All dictatorships find it almost
impossible to bite the bullet and allow a transition to democratic methods in
order to manage the populations’ hopes and aspirations. Yet the leaders have all experienced the turbulence
of the American political system and often have taken the wrong lesson from it. Now they are struggling with real turbulence
without any safety valves except acquiescence as happened recently when villagers
locked out the local cadres.
The noise over outside cultural
influence is just that China
has gained a great deal more that it has ever given in terms of cultural
product and over the next two decades we will see that reversed as we will see
a steady rise in Chinese product that also sells in the rest of the world. The reality is that culture is been totally globalised.
The only thing that makes China
different is its sense of a long history going back in its written form some
twenty five centuries and is only properly matched by Western history. More properly though Western history actually
began as a global society and antique civilization a full forty five hundred
years ago with the emergence of the Bronze Age in 2500BC under the sea borne
empire of the Minoans. There is good
reason to suspect that the Minoans both introduced bronze in China as well as used their influence to build
the pyramids in China
as effectively acknowledged by the Chinese.
If China
is the Middle Kingdom and Europe is the Western kingdom then Aztlan is the Eastern Kingdom across the Pacific.
The communist party is waking up
to its past due date and they have no way to refresh the brand except to do the
unthinkable. That is to fully introduce democratic
forms at the lowest level of governance (already largely happening) and then
allow staged democratization to take place as it rises up the ladder.
While they are at it, shove as
much economic power down to the elected regimes as possible to fire up things
from below.
What Is behind Hu Jintao’s caution against “Western Cultural
Infiltration”?
Chinese leader Hu Jintao says Western influence will subvert China .
He may be right. China 's
reform is at an end.
Thursday, January 26, 2012
By Gao Wenqian
In an article published in early January 2012 in the
Communist Party policy magazine Qiushi , Chinese
President Hu Jintao cautioned against Western culture infiltrating
and subverting China .
In fact, the warning is one of the main points in a speech he gave last October
at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress. Now that it has
been bill-boarded in the official Chinese press, the international media are
trying to decode it. What is the actual message being sent? Is it just the same
old talk of “guarding against peaceful evolution” (from one-party rule toward
democracy) from the Mao era? Or is it something deeper? Below is a brief analysis.
Currently, China’s reform has reached a dead end, and the authorities
are unable to offer up any halfway decent reform proposal prior to the 18th
Party Congress slated to take place in October 2012. The reason for this
inability is that the CPC ruling clique has completely degenerated into a
self-serving special interest group. Any reform is bound to affect the
interests of this elite and destabilize the one-party dictatorship—something
that those in power would never allow. Below, I will look at the four plates of
reform: politics, economics, society, and culture.
Political reform has been stagnant for many years now. This fact has been the crux of the
intensification of all sorts of social conflict across China , yet the
authorities have absolutely refused to relinquish their monopoly on power. Economic
reform is also in trouble—the most prominent cause of China 's social
conflict has long been the pattern of severely unbalanced and unjust
distribution of benefits. This has led to a situation where the people are
moving backward while the nation advances, where the people are becoming poor
while the officials become rich.
However, any reform in China ’s
economic sphere is bound to affect the interests of the power elite and
monopolistic enterprises and disturb the foundation of the one-party system,
something that the authorities are not willing to tolerate. As for social
reform, the priority task is reform of the household registration [hukou]
system, which has been widely criticized for treating migrant workers from the
countryside as second-class citizens. But the household registration system
is the cornerstone of the authorities’ control over the entire society;
once removed, they fear that they would lose social control. Moreover, they
also fear that household registration reform might trigger a rise in the cost
of labor, which would aggravate the current economic downtown.
In this situation, the Chinese authorities can only take the path of
least resistance and make an issue of cultural system reform, which is just
cosmetic. They are doing this because if they cannot produce any plans for
deepening the reform program before the 18th Party Congress, they would have
nothing to show for inside and outside the Party. This is the underlying reason
for proposing reform of the cultural system at the Sixth Plenary Session of the
17th Party Congress.
Further, as China’s current economic development model becomes
unsustainable, the authorities—by bringing state-owned cultural and news
organizations into the market—are not only relieving a financial burden but
also adding a new growth point to the economy, thereby stimulating an already
tired and declining economy. This is their calculation.
But this is a double-edged sword. After bringing cultural news organizations
into the market, the authorities are worried that these organizations would
then be guided by market demands, which would make it even more difficult for
the authorities to control the socially diverse public opinion that has been
made possible by the Internet in recent years. This is the real
consideration behindHu Jintao’s emphasis on vigilance against the
ideological and cultural infiltration of hostile Western forces—both to show
the authorities’ concern over the marginalization of the Party's culture and
themes, and to pre-emptively guard against the side effects of
cultural system reform, tightening the control of public opinion.
When trying to decode the Chinese authorities’ implementation of
cultural system reform, most international media outlets have framed their
commentary from the perspective that the reform is a strategy of the “great
external propaganda campaign”—to promote soft power in a great nation’s foreign
affairs. This is true, but only partially and superficially so. In its core are
the imperatives of internal politics analyzed above; it is an expression of the
fact that reform in China
is in a difficult spot and cannot find its way forward.
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