It should be obvious that she is doing the heavy lifting in terms of diplomatic work between Maduro and Trump. This is the conduit.
The whole situation has quieted down as the USA Hawks have understood that preemptive action is a loser. The economic pressure is heavy, but they are surviving.
The only clear certainty in USA foreign policy is military disengagement however long it practically takes. Recall how precipitously Obama left Iraq and just how well that worked out. It was only matched by the original entry and its aftermath. I have actually never seen such a portfolio of obvious and predictable strategic and tactical errors ever.
We all know what is not working down there. So what? the middle class will steadily escape. The oil crutch will also disappear. See how wonderful it all looks in thirty years. We certainly have the time.
The only acceptable intervention is the support of a non military intervention that ends poverty while excluding the government itself as irrelevant to the issue..
Ottawa Goes to Havana to Talk Venezuela. Returns Empty-handed
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland
has just concluded a working visit to Cuba on August 28 intended to
discuss the “crisis in Venezuela” with her Cuban counterpart Bruno Rodriguez. A reading of the news release from
the Ministry indicates that there were no tangible results aside from a
statement that the two foreign ministers had “different perspectives on
the crisis in Venezuela”, having agreed to disagree, and that “senior
officials would stay in contact and continue to exchange views”.
If Ottawa’s intention was to break the close Cuba-Venezuela
relationship, that is as close to a diplomatic statement of failure as
it gets. Cuba on the other hand has been much more explicit about the
“different perspectives” in its official Cuban Foreign Ministry website stating,
“the Cuban minister reiterated the firm and unchanging solidarity of Cuba with the Constitutional President Nicolás Maduro Moros, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the civic-military union of its people.” It also added, “he proposed to Canada to contribute to [the] elimination” of U.S. unilateral coercive measures that hurt the Venezuelan people.
This impasse raises more questions than it answers.
This has been the third visit to Havana by Chrystia Freeland this year. This last visit was preceded by a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
in Ottawa last August 22. Freeland received Pompeo with lots of praises
for him and the wars that Canada has fought alongside the U.S. She also
announced the agenda for the meeting, which included the “crisis in Venezuela”.
Few days later Ottawa officially announced that Freeland would travel to Havana to meet with her counterpart, and they would “continue
their ongoing discussions on the crisis in Venezuela and the potential
for Cuba to play a positive role toward a peaceful resolution.”
Was there any formal request for Cuba’s role? What would that role
be? Maybe the role required a predetermined outcome? One that Cuba could
not accept?
There is no doubt that Cuba is considered an important actor
vis-à-vis Venezuela. The U.S. administration perceives Cuba as key to
sustaining the Government of Nicolas Maduro. It is not clear how – maybe
politically – given that both countries are under severe U.S. economic
and financial blockades.
One additional item has been on the agenda: “the United States’
decision to end the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.”
The U.S. implemented Title III last May 2. Canada immediately responded that
Canadians doing business in Cuba are protected under Canadian law
against any extraterritorial U.S. legislation. Therefore, this seems to
be an issue that does not concern Canada.
What was the point, then, of “discussing” a U.S. law affecting Cuba?
Is it possible that Freeland was bringing the metaphorical carrot (or
stick) on behalf of Pompeo to persuade Cuba to break ranks with
Venezuela?
We do not know, but we do know that Ottawa is determined to produce a
regime change in Venezuela along side Washington in favor of
self-appointed “interim” president Juan Guaido. We also know that
Freeland is not one that gives up easily.
Do Ottawa or Washington really believe that Havana will break with
Caracas in order to benefit from a relief on the U.S. blockade?
Unlikely. Cuba has a 60-year-old track record of unbroken resistance.
Given the long-standing diplomatic relationship between Canada and
Cuba, Ottawa may have limited capability to put any pressure on Havana
without jeopardizing the relationship. But it is still possible to send
signals of disapproval. A series of events could be construed as such.
Last January the Canadian government cut back half
of its Havana embassy staff claiming health concerns resulting from
unproven “sonic attacks”. Later on May 8, following the first visit to
Cuba by Freeland in March, Ottawa announced major reduction of consular services in Havana that severely affected Cubans applying for those services. On May 16 Freeland traveled to Cuba again. Then in June, Cuban Bruno Rodriguez visited Ottawa and in late July some consular services are re-established in Havana.
Are the links between these events coincidental, or do they reflect some message in a diplomatic language?
The intensity of the exchanges between Canada and Cuba this year has
been quite high. This intensity is only consistent with a high degree of
negotiations on important issues, Venezuela being the obvious one. But
given the balance of forces between Canada and Cuba we can only assume
that Cuba is being pressured to make some significant concession. There
is no expectation that Chrystia Freeland will grasp the parallel that
Cuba-Venezuela relationship is just as important to the two countries as
her professed Canada-U.S. relationship.
At first reading, Chrystia Freeland trip to Havana to “talk”
Venezuela accomplished nothing of relevance if the intention was to pull
Cuba away from Venezuela. How will the Canadian government react to
this diplomatic failure?
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