In 1945, the victor called together all nations sort of and put
together a new world order. There were issues but by and large it
worked for a long time. Now it is largely unraveled, not least by
misteps and human folly and certainly needs to be reassembled under a
fresh international conscensus.
Who is going to do it?
While they are dithering the greatest economic contraction in global
history is setting up and gathering steam. This will sweep away the
flood of hot cash running around created by the oil industry
expansion. Thus no natioanl power will avoid severe diminishment.
This is not idle either. The oil industry has shifted over to
massively surplus production and will close out offchore oil world
wide. Yet the industry itself is about to be simply replaced
outright and no one will have money form oil to spread around. This
can be done right now.
Since that represents an eighth of the global economy and the best
paid as well, the shock will be horrific. Every government will be
thrown into crisis mode with no idea what to do.
Henry Kissinger on
the Assembly of a New World Order
The concept that has
underpinned the modern geopolitical era is in crisis
The concept of
order that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis, writes
Henry Kissinger.
Libya is in civil war,
fundamentalist armies are building a self-declared caliphate across
Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan's young democracy is on the verge of
paralysis. To these troubles are added a resurgence of tensions with
Russia and a relationship with China divided between pledges of
cooperation and public recrimination. The concept of order that has
underpinned the modern era is in crisis.
The search for world
order has long been defined almost exclusively by the concepts of
Western societies. In the decades following World War II, the
U.S.—strengthened in its economy and national confidence—began to
take up the torch of international leadership and added a new
dimension. A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and
representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the
spread of liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an
ability to achieve just and lasting peace. The traditional European
approach to order had viewed peoples and states as inherently
competitive; to constrain the effects of their clashing ambitions, it
relied on a balance of power and a concert of enlightened statesmen.
The prevalent American view considered people inherently reasonable
and inclined toward peaceful compromise and common sense; the spread
of democracy was therefore the overarching goal for international
order. Free markets would uplift individuals, enrich societies and
substitute economic interdependence for traditional international
rivalries.
This effort to
establish world order has in many ways come to fruition. A plethora
of independent sovereign states govern most of the world's territory.
The spread of democracy and participatory governance has become a
shared aspiration if not a universal reality; global communications
and financial networks operate in real time.
The years from perhaps
1948 to the turn of the century marked a brief moment in human
history when one could speak of an incipient global world order
composed of an amalgam of American idealism and traditional European
concepts of statehood and balance of power. But vast regions of the
world have never shared and only acquiesced in the Western concept of
order. These reservations are now becoming explicit, for example, in
the Ukraine crisis and the South China Sea. The order established and
proclaimed by the West stands at a turning point.
First, the nature of
the state itself—the basic formal unit of international life—has
been subjected to a multitude of pressures. Europe has set out to
transcend the state and craft a foreign policy based primarily on the
principles of soft power. But it is doubtful that claims to
legitimacy separated from a concept of strategy can sustain a world
order. And Europe has not yet given itself attributes of statehood,
tempting a vacuum of authority internally and an imbalance of power
along its borders. At the same time, parts of the Middle East have
dissolved into sectarian and ethnic components in conflict with each
other; religious militias and the powers backing them violate borders
and sovereignty at will, producing the phenomenon of failed states
not controlling their own territory.
The challenge in Asia
is the opposite of Europe's: Balance-of-power principles
prevail unrelated to an agreed concept of legitimacy, driving some
disagreements to the edge of confrontation.
The clash between the
international economy and the political institutions that ostensibly
govern it also weakens the sense of common purpose necessary for
world order. The economic system has become global, while the
political structure of the world remains based on the nation-state.
Economic globalization, in its essence, ignores national frontiers.
Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to reconcile
conflicting national aims or ideals of world order.
This dynamic has
produced decades of sustained economic growth punctuated by periodic
financial crises of seemingly escalating intensity: in Latin America
in the 1980s; in Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998; in the U.S. in 2001
and again starting in 2007; in Europe after 2010. The winners have
few reservations about the system. But the losers—such as those
stuck in structural misdesigns, as has been the case with the
European Union's southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions
that negate, or at least obstruct, the functioning of the global
economic system.
The international
order thus faces a paradox: Its prosperity is dependent on the
success of globalization, but the process produces a political
reaction that often works counter to its aspirations.
A third failing of the
current world order, such as it exists, is the absence of an
effective mechanism for the great powers to consult and possibly
cooperate on the most consequential issues. This may seem an odd
criticism in light of the many multilateral forums that exist—more
by far than at any other time in history. Yet the nature and
frequency of these meetings work against the elaboration of
long-range strategy. This process permits little beyond, at best, a
discussion of pending tactical issues and, at worst, a new form of
summitry as "social media" event. A contemporary structure
of international rules and norms, if it is to prove relevant, cannot
merely be affirmed by joint declarations; it must be fostered as a
matter of common conviction.
The penalty for
failing will be not so much a major war between states (though in
some regions this remains possible) as an evolution into spheres of
influence identified with particular domestic structures and forms of
governance. At its edges, each sphere would be tempted to test its
strength against other entities deemed illegitimate. A struggle
between regions could be even more debilitating than the struggle
between nations has been.
The contemporary quest
for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a
concept of order within the various regions and to relate
these regional orders to one another. These goals are not necessarily
self-reconciling: The triumph of a radical movement might bring order
to one region while setting the stage for turmoil in and with all
others. The domination of a region by one country militarily, even if
it brings the appearance of order, could produce a crisis for the
rest of the world.
A world order of
states affirming individual dignity and participatory governance, and
cooperating internationally in accordance with agreed-upon rules, can
be our hope and should be our inspiration. But progress toward it
will need to be sustained through a series of intermediary stages.
To play a responsible
role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be
prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek
to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do
we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral
effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if
supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in,
even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the
nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the
application of these values depend on circumstance?
For the U.S., this
will require thinking on two seemingly contradictory levels. The
celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with
recognition of the reality of other regions' histories, cultures and
views of their security. Even as the lessons of challenging decades
are examined, the affirmation of America's exceptional nature must be
sustained. History offers no respite to countries that set aside
their sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous course.
But nor does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in
the absence of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy.
— Dr. Kissinger
served as national security adviser and secretary of state under
Presidents Nixon and Ford. Adapted from his book "World Order,"
to be published Sept. 9 by the Penguin Press.
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