I have been keeping my head down on this one
because it is so clearly stupid.
Knocking over the Taliban and Saddam Hussein was necessary but as
equally necessary in those situations was a rapid exit leaving a creditable
reaction force locked down in place out of harm’s way to encourage cooperation
among the rising and feuding leadership.
With armies defeated and reduced to police work, it allows painless
surgical intervention when folks take leave of their senses and go astray.
This is the obvious strategy of the Egyptian
military. From their position they can
conduct a new election and a new constitutional congress every year until a
government arises able to serve all the people in a noncorrupt manner.
The immediate outcome is that the reputation of
the military remains above the political fray and they become referees.
This was never an option in Syria were the
minority owns the military who wants to suppress the majority. This never has a happy ending except through
outright partition to overcome the fresh hatreds been developed.
Assad has taken it to the point where sadly, his
removal could quell the situation for now.
Otherwise the ultimate solution where populations have taken essentially
tribal hatreds to been the all-encompassing ideology, is outright partition. Then you are done with it.
Israel built a fence to make that point and now
we are smelling real accommodation and change in the air. The same needs to be done throughout the
Middle East. The original modern post
Ottoman Empire dispensation was constructed toward the creation of digestible
additions to the late British and French empires. From that viewpoint, it was brilliant and it
worked well. Then they got straight out
of the business almost as soon as they had set up.
What we truly need are independent tribal centers,
usually in the form of cities inside an open framework of land ownership with
recourse to the centers in case of disturbances and the threat of arbitrary
removal to ethnic controlled lands. This
escapes capricious border rows.
I presume what is really on the table here is
the outright assassination of Assad with a drone strike along with a general
surgical decapitation. It is not a good
idea. The man is actually desperate to
escape this nightmare and we can play on that with a UN peace keeping force and
a defacto partition. I am beginning to
appreciate the wisdom and alacrity of the president of Tunesia.
On the Fence About Syria? Read This!
Sunday, 08 September 2013 10:46
A quick reader on why military intervention in Syria is a big
mistake - and what we should be advocating instead.
Some progressives remain
conflicted about how the United States should respond to Syria’s increasingly
violent civil war. This internal division has only deepened as the Obama
administration considers launching a military strike on Bashar al-Assad for an
alleged chemical attack by regime forces on civilians last month.
Many progressives are
rightly skeptical about involving the United States in yet another war in the
Middle East, but others are increasingly convinced that only a U.S.-led
military strike can check Assad’s well-documented brutality. In recent weeks,
many leading progressive commentators, members of Congress, and ordinary
citizens have reluctantly come to this conclusion.
But it’s a mistaken one.
However well intentioned this effort may be, there’s no evidence to suggest
that the “quick and surgical” strikes proposed by the Obama administration will
meaningfully change Assad’s behavior. But there’s ample reason to conclude that
they could make things much worse.
For progressives who are
on the fence about this issue, here’s a quick reader on why military
intervention is a mistake and what we should be advocating instead.
We can’t escalate this war.
Let’s start with
something I hope we can agree on: we really, really don’t want to escalate this
war.
The Assad regime is
surely brutal, but make no mistake: this is a civil war, not a one-sided
slaughter. Earlier this summer, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
estimated that 43 percent of the 100,000
Syrians thought to have died in this conflict were fighting for
Assad, surpassing estimates for both noncombatants and anti-regime forces.
And although some of
those anti-Assad forces originally sprung up to protect the nonviolent
protesters being gunned down by the regime, they have since been eclipsed by
al-Qaeda-affiliated groups like the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In addition to committing serious human rights abuses of
their own and establishing Taliban-style fiefdoms in their areas of control, many of these
fighters belong to the same Sunni extremist groups the United States
fought for nearly a decade in Iraq. If a U.S. attack on Assad changes the
balance of the war, these are the groups best positioned to gain from it. (And
for anyone who thinks they’ll return the favor with gratitude, recall that
Osama bin Laden himself was among the mujahedeen fighters
that Washington supported against the Soviets in Afghanistan.)
Syria’s civil war has
already spread into Iraq and Lebanon, with fighters on all
sides of the conflict carrying out car bombings and waging pitched gun battles
in the streets. A large-scale U.S. bombing campaign could push
more fighters and refugees into these fragile states, destabilizing them
further and potentially dragging the United States—as well as major Assad
backers like Russia and Iran—into a tailspin of regional turmoil.
Military intervention
could have other unintended effects as well. When NATO intervened in the
Serbia-Kosovo war in 1999, for example, both sides accelerated
their ethnic cleansing campaigns. And after NATO forces joined the war in
Libya, anti-Gaddafi fighters launched a terrifying campaign of racial violence against
dark-skinned Libyans thought to be loyal to the regime. (And then there was
that whole Mali
thing.)
But what about a limited,
“surgical” strike?
Say the United States
only launches a quick cruise missile strike on the 36
military targets the Pentagon is thought to be eyeballing.
What happens next?
One possibility is that
Syria would retaliate. As Phyllis
Bennis and Scott
Charney have pointed out, there
are U.S. forces all over the region—in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar,
Bahrain, and elsewhere—that could be vulnerable to attack from Syria, Iran, or
one of their proxy groups. If Iran gets involved, it could target U.S. ships in
the Persian Gulf or close the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the
world’s oil passes. If any of this happens, the United States could instantly
be dragged into a larger war that would become immeasurably more violent.
Suppose Assad doesn’t
strike at the United States but continues using chemical weapons (assuming he
actually has already). Does Washington keep bombing—unavoidably killing
civilians and potentially rallying some Syrians around the regime—until he
stops? Even if he swears off chemical weapons categorically, civilians on all
sides of the conflict will still die in droves from conventional attacks. The
only meaningful change will be an elevated risk for escalation.
