's ongoing projects -- and China has also become increasingly wary.

Domestic political and economic crises in Pakistan have consumed attention in Islamabad in recent years despite recurrent references by the leaders in power to the importance of the CPEC.

It simply no longer appears to be a top priority. The emerging reality is that while rhetoric about Pakistan's deep friendship with China is still frequently heard, officials are increasingly signaling an interest in making room for other foreign investors, even in areas that had been informally reserved for Chinese use.

In particular, Islamabad seems keen to attract Saudi investment and American assistance for mining projects in southern areas, including Balochistan province, long a center of Chinese attention.

Pakistani officials are believed to have held discussions with the Saudi sovereign Public Investment Fund (PIF) about taking over state-owned shares in Reko Diq, a huge planned copper and gold mine in Balochistan.

Gwadar, the province's main seaport, which was previously almost a no-go area for Western diplomats and is home to what some have suggested is a nascent Chinese naval base, has been visited several times in recent years by British and American diplomats while China's top local envoys have not been seen.

These developments certainly do not mean that China has become unimportant to Pakistan. Beijing is now the only major source of weapon systems for Pakistan and key to its defense industrial infrastructure.

Yet Qamar Javed Bajwa, who succeeded Raheel Sharif as army chief in 2016, often spoke privately about feeling more affinity with the West than with China. At a private briefing at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 2019, he remarked that Pakistan has "genetic ties with the West" that could supersede its links with China.

Gen. Asim Munir, who replaced Bajwa in 2022, seems even keener to engage with the U.S., especially to enlist its support in securing financial relief for Pakistan from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral aid donors. Munir's first visit to Washington in December led to U.S. promises of support in areas including agriculture and mining as well as combating insurgents.


Gen. Asim Munir, center, visits a man wounded in a suicide attack in Peshawar in 2023: The army chief seems especially keen to engage with the U.S. (Pakistan Prime Minister's Office via Reuters)

It seems conceivable that Beijing could begin to feel a sense of envy regarding other nations' activities in Pakistan.



Canada's Barrick Gold, which operates and owns half of Reko Diq, has come under relatively little criticism from Baloch nationalist groups nor suffered physical attacks, in stark contrast to Chinese companies operating in Balochistan. It seems possible the Saudi PIF might be similarly tacitly accepted at Reko Diq.

From the point of view of Baloch nationalists, Chinese state companies and workers are in cahoots with what they see as an oppressive Pakistani state apparatus. Other foreign companies like Barrick generally operate with a much lighter physical presence, making them less of a target for criticism or attack. Additionally, as home to members of the Baloch diaspora, Western countries are seen as much more potentially sympathetic to the Baloch cause than Beijing is. Saudi Arabia also is home to a Baloch community that may translate into a degree of a goodwill.

For now, China and Pakistan will remain closely tied. Yet suspicions of each other's motives and intentions seem bound to fester.

What would Thucydides say?



And just who else can we hold up as an example of historical writing?  We have way more Athenian and ancient Mathematicians remembered.  It was then on the dawn of scholary invention that he emerged and exactly who since?  most later histories follow the path of Caesar as useful propaganga.


I do think that caesar wrote his stuff with an assist from scribes.

The important historical question is whether we will ultimately have the RULE of TWELVE.  fully applied, all risk of social conflict and gratuitous revolution should disappear which will be the final blessing provided by Yesua.

We would all discover happiness if authority is thus tempered and revolution itself becomes impossible.
even Thucydides would argue that history has ended.


What would Thucydides say?

In constantly reaching for past parallels to explain our peculiar times we miss the real lessons of the master historian


Thucydides. Photo by Alamy


is assistant professor of government at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. His research focuses on the history of democratic thought and, especially, on early attempts to understand and theorise Athenian democracy.



In the weeks after Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte seized power and declared himself Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, Karl Marx sat down to write a history of the present. The purpose of this work was straightforward. Marx wanted to understand how the class struggle in France had ‘made it possible for a grotesque and mediocre personality to play a hero’s part.’ Much of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852/69), as the work would be known, accordingly consisted of fine-grained political and economic analysis. But Marx opened in a more philosophical vein. After quipping that history repeats itself first as tragedy and then as farce, he reflected upon the role that historical parallelism played in shaping revolutionary action:

The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle-cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.

This tendency had pervaded European history, Marx thought, and occasionally served the ends of progress. The cloak of Roman republicanism, for instance, had helped French society lurch blindly forward during the revolution of 1789. In the present case, however, the appropriated symbolism of that earlier revolution served no higher purpose than to veil a grifter’s power grab in a more compelling guise.

Marx points toward one of the more paradoxical tendencies of modern political life: the more times feel unprecedented, the more we reach for past parallels. We do so, however, not only to legitimate new regimes. Just as often, historical analogies are invoked to explain, predict and condemn. The past decade alone offers a trove of examples. Among them, the use of ‘fascism’ to characterise Right-wing populist movements has generated the most heat, giving rise to a multifaceted debate about the legitimacy of historical analogy as a mode of political analysis. But there are others that have occasioned less self-reflection. In reckoning with the possibility of open conflict between the United States and China, for instance, foreign policy experts have routinely likened the escalating tension to the Cold War, the First World War, and even the Peloponnesian War. Similarly, in the early days of COVID-19, many dealt with the uncertainty of the pandemic by turning to the Spanish Flu, the Black Death, and the Great Plague of Athens for guidance. Something of the sort is also happening in real time with generative AI. How we interpret the risk that it poses hinges in large part on which analogy we favour: will it be most akin to the Industrial Revolution, the nuclear bomb, or – perhaps most horrifying of all – the consulting firm McKinsey?

If many of these parallels seem self-evident, one recurring point of reference does not: Thucydides, the ancient Athenian general and author of History of the Peloponnesian War. Though hardly a household name, he has been a favourite of those intent on doom-scrolling the historical record for relevant exempla. In the first month of the COVID-19 shutdown, for instance, so much was written about his account of the Athenian plague that one prominent scholar deemed Thucydides himself to be a virus. Something comparable could be said of Thucydides’ role in the viral discourse surrounding Sino-American relations. Ever since the early 2010s, when Graham Allison began referring to the stress on global order produced by hegemonic rivalry as ‘Thucydides’ Trap’, foreign policy discussions have themselves often appeared trapped by the need to balance geopolitical analysis with exegesis of an ancient text.

However strange Thucydides’ prominence may seem, the tradition of looking his way in moments of existential crisis is well established. During the American Civil War, for example, his ‘Funeral Oration of Pericles’ served as a model for Abraham Lincoln’s famed Gettysburg Address, while his account of Athenian defeat helped inspire an overhaul of the US Naval War College curriculum during the war in Vietnam. In Europe, both English and German propagandists excerpted History of the Peloponnesian War during the First World War in support of their causes, and soldiers reported reading Thucydides in the trenches. In subsequent decades, prominent writers in both England and Italy used Thucydides to reflect their concerns over the rise of European fascism.

