In case no one has noticed, we are watching a step by step housecleaning underway in China that is even now tightening its grip slowly on the military itself. Perhaps we will have no more bellicose pronouncements from them. It had to be done and once Xi's hand was forced, he obviously decided it was time to be also thorough.
So far so good. Yet it appears that he is a long way from finished and plans to reach into very locale to cleanse the system of outright corrupt enrichment which is pretty difficult to hide. The party is really over.
The big problem will be much larger. That is financial enrichment through unnecessary infrastructure build out. China appears to outdone itself in terms of white elephants. Once that disease caught on, few were obviously immune..
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Chinese Leader ‘Grasps Knife Handle,’ Turning It on Foes
By Zhang Dun, Epoch Times and Matthew Robertson, Epoch Times | January 22, 2015
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1212769-chinese-leader-grasps-knife-handle-turning-it-on-foes/
In the wake of the purge of top security official Zhou Yongkang,
Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping appears to be making an
explicit case against the former security czar—and hinting that other,
higher, officials are in the offing for elimination.
These messages, conveyed directly or interpreted afterwards by
analysts, were presented in recent speeches by Xi to cadres in the
Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC), the agency that controls
the entire domestic security apparatus of the Chinese state. It
represents the first public reckoning with the legacy of Zhou Yongkang’s
control over the security apparatus, which was widely recognized to
have become a second center of power in the regime.
Many political-law cadres sighed: “It’s been so long since I heard the phrase ‘knife handle.'”
Zhou, who chaired the PLAC from 2007 to 2012 (after five years as
head of the Ministry of Public Security), was effectively appointed to
the position by former Party godfather Jiang Zemin. Apart from
continuing to execute Jiang’s violent security measures against the
Falun Gong spiritual group, Zhou helped build the office into a
many-tentacled empire, largely impervious to the directives of the Hu
Jintao leadership.
The system’s growth was also based on the perversely incentivized
“stability maintenance” system, where instances of protest would be met
by overwhelming force, which engendered anger at the regime and led to
more protests, thereby justifying the use of greater force.
‘Handle of the Knife’
As part of breaking with this legacy, Xi chaired a major conclave on
Jan. 20 in Beijing, where he spoke of the need to “firmly grasp the
handle of the knife” when it comes to the work of the PLAC, where Zhou
once enjoyed his unfettered power.
A helpful interpretation published in People’s Daily on the same
day—where the author referred to Xi by his deferential and respectful
nickname, “Xi Dada,” which can mean “Uncle Xi”—made clear that Xi’s
remarks meant business.
“Many political-law cadres sighed: ‘it’s been so long since I heard
the phrase ‘knife handle,'” the author (who was not named) wrote. The
piece went on to explain that the phrase comes from Mao Zedong, the
revolutionary leader of the Chinese communist insurgency and the first
chairman of the People’s Republic of China.
“At that time, class struggle was intense, class conflict was
prominent, and he emphasized ‘the knife handle’ to point out the class
character of the political-legal system.”
In May of 1926, when Mao was chairing a conference in Guangzhou on
agrarian revolution, he reportedly said: “making revolution is knife
against knife, gun against gun. To overthrow the militia of the
landlord, we need our own peasant army. If the knife handle isn’t in
one’s own hand, there will be chaos.”
The People’s Daily author made clear the subtext of Xi’s reference to
this phrase: Xi Jinping must be the one with control over the Party’s
instruments of coercion.
“The political-legal system is the nation’s powerful agency; it is
able to restrict people’s freedom and confiscate personal assets; as
soon as it leaves control of the Party and the people, falling into the
hands of someone with ulterior motives, then it will become a sharp
weapon that harms the enterprise of the Party and the people,” the
author wrote.
Conspiracy
Unusually for a piece in People’s Daily, the article referred to the
alleged abuses of power of Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun, who ran the
southwestern mega-city of Chongqing as “their family empire,” the writer
said.
Since 2012 Epoch Times reports and columns, particularly in the
Chinese edition, discussed a conspiracy to seize power by Zhou Yongkang
and Bo Xilai—with others behind the scenes. The paper reported that
Jiang Zemin, the former leader, directed the conspiracy, while Zeng
Qinghong, his henchman and political fixer, plotted many of the details.
Recent speeches by Xi Jinping represent the first public reckoning with
the legacy of Zhou Yongkang’s control over the security apparatus
The original plan, these reports said, based on details provided at
the time by Party insiders, called for Bo Xilai to replace Zhou Yongkang
as head of the security apparatus, and then, when the time was ripe,
shunt aside Xi Jinping to seize the highest power in the Party. This
would have been possible because of the enormous power wielded by
whoever was the chairman of the PLAC under the old system: the public
security apparatus, the People’s Armed Police (around one million
strong), and other auxiliary forces.
The conspiracy theme has since been at least partially corroborated,
most recently with reports in the Hong Kong and mainland press about
Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai holding secret meetings to discuss an
alternative political line—one based on hard Maoist class theory rather
than the commercially-oriented “reform and opening up”
policies of Deng Xiaoping. They reportedly decided to “do something
big.” The overall tenor of the reports was understood by analysts to
mean that the two are alleged to have conspired to seize power.
Now, analysts suspect that Xi Jinping is sharpening the knife for a
new target: Jiang Zemin himself. A necessary precondition of any major
move of that sort, of course, is firm control of both the military and
the domestic security apparatus. With the purging of high-level military
officials through last year and this year, and the current ideological
fortification being applied to the security services, Xi appears to be
making just such arrangements.
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