The Wilson Center recently
put together a great short list of four “quick military strikes” that had long-running consequences. Remember
when Ronald Reagan bombed Libya in 1986? Two years later Libyan agents blew up
Pan-Am Flight 103 in retribution. And Bill Clinton’s 1998 strikes on
Afghanistan and Sudan? These helped precipitate the al-Qaeda attacks on
the USS Cole and eventually the
World Trade Center. All of these led to much larger-scale wars later on.
Obviously there were other factors in each case, but the point is that the
United States can’t just dunk its toes in the water without getting wet.
But don’t we have to enforce the
international norm against chemical weapons?
Yes. But here’s the
awkward part: the United States actually has a long, painful, and surprisingly
recent history
of its own with these weapons.
Declassified documents,
for example, recently
confirmed Washington’s long-suspected cooperation
with Saddam Hussein’s chemical attacks against the Iranians during the
Iran-Iraq War. And more recently, reports out of Fallujah, Iraq—where the
United States used white phosphorus and potentially depleted uranium during a
large-scale assault in 2004—have shown spikes in cancer rates and birth defects
outpacing even
Hiroshima’s after its nuclear holocaust. This doesn’t
mean the United States doesn’t have a responsibility to act, but it does
suggest that the international norm against the use of these weapons has
survived some pretty grievous abuses already.
More to the point,
there’s another norm we need to be upholding here, and that’s the international
prohibition on unilateral military action. Since Syria has not attacked the
United States and the UN Security Council hasn’t authorized any international
military action, a U.S. strike on Syria would be unambiguously illegal under international law. Even with the
best of intentions, enforcing a humanitarian norm with an illegal war is a
lousy way to uphold international justice.
If we fail to act here, won’t
that give Iran a green light to develop nuclear weapons?
Nuclear weapons,
as Maysam Behravesh has written, are a response to
insecurity. No country that decides it really needs nuclear weapons will wait
for Washington’s clearance.
Look at the region from
Iran’s perspective. Washington garrisons warships and thousands of troops to
Iran’s south and southwest, sells weapons to its Sunni enemies across the Gulf,
and supplies its main regional rival—Israel—with billions of dollars each year
in military aid. And in the last decade alone, Iran has seen the United States
invade and occupy countries on both its eastern and western borders. If
Washington also attacks Syria, Iran’s most important ally in the region, Iran
will be more likely—not less—to decide it needs a nuclear deterrent.
Moreover, the timing
couldn’t be worse. Iran just elected a relatively moderate new president who
campaigned on establishing a more cooperative relationship with the West. If
the United States and Iran get into a proxy war in Syria, you can kiss those
negotiations over its nuclear program goodbye. (In fact this is exactly
what some
neoconservatives want.)
Now is actually the
perfect time to redouble efforts to engage Iran, whose president—no doubt
remembering Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranians—recently condemned Syria’s
alleged use of sarin gas.
So what can we do instead?
To someone with just a
hammer, they say, every problem looks like a nail. Same goes for superpowers
and their militaries. Fortunately there’s a lot more in our toolkit than that.
Check out Phyllis Bennis’ great piece on Al Jazeera for a full
list.
Among other options,
Phyllis writes that the United States can call for a second UN investigation
team to determine not only whether chemical weapons were used, but also who
used them. And better still, if the U.S. Senate ratifies the International
Criminal Court—the international body charged with prosecuting war criminals—it
will be much better placed to eventually prosecute the culprits for the attack.
The lack of a bombing campaign now doesn’t mean that these criminals won’t have
to account for their actions later.
Most importantly,
instead of butting heads with the Russians and trying to get UN authorization
for a strike on Syria, the United States needs to engage directly with the
parties arming the belligerents in Syria to negotiate a full international arms
embargo. That includes principally Russia and Iran on the pro-Assad side and
Turkey, the Gulf States, Europe, and the United States on the anti-Assad side.
Especially among its allies, the United States has considerable leverage in
terms of withholding arms sales and other assistance to extract concessions.
Until these parties reach a deeper understanding of each other’s regional
interests, they’ll continue to use Syria as a proxy battleground.
It’s a tall order, but
with neither the rebels nor the regime able to break the stalemate, there’s not
much other hope for a solution. An encouraging
piece in Foreign
Affairs suggests that “leaders in Damascus could offer amnesty to
the rebels to initiate negotiations for a formal cease-fire, which would
include international monitoring and peacekeeping troops. That would create the
space to begin a slow, deliberate process of formal mediation that addresses
all of the major conflict issues. Mediation ought to involve third parties and
all the major factions of the opposition. Of peace agreements that have met
those conditions, less than five have failed in the last 25 years.”
And don’t forget: many,
many Syrians are desperately in need of humanitarian aid. The UN estimates that this war has turned
over 2
million Syrians into refugees, and international aid has
fallen far short of what’s required to help them.
But won’t our “credibility”
suffer if Obama doesn’t intervene like he said he would?
Look. There’s nothing
worse for your credibility than making a huge mistake just because you promised
something you shouldn’t have. Better that Obama learns to speak
more carefully than the rest of us learn—again—that we
can’t bomb our way to a more peaceful Middle East.
What can I do?
Sign a petition. Call
your representative. Get out in the streets.
United for Peace and
Justice is compiling a running
list of places where people are gathering to
oppose this war. CREDO
Action, MoveOn, and Avaaz have
drawn up antiwar petitions, and the Friends Committee on National Legislation
has all
the information you need to contact your member of Congress.
And if it helps, you can
share this article with any of your friends who are on the fence.
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