This cultish appeal has nevertheless come at a cost. While many have tried in earnest to wring wisdom from Thucydides’ text, others have sought little more than an ancient authority for their shower thoughts. Careless glosses and misattributed quotes abound, both in the anarchic spaces of social media and in others that should be held to a higher standard: the website for Harvard’s Belfer Center, for instance, which features an apocryphal quote lifted from the first Wonder Woman movie, or on the desk of the late Colin Powell when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If this should seem a sad fate for any writer, it is a particularly ironic one for Thucydides. He was both a vocal proponent of accurately accounting for the past and a careful analyst of the textured nature of historical repetition. Resistant to simplification and rich in ‘unuttered thoughts’ (to quote Friedrich Nietzsche), Thucydides recognised that an effective understanding of the relationship between past, present and future would be both highly complex and absolutely critical for prudent political judgment. This combination did not bode well for the ancient Athenians, who ended up suffering dearly for their mishandling of historical analogies, and it is not clear that we have the resources to do much better. But we stand to learn more by thinking with Thucydides about the role of historical analogy in political life than by simply pilfering his text in search of such analogies. If nothing else, taking such a tack helps to remind us of the risks involved in abusing specious parallels in the way that we are prone to do.



Thucydides was unusual among classical writers in stating directly what he hoped his readers would gain from his work. He would be content, he says, if History of the Peloponnesian War was deemed ‘useful’ by those who wanted ‘to scrutinise what actually happened and would happen again, given the human condition, in the same or similar fashion’ (my translation). The description nevertheless leaves readers wanting. How exactly such knowledge should prove useful is underspecified, and scholars have long disagreed over what Thucydides expected the utility of his text to be.

Most assume that Thucydides tried to offer his reader a type of foreknowledge that could potentially translate into active control over the politico-historical process. Taken to its extreme, this ‘optimistic’ interpretation reads History of the Peloponnesian War as a sort of ‘political systems users’ manual’, as Josiah Ober put it, capable of creating expert political technicians. Recognising regularities in the historical process, it is thought, should lead to predictive capacity, which in turn allows for political mastery. Proceeding in this fashion, Thucydides takes himself to be training master statesmen capable of solving the fundamental problems of political life.

Others detect a more pessimistic outlook in Thucydides’ stated ambition. They suggest that the lessons on offer are insufficient to produce control over events even if they can help the reader detect regularities in the political process. Unexpected events will often upset our expectations, as the plague did in Athens, and the ignorance of non-experts will often disrupt the translation of technical insight into effective policy. This problem will be particularly acute within a democratic context, where a popular eagerness to apply bastardised versions of such insights may even make matters worse. In this interpretation, Thucydides is ‘useful’ to the extent that he can temper the ambitions of those wishing to impose rational order onto political life. The best we can hope for, it seems, is to minimise our self-harm.

We must learn how to choose the right parallels if we are to judge well in politics

At issue between these two interpretive poles is the basic presumption of applied social science: to what extent can the recognition of recurring patterns translate into effective political policy? Yet, Thucydides was not writing social science as we know it. To the extent that his text articulated anything like fundamental laws of political behaviour, it did so through exemplary instances and carefully curated parallelisms. The Peloponnesian War served as a paradigmatic event for Thucydides: a particular instance that revealed general truths. It served this representative role, however, not because it was typical. Rather, it was exemplary because it was uniquely ‘great’. The war would prove useful, in other words, not because of history’s strict repetition, but by the pregnancy of similarity and the reader’s ability to parse analogies effectively.

Thucydides schools his readers in just how difficult such acts of analogical interpretation can be. A series of carefully considered verbal parallels, or what Jacqueline de Romilly has called fils conducteurs (‘guiding threads’), extend through Thucydides’ narrative like a web, ensnaring the reader in a constant and, at times, overwhelming sense of déjà vu. Sometimes, repetitions point towards important explanatory insights. But they also suggest likenesses that can lead the reader astray. Time and again, Thucydides confounds the expectations he has created. Even upon rereading, one can feel an internal tension between what one knows to be the case and what one is nonetheless led to expect will happen. Whether it is your first or your 15th read, you can still catch yourself thinking: this time surely Athens will win.

The evident lesson behind all of this is that we must learn how to choose the right parallels if we are to judge well in politics. But Thucydides also knew that we did not have full control of the analogies that shape our deliberations, especially in public life. Our analogical vocabulary is woven directly into the cultural fabric, a product of the contingencies that shape collective memory. We choose them no more than we choose the language we speak. (Once again, Marx: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.’) Some events, such as the Persian Wars in Thucydides’ day or the Second World War in our own, simply loom too large to avoid, and we are easily held captive by the emotional weight of their cultural significance. Thucydides measured this gravitational pull also in terms of ‘greatness’, a concept that he identified closely with the production of collective trauma.

The danger inherent in this, of course, is that emotional resonance is often a poor guide to explanatory power. The most immediately compelling analogies can prove deeply misleading. The most haunting Thucydidean parallelism to highlight this point occurs through the phrase ‘few out of many returned home again’. Thucydides repeats this line three times, each to memorialise a harrowing military defeat: two massive Athenian expeditions, first to Egypt and then to Sicily, and a surprise attack that caught an entire army of Ambraciots asleep in their beds. Thucydides’ verbal repetition tempts the reader into seeing these events as an analogous set. Yet the last of these to occur, the Sicilian disaster, could not have been prevented by learning the lessons of the previous two. Quite the opposite. Rather than suffer from neglect by the metropole, as the Egyptian Expedition had, the Sicilian Expedition failed in large part due to the city’s miscalculated interventions. Rather than profit from the creative generalship of Demosthenes, which had proven decisive in the victory over the Ambraciots, his arrival in Sicily only further exacerbated the carnage.

The seductive pull of ‘great’ events is not an incidental danger to the use of historical analogies. If historians tend to debate the appeal of these parallels primarily in terms of their explanatory value, the motive behind their day-to-day use is arguably more visceral. Analogies serve more as vehicles for generating awe and outrage than for unearthing more nuanced understandings. Yet, even when used merely as rhetorical tools, they can carry serious diagnostic implications.

These implications aren’t always detrimental. Figurative rhetoric can use the resources of collective memory to move people toward better policy when explanatory traction aligns with affective resonance. Thucydides’ Pericles appears exemplary of this. Early in the war, the celebrated Athenian leader faces a crowd wearied by plague and the general miseries of war. In an attempt to steel their resolve, he draws on two coordinated analogies. In the first, he describes the Athenian struggle in terms of a Greek hero overcoming labours in the pursuit of glory. In the second, he likens the democracy’s empire to a tyranny that, in defeat, must confront the widespread hatred it has incurred.

