Why China will blockade, not invade, Taiwan

Perhaps, but a blockade can only happen if the USA and Japan stand down at least.  This assumes a win for a CCP supported USA election.  That may even be the plan afoot.

A hot assault has always been impractical and a resisted blockade equally impractical. I can imagine 10,000 fishing boats choking Taiwanese waters.\ to make a statement.  Until typhoon season.  and all shipping can be escorted.

A hot blockage would simply trigger the allied fleet at hand.

This agitating must stop.

Why China will blockade, not invade, Taiwan

Blockade eschews win-loss invasion risk while keeping US in rules-of-engagement limbo for months or years while strangling island into submission

by Denny Roy

October 19, 2024

China’s October 14 “Joint Sword 2024B” military exercise, the fourth large exercise near Taiwan in the last two years, reconfirmed Beijing’s vow to use force if necessary to compel Taiwan to join the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against the will of Taiwan’s people.

PRC officials and media said the exercise was a reaction to an allegedly provocative Republic of China National Day speech given by Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te. That claim was clearly bogus.

Lai’s speech was relatively mild toward China. He even said he is comfortable with the name “Republic of China,” which annoys some of his fellow Democratic Progressive Party members who would rather call their country the “Republic of Taiwan.”

Furthermore, Beijing called a previous large exercise in May, after Lai’s inauguration, “Joint Sword 2024A,” indicating there was already a plan for another one before the end of this year. So it now appears that major PLA exercises are no longer reactions to new steps by Taiwan or the US toward de jure Taiwan independence. Rather, they follow a schedule set by Beijing.

If there is a positive glimmer from Joint Sword 2024B, it might be that the exercise seemed mostly a rehearsal for a blockade. The Chinese Coast Guard’s (CCG) participation was prominent and much hyped by PRC spokespeople and the media. The CCG would be a major player, as important as the PLA Navy, in a blockade scenario.

During the exercise, CCG vessels took up positions on all sides of the main island of Taiwan and also sailed near two small Taiwan-held islands close to the coast of mainland China.

PRC government media organ Global Times said, “This indicates that the CCG, as a maritime law enforcement force, will intensify and increase the frequency of its activities around Taiwan,” foretelling a larger role for the CCG in future Chinese efforts to force Taiwan toward unification.

To hammer home the message, China dispatched CCG vessel 2901 to participate in the exercise. This ship, the largest coast guard vessel in the world, is heavier and longer than a US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

In a situation involving ships bumping and blocking each other, such as has become commonplace in the South China Sea, large Chinese vessels would have an advantage – as Beijing wants to remind Taiwan.

One Chinese military spokesperson said the purpose of the drill was to “form a situation where the island is pinned down from both sides.” Another said the exercise scenario included cutting off Taiwan’s imports and setting up a picket line to prevent “foreign”—spelled US—intervention from the east.

That the PLA was practicing a blockade scenario is significant because this is a different way to use the military to compel unification than trying to seize Taiwan by landing troops to physically conquer the island.

Analysts have long disagreed over the question of whether China would employ a blockade or attempt an invasion. Many have argued that invasion is Beijing’s preferred strategy.

Brandon Weichert wrote in The National Interest in June 2024 that “Most Western observers believe that China will seek a bolt-from-the-blue strike on Taiwan … because it would catch the world by surprise” and enable Beijing to directly achieve its goal of “decapitating Taiwan’s leadership.”

To be sure, plenty of others have contended that from China’s standpoint, a blockade is a better strategy than an invasion.

The fact that Joint Sword 2024B was the most recent exercise and highlighted operations relevant to a blockade possibly indicates that PRC military planners have concluded they prefer a blockade to an invasion if China decides to take military action against Taiwan.

It would not be surprising if Xi’s government came to the same conclusion as many other analysts: That an attempted invasion would be disastrous not only for Taiwan but also for China.

There are several reasons a blockade might look more appealing to the Chinese government than an invasion.

An invasion would be an all-or-nothing gamble that would either succeed or fail in its immediate objective of securing control of Taiwan’s government, infrastructure and key industries by PRC military commanders. (Longer-term objectives, such as effectively governing Taiwan’s people, are a different matter.)

A blockade, on the other hand, is a flexible strategy. It could range from firing on ships that tried to enter pre-declared restricted zones to demanding “inspections” of certain kinds of vessels to periodically lobbing missiles into the waters near Taiwan’s main ports.

China could enforce a blockade stringently or loosely, intensify it or discontinue it any time, depending on how Taipei and other governments were reacting to it.

A blockade would allow for the possibility that Taiwan would submit to Beijing’s will without the massive death and destruction that would inevitably result from an amphibious assault accompanied by massive bombardment.

An invasion would probably bring China immediately into combat with America’s formidable armed forces. A blockade, on the other hand, would pit a Chinese strength, gray zone tactics, against an American weakness, impatience.

If American ships arrived to help Taiwan deal with the blockade, Chinese ships could keep the US captains in a state of rules-of-engagement limbo for months or even years until the Americans decided to withdraw.

From Beijing’s standpoint, Taiwan looks vulnerable to a blockade. The island’s economy is highly dependent on international trade. It imports 98% of its energy. It is politically divided.

The Chinese Nationalist Party (or KMT), which holds the most seats of any party in Taiwan’s legislature, accepts the notion that Taiwan is part of China and favors seeking better relations with Beijing.

The PRC government could enhance the effects of a blockade by implementing other operations short of kinetic warfare, such as disinformation, cyberattacks against infrastructure and activating sleeper agents inside Taiwan.

A blockade is an awful prospect. It would bring misery to Taiwan and might result in a US-China war. The scale of the violence and mayhem unleashed by an attempted invasion, however, would be much worse.

If Beijing has quietly moved toward ruling out an invasion, this would be a significant and welcome step even if genuine relief for Taiwan still remains far away.