In paralleling the Athenians to two of the most provocative figures in the Greek imagination, Pericles goads the people back to their original resolve with the alternating spikes of pride and fear. And he does so perceptively. Thucydides draws on the same analogical models when characterising Athenian power and political culture in the opening pages of History of the Peloponnesian War. It’s to Pericles’ further credit that he doesn’t simply discard the analogies after they’ve served his immediate purposes. Rather, the need to balance the ‘heroic’ and ‘tyrannical’ elements of the imperial democracy serves as a framing priority for his entire war strategy – a strategy that Thucydides himself explicitly praises.

This is not to say that Periclean policy does not prove costly for the Athenians. It serves to enhance the devastation of the plague by demanding that the Athenians crowd together behind their city walls, thereby exacerbating Athenian deaths. But the costs of this policy do not arise from Pericles’ misuse of analogical rhetoric. The experience of the plague only proves a point that should already be obvious, namely, that using analogies well cannot save us from forces beyond our control. Elsewhere, however, Thucydides makes it clear that the misuse of analogies can actually invite catastrophes on par with those suffered by chance.

A false version of the story weighed heavily on the minds of the Athenians as they made a series of bad decisions

Nowhere is this message more clearly drawn than in Athens’ climactic defeat in Sicily. The toll of this disaster is hard to overstate: not only did Athenian casualties approach those of the plague, the mishap so shook the city’s faith in popular rule that an oligarchy temporarily displaced the democracy in its aftermath. Many events contributed to this grim result. Yet Thucydides’ own explanation of why the expedition failed began with a story about an event that had occurred nearly a century before the Athenian fleet set sail.

Harmodius and Aristogeiton were towering figures in Athenian civic legend. As ‘the Tyrannicides’, they were credited with putting an end to Athenian despotism and instigating the transition towards democracy. For this, they were heroised and memorialised with unparalleled reverence. And yet, Thucydides tells his reader, their reputation was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what they’d actually done. Far from being civic benefactors or even tyrannicides, Thucydides reveals, they’d murdered the tyrant’s younger brother in a romantic rivalry gone wrong. The consequences of this murder were devastating: the previously beneficent ruler spiralled into paranoia, resulting in increasingly harsh treatment of the Athenian people.

Athenian lore had gotten everything backward: the so-called Tyrannicides, far from saving the city from despotism in an act of self-sacrifice, had caused this despotic turn for eminently personal reasons. Nevertheless, it was this false version of the story that weighed heavily on the minds of the Athenians as they made a series of bad decisions in the early days of the Sicilian Expedition. It did not do so unprompted. Rather, this misunderstanding proved a useful tool among aspiring elite leaders within Athens, each of whom was eager to clear a path for their own ascent. Standing in the way of most, however, was the Sicilian Expedition’s most talented general, a brash and charismatic leader named Alcibiades. When a series of sacrilegious acts occurred on the eve of the expedition, Alcibiades’ rivals pushed the (false) Tyrannicide parallel, suggested a tyrannical coup was afoot, and implicated Alcibiades. There was no evidence for this, but in the resultant hysteria it did not matter. Faced with certain prosecution, Alcibiades defected to Sparta, turning the tide of war against Athens.

This elite manipulation of popular misunderstanding effectively inverts Pericles’ constructive use of heroic and tyrannical parallels. By painting Alcibiades as a potential tyrant, his opponents easily conjured up an exaggerated state of fear that allowed them to achieve their private ends at the expense of the city. In the end, Thucydides shows that the analogy between past and present was indeed illuminating: personal rivalries once again led to civic casualties that resulted in brutal and self-undermining politics. But the cost of this collective delusion would become clear only later. Hindered by increasingly poor generalship and an opponent emboldened by Spartan help, ‘few out of many’ would make it home from Sicily, and Athens would soon devolve into civil war.

In May 1861, Marx found himself increasingly depressed about the American Civil War. The best he could do to mitigate his low mood, he told a friend, was to read Thucydides. ‘These ancients,’ he explained, ‘always remain new.’ They do so, we might add, by forever remaining old, thereby creating the space we need to find ourselves in the contrast.

It is tempting to see Thucydides’ digression about the tyrannicide analogy as the key to understanding his historical method. Had the Athenians only understood the truth of their own history, we might think, they wouldn’t have made such easy prey for self-serving politicians. In this vein, Thucydides’ project may seem to be that of saving future generations from comparable mistakes. As the ‘greatest’ conflict to ever beset the Greeks, unique in both its glory and its trauma, the Peloponnesian War would soon usurp the Tyrannicides and the Trojan War as the privileged source of political analogy. As such, it promised unparalleled resources for anyone trying to persuade others to their cause. It is reasonable to think that Thucydides expected his work to hinder the ability of bad actors to abuse this power. At the same time, it is unclear just how far it was in his ability to do so. The Athenians, after all, had everything they needed to realise the truth about the Tyrannicides. What they lacked was the will to scrutinise something that they felt to be intuitively correct. Thucydides could give posterity an account of the Peloponnesian War that might stop it from becoming fodder for false parallels if considered carefully. But he could not thereby prevent opportunists from constructing misleading analogies on its back.

Approaching Thucydides’ text from the angle of historical analogy does not resolve the age-old disagreement between his optimistic and pessimistic readers. It may nevertheless encourage us to recognise that a more realistic approach to political agency must exist somewhere between these two poles. Thucydides intimates that the careful art of drawing fitting analogies, honed as it may be through the diligent study of political history, will assist some to think more clearly about the present. But mastering this art should not be confused with political mastery. The power of ‘great’ events will remain too easily harnessed, and too hard to control, to serve only those who are clear-headed and well-intentioned. Specious analogies will remain a danger for as long as people stand to benefit from them, and their emotional pull will continue to knock even the most astute off balance. And yet, if there’s little chance that political life will ever be freed from distortive thinking, it may still prove less hazardous for those who look toward history as something more than a sourcebook of convenient parallels.

Return of the descendants





Something important needs to be said. We all have stories we tell ourselves
originating from parental stories.  Yet they track back perhaps to a great grand parent or two.  no0
t that much actually.

Yet we all have two parents, four grand parents, eight great grand parreents, 16 grest great grand parents and 32 great great great grand parents and in my case this ends up around 1800.  That adds up to over 62 folks of whom we may o0r could reasonably know about.  The fact is that we can know about perhaps six of them.

It is obviously silly to attach any import to biological lineage at all.  Yet it has been an ongoing parlor game forever.

thanks to universal education, we all all extensively informed by eighteen years of age and this can be quite different from even our parents.  I know that Canada is a deeply Scottish informed culture but only because i did visit my German cousins to find an alien culture.  Only decades and even that shifted from a  universal british MEME.

We are now landing one million new immigrants every year and our education system is converting their children into good little Canadians.  and today, tge whole world is been processed into good little global citizens and way more quickly than we thought possible 


Return of the descendants

I migrated to my ancestral homeland in a search for identity. It proved to be a humbling experience in (un)belonging


The Old Bridge, Heidelberg, Germany. Photo by Zhong Feng/Getty


is a journalist and communications scientist. She is the editor of the 50 Women anthology series.

https://aeon.co/essays/i-migrated-to-my-ancestral-homeland-in-a-search-for-identity


Aphysician motions for me to enter the institutional labyrinth of Impfzentrum booths. Once inside, my hands press flat and sticky against my US passport, German residency title and COVID-19 vaccine card. The doctor’s cobalt eyes squint beneath her mask, forming deep frown lines as she peers in suspended bewilderment, muttering at my documents. I ask her to clarify.

‘You’re a Buchleitner and not a native German speaker?!’ Her astonishment and disgust flood me with shame.

What does it mean to return to a land you are supposed to belong to as a descendant but in which you are functionally a foreigner?

Misspelled on my birth certificate with a visible strikethrough, my German family name always proved difficult for Americans, making me an easy target for school-playground bullying and assumptions about my nationality that left me feeling alien. Absent any accompanying grandparents’ memories, recipes, customs or folklore, it remained a phantom identifier with a disembodied lineage.

By divine miracle or sheer coincidence, two months after my first trip to Germany in 2009, where I had a premonition while perched on Heidelberg’s arch bridge that I would return, a distant relative contacted my father with news that felt almost like a premonition: she had painstakingly documented the Buchleitner genealogy from 1520 onward, chronicling the emigration of four sets of ancestors from Saarbrücken to Pennsylvania in the mid-1800s, offering answers to our missing lineage. Craving religious and political freedom, avoiding compulsory military service, and overcoming economic hardship were reasons enough to make a hellish months-long journey to a departure port and then dodge outbreaks of cholera, typhus and smallpox in steerage-class ship accommodations.

When I was leaving Germany, it had seemed as if my ancestors were beckoning me to return. But that wouldn’t happen for another decade, after I became a finalist for the Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship and fell in love with a German man I’d met in the Temple of the Reclining Buddha in Bangkok. In 2019, I stuffed my keepsakes into three zip-tied suitcases and, though I had no grasp of the German language at all, decided I was migrating to Munich indefinitely.

With a perception of Germany as a methodical, organised utopia to emulate, I assumed my integration would come naturally due to my lineage and new relationship, sooner rather than later granting me an identity to match my name. Within months, however, the assimilation challenges boiled me down to a flicker. Everyday moments of pretending I understood a store clerk’s questions while flanked by impatient customers proved daunting. When strangers barked orders at crosswalks, I awkwardly smiled and nodded. A deep purgatory of straddling an ancestral place that labelled me Ausländerin (foreigner) amassed. ‘Buchleitner’ became something to justify everywhere names matter: from my Frauenärtzin’s (gynecologist’s) office to the Bürgerbüro (citizen’s office) to airport passport control, producing confusion. Everyone wanted to know how an American, sans German husband, sans emigrated German parents, Oma or Opa, could possess such a name.


Iam not alone in my quest to belong somewhere. In the book Birchland: A Journey Home to Norway (1939), Joran Birkeland, the US-born daughter of Norwegian parents, chronicles her return to Norway to discover her roots, sent by an irresistible urge. At the time, it was a highly publicised representation of our American (and human) will to pilgrimage to ancestral homelands. Nested on territories taken from Native Americans, inhabitants of North America today often feel like a collection of refugees and migrants united in missing our origin, thrown into a melting pot and dizzied by our embodiment of multiple lineage ties.

The rise of consumer DNA testing companies indicates that Americans grapple with a sense of alienation from their roots. As of 2019, more than 26 million consumers had added their DNA to four leading commercial ancestry and health databases, according to MIT Technology Review. About one in seven US adults report having used a mail-in DNA testing service from companies such as AncestryDNA or 23andMe, according to a 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center. When asked about their reasons, the majority (87 per cent) say they wanted to learn more about where their family came from. AncestryDNA even offers personalised travel to testers craving a toe-touch with origin destinations. According to the researchers Solène Prince and Aydan Mehtiyeva, a process of self-discovery that sometimes includes ancestral tourism is increasingly significant for those feeling alienated from their roots and hoping to trace their family lineage. Voyaging to a heritage place is viewed as a form of affective sacred pilgrimage or rite of passage, building a larger narrative about one’s past.

With her young son, the travel journalist Sheeka Sanahori traced her great-grandmother’s journey from Mississippi to Missouri during the Great Migration, when an estimated 6 million Black Americans left the southern United States between the 1910s and the ’70s. Her desire to make the journey began after she became pregnant and dove into genealogy, scouring public documents and notes in a family Bible.

‘I always had this idea that I would return … We’re called here to heal the rift from a past generation’

‘When the train was moving, I noticed some of the trees were probably still there when my family came through,’ she told me. ‘I started to pay attention to small details, feeling the energy and breathing the air.’

Genealogy tests offer empirical snapshots, but they can’t fully explain one’s nuanced pull to an ancestral homeland. While tourism whets tastes and experiences, migration is perhaps the greatest length we will go in our search for identity and belonging. Others I interviewed had various reasons for migrating or solidifying transnational ties to their ancestral homeland, perceiving it as a cultural centre.

The writer Dan Q Dao moved from the US to Saigon in late 2022. His parents fled Vietnam as teenage refugees in 1975 at the end of the Vietnam War. In his 2020 essay for Condé Nast Traveler, he describes being ‘homesick for a place [he] hadn’t yet visited’ as a young child, and the ‘convoluted topic’ of returning to the homeland on family trips in support of his parents’ non-profit organisation, which builds schools in rural Vietnam. Dao is Việt Kiều – a phrase referring to ‘Vietnamese sojourners’, a person of Vietnamese descent who was born or lives overseas. He has since discovered a local community of others with similar ties.

‘I always had this idea that I would return,’ he told me. ‘I felt out of place my entire life. Most of us were used to perceiving the country in the shadow of our parents. Once we met each other and socialised, we broke barriers. We’re called here to heal the rift from a past generation. I also found comfort in witnessing Saigon’s thriving, powerful queer community. Vietnam is a mystical place.’

The performing artist James Monroe Števko theorises that Americans return to ancestral places because they lack a sense of community or belonging. ‘People love storytelling,’ he told me. ‘They want stories about themselves. Americans need that. We are looking for our history. All human history has been about stories passed down from generation to generation. That is perhaps what compels me to search for information.’

Števko found his great-grandfather’s military draft card in a photo album and traced him to Rovňany, Slovakia. He then evolved his transnational identity by making two heritage pilgrimages to Slovakia to dive deep into local culture, took a 10-week intensive Slovak language course, attended events, and applied for ancestral citizenship, which required on-the-ground investigation into his family background.

‘At a ski resort, a local woman wrote on paper that she granted me my citizenship,’ he told me. ‘People are very welcoming to me due to my lineage and have helped me in countless ways uncover more.’

Despite blending in with her name and appearance while abroad in Tokyo, the sociologist Jane Yamashiro felt like a cultural foreigner at times, prompting her to pursue studies into the meaning of ‘Japaneseness’. Between 2004 and 2015, she chronicled ethnographic fieldwork in the greater Tokyo area, interviews in both Japan and the US (mainland and Hawaii), and other research in her book Redefining Japaneseness: Japanese Americans in the Ancestral Homeland (2017) to understand the ‘further complications that arise when you go “where you’re from”’.

Migration research is heavily centred on diasporas – migrants and descendants of migrants, whose identity and sense of belonging have been shaped by their experience or background. The concept is historically linked to Jewish, Armenian and Kurdish populations dispersed worldwide with limited access to a place of origin and often accompanied by an idealised collective memory about the ancestral homeland or at least the ancestral experience, a sense of kinship and robust group consciousness. When a person migrates back to an ancestral homeland, they are often assumed to identify via a diaspora group. What, then, can explain those who don’t come from diasporas, including myself and some others I interviewed?

To avoid the sometimes negative or pejorative connotations she found in the terms ‘ethnic return migration’, ‘diasporic return’, or other academic terms, Yamashiro conceptualised ancestral homeland migration – the movement of global co-ethnics to their ancestral homeland regardless of their identification with it. While it describes Japanese American migrants from her research, the idea has universal implications.

‘My concept of ancestral homeland migration starts from a more neutral place. There’s an ancestral connection, and this person is raised, often even born, outside of this ancestral homeland. They’re migrating to this place where they have this ancestral connection. Now, let’s start there and see what else there is. I don’t want to make assumptions about individuals or groups other than starting with some empirical facts,’ Yamashiro explained to me.

People often expect the ancestral homeland to complete missing pieces of their identity. I know I did

From her observations, Japanese American migrants in Tokyo are often perceived as ‘returning’, masking the underlying complexities. People of Japanese ancestry developed different communities, identities and forms of culture worldwide, including between the mainland US and Hawaii, where ‘Japanese’ takes on different meanings: in Hawaii – where Japan has a mainstream association – they enjoy a higher status, while in the mainland US they contend with lower social positions, minority status and racism, which are similarly reflected in their experiences in Japan.

Yamashiro says those offshoots are part of a global ancestral group, her term for a population with shared ancestral ties that has dispersed across multiple societies and nation-states, including people both oriented and not oriented toward the ancestral homeland, with diaspora and non-diaspora experiences, who are historically and culturally linked despite diverse histories and local identities. Since ‘Japanese’ varies in meaning from place to place, Yamashiro’s term is not meant to be homogeneous but rather one that encapsulates these variations while recognising their common ancestral link. Global ancestral groups are composed of branches, with the ancestral homeland as one of many, decentring it as the ‘contemporary cultural centre’ while still recognising its critical role. ‘If the ancestral homeland is seen as the authentic cultural centre, then populations outside of it will always be seen as inauthentic, lacking, and diluted,’ writes Yamashiro.

People often migrate expecting the ancestral homeland to complete missing pieces of their identity. I know I did. Perhaps what is most remarkable about Yamashiro’s research, which I and others experienced, is the discovery that the ancestral homeland is not always the arbiter of culture, nor is it always the vessel to replenish what we think we may be missing. Many of her interviewees learned to ‘feel less Japanese’ due to their language abilities and reduced cultural fluency. Their migration did not always reaffirm identity as expected.

Despite being born and raised in San Diego, Kevin, a young man from her research, is perceived as foreign by Americans due to his East Asian appearance. To Yamashiro, he recalled a serendipitous moment of sitting on a train and blending in with other passengers. Eventually, however, he found his lack of language fluency, body language and use of chopsticks set him apart. Similarly, since Japanese Americans experience racial discrimination in the continental US, moving to the ancestral homeland is an attempt to find a place where they can blend. Yet those of hāfu or mixed ancestry also reported it was difficult for the Japanese to acknowledge their shared ties.

‘Experiences in the United States and expectations before going to the ancestral homeland shape experiences in the homeland because they highlight things they’re not expecting,’ Yamashiro told me. ‘So regarding phenotype, when people look different from the majority in the United States and expect to go to Japan and fit in, it stands out to them how they’re not accepted. Then, they must negotiate that and realise they need to learn the language to fit in better. They need to think about how they dress, their body language, and other things that we’re not usually thinking about when we think about romantic ideas of the ancestral homeland where all people of our ancestry will be accepted.’

Yamashiro’s interviewees came to redefine Japaneseness as ‘a form … which does not fully include them’. Instead, they constructed true transnational identities – a better understanding of contemporary Japanese society while remaining connected to their American cultural framework and embodiment.

Does our mere blood make us something? Does mine make me German? Does James’s blood make him Slovak, or is there more to this equation?

Stephen Cho Suh, an assistant professor of Asian American studies at San Diego State University, examined Yamashiro’s approach in a paper discussing his own 2010-19 study. In that work, Suh conducted 57 in-depth interviews with Korean American ‘returnees’, mostly people who had lived in South Korea for a median stay of five years. The study tapped what scholar Ji-Yeon O Jo calls ‘imagined affective connection’ in her book Homing: An Affective Topography of Ethnic Korean Return Migration (2017), which investigates the experiences and degrees of belonging of legacy migrants – later-generation diaspora Koreans who ‘return’ to South Korea with no first-hand experience, possessing only inherited memories, stories, pictures, and family traditions and community, or knowledge gained through media. How much of that connection was actual, and how much of it had been imagined, created in their minds alone?

After doing the interviews, Suh realised the migrants, who may not explicitly articulate being a member of a larger diaspora, envisioned their migration as a return to the ancestral centre despite being cultural foreigners. He identifies three categories of orientation:Bio-explicit individuals who ‘(re)connect with a strictly primordial or biologised rendition of Korean ethnicity as one of their primary motivating factors for migrating’, confident that they shared indisputable ‘blood’ ties with local South Korean people.

Those with a culture-explicit ‘return’ orientation, who reaffirm their ties to an abstracted Korean culture perceived via secondary sources. ‘Korea was thus simply an ideation for most respondents; an amalgamation of anecdotes, ideas, and memories that brought about feelings of positive affect such as nostalgia and comfort,’ writes Suh.

Finally, Suh refers to those with ambivalent orientations, who migrated not because of perceived biological or cultural ties but by other connections. Still, they possessed and articulated an imagined affective connection with South Korea.

His findings reveal that identities shifted as time went on. Most considered South Korea ‘the arbiter of Korean-ness’ and viewed their migration as a meaningful way to reconnect with their Korean ‘roots’ and relatives or reaffirm culture. Still, their returns were, as Suh put it, ‘far from idyllic’. They lacked recognition as full members of South Korean civil society and ‘national polity’. They faced significant structural and cultural barriers in workplaces, public spaces, and within extended family, producing ‘identity dissonance’ – reality clashing with their upbringings and expectations, causing them to question long-held notions. One second-generation Korean American, Sam, actively avoided identifying as Korean post-migration, saying ‘Korean American’ instead.

‘Korean Americans, especially those raised in the US, have very different experiences, identities, and world views from those raised in Korea,’ Suh told me. ‘Legally, they’re also not South Korean in most cases … they’re Korean by name only … and so politically and culturally, they quickly realise there’s more to being Korean than simply being of shared ancestry. They begin to see themselves as either American or Korean American. That term, for many of these individuals before migration, is fraught with a kind of ambivalence because most Asians in the context of the US will refer to themselves by their ethnicity, nationality, or race: Korean or Asian. For the first time, they are the gatekeepers to Americanness within the context of Korea, more so perhaps than other American expats. We begin to see the kind of renegotiation of what it means to be American within the context of South Korea, ironically.’

In 1954, the Canadian anthropologist Kalervo Oberg first presented culture shock: a model of cultural adjustment, still prevalent today. In it, the migrant wafts into a honeymoon experience where the new country’s sights, sounds and food enchant them. Then, ‘negotiation’, a phase where the suspended interregnum of place and identity causes reality to clamp down and cultural barriers to arise, is described well by the Spanish language term zozobra, an anxious inability to be at home in the world. Its meaning is universal. Picture yourself standing on a paddle board in choppy water where your feet wobble beneath you as you struggle not to capsize. An ‘[incessant oscillation] between two possibilities, between two effects, without knowing which one to depend on … in this to and fro the soul suffers, it feels torn and wounded,’ per the philosopher Emilio Uranga. This phase also produces demoralisation, a psycho-spiritual crisis associated with the breakdown of one’s cognitive map, where the assumptions that grounded you before lose all credibility, leaving you utterly confused.

During a Hatsuhinode New Year’s ritual in Japan in 2019, German man dropped to one knee with glistening eyes and asked me to be his wife. Saying yes birthed a palpable tornness since Germany would become my country indefinitely, and I’d been struggling to integrate, despite the perception that, due to blood ties and my name, I could belong. In the months following our engagement, my intensive language course in Munich and its stiff wood chairs became a dreaded chore. COVID-19’s ravenous descent ground life into a quarantined, stagnant pressure cooker, adding a topsy-turvy macro backdrop to my existing confusion. As European borders shuttered, an ever-growing precipice between our personalities emerged, and by September 2021, after the second mandated COVID-19 lockdown, the relationship was done. My only anchor in Germany sunk, I found myself a remote vessel bobbing in unsettled waters.

In the beginning of that period, I lay on the cold bathroom floor of my new flat, drawing deep slow breaths to stave off anxiety. Anxious to build more community in my new aloneness, I reached out to other expats. Although welcome company, they could not understand the purgatory of my experience in an ancestral place because they lacked deeper ties to Germany. Similar to Yamashiro’s and Suh’s interviewees, these experiences further enhanced my foreignness to the point that I contemplated shedding ‘Buchleitner’ for another non-German identifier.

Despite recent global migration headlines, according to the 2022 United Nations World Migration Report, most people continue to live in their birth countries – one in 30 are migrants. As of 2020, around 3.6 per cent of the global population, 281 million international migrants, were on the move. Europe is currently the largest destination, with 87 million, followed by 86 million in Asia. How many of them have the privilege to voluntarily return to an ancestral homeland? Locating data on ancestral homeland migrants is challenging because it does not fit more specific categories of tracked migration by governments and NGOs examining refugees, internally displaced persons, remittances, or return migrants. More than 50 countries offer pathways to citizenship by descent, with 25 inside the European Economic Area offering EU citizenship to grandchildren, great-grandchildren or distant descendants of European citizens. I consulted Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, to uncover data on ancestral citizenships requested in the EU, which could signal an intention to migrate to an ancestral homeland. A spokesperson told me no specific data on citizenship through ancestry for non-EU nationals is available.

Often referred to as ‘Global North’ or lifestyle migrants, Americans and other relatively affluent individuals are moving primarily for quality of life – for instance, starting anew, or achieving goals. This contrasts with economic refugees, fleeing persecution, the climate crisis, gang violence, and war. I, my interviewees, and those in Suh’s and Yamashiro’s studies are somewhat privileged in our migration because we could pull the plug on our experiences if they become too much to bear.

The ancestral homeland shakes us, deconstructs us, and cracks us open, ushering in new resilience

‘Relatively well-off citizens of North America and Western Europe are often assumed to have the privilege and options to relocate elsewhere, typically “voluntarily” and for a mix of economic or social/cultural/lifestyle reasons, as opposed to being “pushed” out by factors like war, revolution, or violence,’ and thus are not ‘fully considered as part of an identifiable “emigration flow”’ in social research, Helen Marrow of Tufts University explained in a brief prepared for me. Marrow and Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels of the University of Kent have conducted two surveys on such groups, but say a much deeper dive is called for in years to come.

One question lingering for me is whether ancestral homeland migration is powered by inherited recollections. Could my own 2009 premonition have come from my genetics? Biological experiments reveal that lifetime events or environmental factors can change DNA expression without changing the DNA sequence via the epigenome – chemical compounds and proteins that attach to and ‘mark’ DNA by telling it what to do, controlling the production of proteins in particular cells, enabling an organism to adapt.

But the experts don’t feel that holds much weight when it comes to episodic memory in humans. Recent findings apply to simple organisms, as evidenced in a study published in Nature Neuroscience in 2013 where mice passed a scent aversion to their descendants, and the 2016 discovery, from Oded Rechavi’s Lab, that acquired traits in Caenorhabditis elegans worms can be inherited beyond DNA via small RNA molecules that tune survival at certain temperatures, or resistance to certain pathogens. But while you can transmit general tendencies such as hypersensitivity to a toxin, Rechavi told me in an interview, ‘we would not remember a book just because our parents read it. We don’t have a mechanism to transmit specific elaborate memories about arbitrary things we experience in our lives.’

Instead, Rechavi suggests that cultural memory, similar to the imagined affective connection mentioned in Jo’s book and Suh’s study, can be more influential than biology. It is the stories of our heritage, passed down through the generations, that can colour our experiences, creating a ‘mystique’.

Perhaps all the floods, triumphs, plagues, droughts, and manmade borders drawn by power-shuffled empires through the centuries my ancestors survived echo in my migration experience during the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As I write, half of my things are in Germany and the other half in the US; a metaphor for who I am – an American migrant in their homeland. I and the others moved seeking to connect our fragmented pieces, our hands outstretched, begging to be nourished with who we are. Instead, the ancestral homeland shakes us, deconstructs us, and cracks us open, ushering in new resilience and perspective.

In the apartment that became my refuge, a nest, I write my final chapter of Germany in real time: the story of a solo woman abroad in her lineage country, who emerged to embody the community by cofounding a 3,900-member advocacy group for other skilled migrants, leading collaborations with policymakers, including Munich’s migration advisory council (Migrationsbeirat). My resolve is now airtight, but my perception of our identities as transnational mosaics is forever fluid.

The author received funding from an International Center for Journalists 2023 News Corp Media Fellowship, which made possible the reporting in this essay.

Saturday, April 27, 2024

The incredible new tech that can recycle all plastics, forever



This is a survey of where we are at and it is everything we have talked about continuing to evolve.

The major problem is that no one ever wants to bite the bullet and simply stop trying to be clever.  A closed incinerator that takes the temperature up to 500 degrees breaks down all carbon based components dropping out metal and glass and ash.

The off gas then needs to be run through a 2000 degree oven to concume the offgas to produce water and CO2.  Even a not optimal system knocks the problem out.

Way too much effort has been spent trying to pull back something useful and it can never be economic.

Two steps ladies and you are good.  The exit gas can to used to heat water and a water screen can grab any acids and salts.

Everyone else is building an engineering rube goldberg system and pitching a different outcoe.


The incredible new tech that can recycle all plastics, forever

"Advanced recycling" promises to convert dirty, mixed waste plastic into brand new plastic time and time again. It is a major step towards creating a circular economy and fighting climate change



22 April 2024



I spend an inordinate amount of time in my kitchen scrutinising pieces of plastic, trying to discern whether they are recyclable or not. If they are, they go into a bag alongside glass, cans, cardboard and paper. If not, or if I am unsure, I put them in a plastic bag (non-recyclable) and shove it into the cupboard under the stairs. My intention is to deposit it in a container for non-recyclable plastics in a nearby supermarket. But the road to landfill is paved with good intentions. Sometimes I get exasperated and just end up chucking it.

Whether my obsessive sorting actually makes any difference, I don’t know. I hope the recyclables do end up being recycled. As for the other stuff, which makes up about half of my plastic waste, I have no idea of its fate. I presume it is called “non-recyclable” for a reason.





Hopefully, I soon won’t have to waste any more of my precious time triaging this type of waste. A suite of “advanced recycling” technologies is gradually coming on stream, promising to take used plastic of any type and convert it into something extremely useful: plastic. The goal is to create a circular economy for this material where there is no longer any need to make virgin plastic from crude oil, just endlessly recycle what we already have. Plastic, rightly demonised as a scourge of the modern world, could be fantastic again.

There is plenty of it to work with. Since the 1950s, we have produced over 10 billion tonnes of the stuff. More than 8 billion tonnes of that has ended up as waste. Much of it is still hanging around in landfill and the environment, and the deluge keeps coming. The world currently generates around 350 million tonnes of plastic waste each year, according to Suhas Dixit, CEO of plastics recycler APChemi in Mumbai, India.

In 2017, a team led by Roland Geyer at the University of California, Santa Barbara, analysed the fate of all plastic ever made. That work still gives us the best overall picture of what happens to the stuff — and it isn’t pretty (see graphic, below). About 55 per cent was sent straight to landfill or discarded, 8 per cent has been incinerated and only 6 per cent recycled — and, of that, most was then subsequently discarded to landfill.

It goes without saying that all this is a horror for the environment. Plastic that is burned or that decomposes in landfill releases vast amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. And somewhere between 10 and 15 million tonnes of plastic finds its way into the oceans each year, creating informal rubbish dumps like the Great Pacific Garbage Patch. This profligacy contributes hugely to the three great planetary crises of our time — climate change, biodiversity loss and, of course, waste and pollution. There is also growing concern about the impact of plastic on human health.

We persist in using the stuff because it is so useful. This is down to the fact that it comes in a diverse range of chemical forms that can do almost any job. What unites them is that they all start with monomers: small molecules with two reactive ends. Under the right conditions they join up like carriages in a train to create long, repeating strings called polymers. Start with a monomer called ethylene, for instance, and you get polyethylene. Strong, transparent and flexible, it is the world’s most abundant plastic, mostly used to make drinks bottles. Other plastics are “copolymers” consisting of two or more types of monomer. Finished plastics also contain additives — lubricants, flame retardants, pigments and more.

Plastic waste

Up to now, efforts to clean up our act have barely scratched the surface. “Plastics recycling has been an abysmal failure,” says Judith Enck, president of Beyond Plastics, a non-profit group based in Bennington, Vermont, that aims to end plastic pollution. The recycling technologies that do exist are rudimentary and laborious. Plastic waste is sorted into different types, sometimes by hand, and the best of it is sent for mechanical recycling. That involves washing, shredding or grinding, melting and extruding or compacting the plastic into pellets that can be melted down and used again.

This is very effective for some types of plastic. It works well for waste polyethylene terephthalate (PET) that hasn’t been recycled before, for example, which constitutes about 7 per cent of plastic waste. Upwards of 90 per cent of this is recycled, according to Dixit. But an awful lot of plastic waste is unsuitable for mechanical recycling. And plastic that has been treated this way isn’t as good as new. Even though it is washed, it isn’t always completely clean and therefore can’t be used in food packaging. Recycled PET, for example, can only very rarely be reused in drinks bottles. “These mechanically recycled wastes may be contaminated, so you will never get food contact approval,” says Lars Krause at the nova-Institute for Political and Ecological Innovation in Hürth, Germany. This means that recycled PET is mostly downcycled into upholstery, carpets and insulation.





These pellets are the result of mechanical recycling of plastic

aydinmutlu/Getty Images



The process also degrades the plastic a bit, each cycle producing a slightly poorer product until it is no longer good for anything. Mechanical recycling thus merely postpones the day when the plastic ends up in landfill or an incinerator.

I visited a company that uses this method last year and saw what a messy business it is. Pure North is based in Hveragerði, Iceland. At its plant on an industrial estate at the edge of town, it receives bales of filthy agricultural film and worn plastic piping, which it washes, shreds, melts, turns into pellets and sells. But the profit margins are very tight, and only certain kinds of plastic are worth recycling in this way. The company can’t deal with the jumbled mess that is “post-consumer” plastic waste — discarded food packaging and the like — as it is too expensive to sort and clean. Complex mixtures of plastics, such as the ones found in carpets and clothing, are a non-starter.

In principle, advanced recycling can do much better because it works not mechanically, but chemically. At its best, it can take bundles of dirty, mixed plastic waste and transform them into pure chemicals indistinguishable from those extracted from crude oil. These can then be remade into plastic that is chemically and physically identical to the virgin version, or used as other industrial chemicals. And once they reach the end of their short afterlife, they can be recycled again. “Plastic can go back to virgin over and over and over again,” says Bill Cooper at Cyclyx International, a plastics recycling technology company in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Advanced recycling

The most mature of the advanced recycling technologies is called pyrolysis, which is the application of heat — upwards of 500°C — in the absence of oxygen to break down plastics into their component parts. This typically produces a cocktail of end products, including oils, diesel, naphtha, waxes and monomers. It also produces “syngas”, a highly prized mixture of carbon monoxide and hydrogen, which can be built back up into a multitude of useful chemicals. In short, this gets you back to the starting materials industry needs.

There is also gasification, which uses even higher temperatures to fully convert waste plastics into syngas. It is a longer, more energy intensive process than pyrolysis, but has the advantage of being more scalable, says Krause. According to an analysis by the nova-Institute, a large pyrolysis plant produces about 40,000 tonnes a year, whereas gasification sites can churn out five times as much.

Both processes require the application of heat, which dents their green credentials somewhat — but then so does the creation of virgin plastic. Exactly how much heat is required depends on the precise nature of the process. The umbrella terms pyrolysis and gasification cover a multitude of different technologies.




Both processes have evolved rapidly over the past few years. Initially they were principally a way to convert waste plastic into diesel, aviation fuel and other liquids to be burned for energy. “About five to seven years ago, there was a heavy emphasis on creating fuels,” says Joshua Baca at the American Chemistry Council (ACC), a chemical industry trade body in Washington DC. That is an improvement over simply dumping it in landfill because it displaces fuels that would otherwise have to be refined from crude oil.

Times, however, have changed, and the emphasis is now on genuine circularity — in other words, endless recycling. “The world has evolved very significantly, and today, advanced recycling is in the business of creating a feedstock that will create new plastic,” says Baca. And not just plastic: according to the nova-Institute, about a quarter of the output of an advanced recycling facility is “secondary valuable chemicals”, which are used instead of virgin chemicals extracted from crude oil.

Right now, Europe is the global leader in advanced recycling. A recent analysis by the nova-Institute identified over 100 advanced recycling technologies either in operation or development within the 27 countries of the EU plus the UK, Switzerland and Norway. Many have gone beyond the drawing board: the continent already has dozens of plants with a combined annual output capacity of 270,000 tonnes, which the nova-Institute forecasts will more than double by 2026.





Plastic waste is a muddle of materials requiring laborious sorting

Halfpoint Images/Getty Images



One company, called Enval, set up a pyrolysis plant near Peterborough in the UK. This specialised in flexible packaging composed of plastic and metal film, which is commonly used in containers for things like fruit juice and is normally very difficult to recycle because of its mixed composition. The firm claimed one of its typical plants could recycle 2000 tonnes of it in a year. Enval has recently been bought out, however, and the facility shuttered. The new owners say they want to have a plant going in the UK before the year ends.

The US is in the game too. Companies there have invested over $7 billion in advanced recycling since 2017, according to Baca, and more than 50 products made from recycled plastic are already on the shelves, including Herbal Essences shampoo bottles, Philadelphia cream cheese tubs and Magnum ice cream packaging.

On the horizon is an even more promising method called solvolysis. Again, the term covers a range of technologies, but it essentially involves dissolving plastic in liquid and recovering useful chemicals from it. Solvolysis requires less heat than pyrolysis and gasification, making it greener, and it produces fewer toxic byproducts.

Scaling up

The growth of advanced recycling is in no small part driven by ambitious new recycling targets, both voluntary and mandatory. The membership of the ACC, for example, has pledged that all plastic packaging used in the US will be recyclable or reusable in principle by 2030, and that 100 per cent will actually be reused or recycled by 2040. There is also the expectation that the UN will bring the gavel down on a legally binding treaty on plastic pollution later this year that will drastically curtail the manufacture of virgin plastic and pile on the pressure to create a circular plastics economy.

Advanced recycling isn’t a panacea, however. It still consumes energy and — unlike mechanical recycling — has the potential to generate toxic waste, according to Kate Bailey at recycling company Eco-Cycle in Boulder, Colorado. Each individual process needs a thorough audit of its green credentials.

One area that is still in its infancy is the purification of the end products. “The easiest step is depolymerisation,” says Krause. But that leaves a soup of additives, fillers and other chemicals that need to be separated out and this could prove to be the greatest challenge.

The toxic waste problem is becoming a hot potato. “These projects are extremely controversial,” says Bailey. ” Be prepared for a lot of public pushback.” In Youngstown, Ohio, for example, residents are fighting to stop a pyrolysis plant that they say will belch out toxic waste.



Volume is also an issue. In Europe, where the technology is most widespread, there is still a yawning gap between the amount of plastic waste and the capacity of advanced recycling plants to deal with it. Even if the nova-Institute’s projections of a doubling of output come to pass, that will only circularise a sixth of the continent’s waste stream.

Last but not least, plastics recycling in general has an image problem. “The public is upset,” says Bailey. “They don’t trust what’s happening with recycling, particularly around plastics, and they no longer believe this mantra of ‘plastics are all recyclable, just collect them and we’ll sort them out’.”

The pushback is in full flow, with organisations such as Beyond Plastics stepping up their campaigns. According to Enck, the group’s president, advanced recycling is merely a “lobbying and marketing tactic by the petrochemicals industry” to continue business as usual. Nonsense, says Krause. The campaigners’ goal is for plastic to be phased out altogether, but that isn’t going to happen. The genie is out of the plastic bottle.

“Plastic has played a critical role in making modern life possible,” says Baca. And thanks to advanced recycling, we could keep on living modern lives. If it fulfils its potential, 90 per cent of what isn’t recycled today could be channelled back into plastics production, he says. I look forward to the day when I can just sling all my plastic into the recycling bin, safe in the knowledge that it will have a meaningful afterlife. And another, and another, and another.

Graham Law