This sadly is what is awaiting the American
people if the financial lunatics have their way.
What no one gets is that massive debt creates a
situation that must be sustained by increasing the supply of money consistently
over the ongoing life of the debt just to break even. Let me make it blindingly simple. I borrow $1,000,000 at 10% simple interest
for ten years.
That means that I must
pay $100,000 for ten years and then the principal of $1,000,000 for a total of
$2,000,000 in the tenth year. For that
reason alone such an economy can never allow the currency supply to contract at
all and in fact it is in recognition of this that Central Banking is now
focusing on increasing that money supply by a modest amount every year.
If you then choose to actually contract that
money supply by cutting wages but not interest, you actually worsen the cash flow
and the debt quality.
All this is hopelessly worsened in Greece by a
non-compliant tax payer and the usual corruption that erodes public trust in
public enterprise. Roads do need to be
built for the common weal but if such funds simply get diverted offshore into
the hands of connected rent seekers, then nothing gets done at all.
Today we have collapsed core services in which
quite bluntly, the government pretends to pay and the employees pretend to work
while everyone is forced off balance sheet to live. Thus revenues will collapse further and Greek
paper will simply become even less valuable.
The only good news is that they do have the euro as their currency so
that the grey market can happily perform.
Again this can be fixed. However, no one is going to ask me so we will
let it go as that is another essay with several protocols to describe.
The Greek "Success Story" of a
Crushing Economy and a Failed State
Contrary to the official story, Greece's economy is not
recovering, and the continuation of the Troika's neoliberal austerity medicine
assures the country a bleak economic and social future.
The official story about
Greece is that its economy is recovering after being in the grips of a severe
economic depression that has lasted six years, wiping out 25 percent of GDP
and raising the official unemployment rate over 27 percent. The government
points to the elimination of the current account deficit for 2013 (it is
claimed that a primary surplus has been secured, which is the first one for
Greece since 2002) as hard evidence that the economy is out of the woods. Thus,
in spite of a government debt-to-GDP
ratio which is hovering around 170 percent, the conservative Greek prime
minister Antonis Samaras is confident that the debt level will become
sustainable in 2014. Little wonder then that he has labeled the austerity
experiment as a Greek "success story."
This article not only
debunks the myth of Greece as an economic "success story," but shows
that current trends and developments in the country make for a bleak economic
future. The mindless austerity imposed on Greece by the European Commission,
the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund - the so-called
"troika" - as part of the bailout agreements has had a catastrophic
effect on Greek economy and society while the policies of privatization and
structural reforms including radical labor market restructuring have set the
stage for the emergence of a type of economy in which economic inefficiency,
brutal economic exploitation, severe inequality, foreign dependence and
environmental degradation will be the primary characteristics. The claim made
here is that the wild neoliberal experiment under way in Greece will produce an
economy that will resemble features not of the Celtic Tiger of the mid-1990s to
early 2000s - as the current government envisions - but that of an
underdeveloped Latin American country of the 1960s.
Whether the conversion
of Greece from a fairly developed economy into a colonial periphery is by design
or not on the part of the nation's international creditors is of secondary
importance:
This is the price Greece is paying for being a bankrupt nation as
a member state of a currency union that has a deeply flawed institutional
architecture and is being led by a hegemon that practices an extreme type of
economic nationalism and "beggar thy neighbor" policies.
As long as Greece
remains in the euro zone, and the euro zone remains what it is today, the
country will most likely remain mired in its austerity trap for many years to
come - with or without debt
restructuring in the official sector. (Close to 90
percent of Greece's public debt is now in the hands of the European Central
Bank and of European governments). Even the IMF's overly optimistic projections
for a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 124 percent by 2020 imply commitment to
fiscal discipline.
The current European
Union is fully committed to antigrowth austerity policies, as reflected in
various European laws, including the infamous Fiscal Compact. What it would
take to reverse this situation is beyond the task of this article, but suffice
it to say that European governments seem most determined to remain part of the
euro zone under the current regime. In such an environment, euro zone member states
that exhibit a proclivity for "fiscal profligacy" must be reformed by
any means necessary or face the possibility of being forced out of the Euro
area. This is clearly the story behind the drama that has been unfolding in
Greece and the European Union since the outbreak of the global financial crisis
of 2008.
A Cursory Look at Greece's
Fiscal Crisis under the Euro
The economic problems of
Greece that led to its bankruptcy have
been attributed mainly to "fiscal profligacy," a process aided by a
deeply corrupt and inefficient political system. Indeed, the country lived
beyond its means, if that what is meant by "fiscal profligacy."
As Figure 1 shows below, an upward trend in public debt started in the early
1980s, reaching its endgame in early 2010, when the country went bust and was
forced into the arms of the "troika."
The "fiscal
profligacy" argument in support of the cause behind Greece's bankruptcy
gains further credibility by the fact that Greece had by far the largest
government debt in the euro area (Figure 2). And there is hardly anyone would deny
the phenomenon of institutionalized corruption and the working of a
kleptocratic state in contemporary Greece.
Nonetheless, Greece was
allowed to enter the euro area with a government debt to GDP ratio that was
already close to 100 percent, and its public debt load didn't work its way up
to unsustainable levels until the start of the global financial crisis. When it
got close to the 130 percent mark in 2009 (Figure 2), the country was already
in the midst of a major recession.
Thus, in spite of the high
levels of public debt between 2001-2007, the Greek government was able to
service the debt because the economy posted some seemingly impressive growth
rates in real GDP, with an average of slightly less than 4 percent annually.
With access to cheap credit, high growth rates were easier to attain for an
economy with other severe structural economic weaknesses. Indeed, during the
period under consideration, the yield on Greek 10-year bonds was just
marginally higher (0.3 percent) than on their German counterpart. But the gap
began to increase substantially by late 2009 and early 2010 - once the Greek
deficit was discovered to have been double what it was originally believed to
be (close to 13 percent of the GDP while later on it was revised to over 15 percent),
with the public debt-to-GDP ratio standing close to 130 percent. By late 2010,
the 10-year Greek government bond yield stood close to 12 percent.
The "growth
performance" of the Greek economy had little to do with a dynamic
capitalist economy. Growth relied on the twin pillars of state borrowing and
European Union (EU) transfers. Between 2002-2006, EU transfers amounted to
approximately 20 billion euros, which, according to some estimates, equals
about 3.3 percent of annual GDP.
Of course, over-indebtedness
and EU transfers to Greece represent only one side of the coin. The other side
of the coin is the huge amount of funds paid to creditors. According to the
Bank of Greece, for the seven-year period leading to 2004, Greece paid 208 billion euros to
its creditors, and yet its debt did not decrease but rather increased, from 105
billion to 185.3 billion euros. This is the same ugly and vicious cycle of debt
that many Latin American and other third world countries found themselves in at
the height of western financial exploitation back in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus,
by 2006, Greece had already posted the second largest public debt among the 27 EU
member-states. In addition, Greece's debt was mostly external. In 2009,
Greece's external public debt constituted 89 percent of GDP.
Greece's fiscal woes
were intensified by the huge discrepancy between expenditure and revenues. The
data from show that the Greek government collected 7.9 percent of GDP from
direct taxes when the average
EU government collected 13.7 percent.
As further evidence of
the weak foundations of growth in the Greek economy between 2001-2007, all-time
historical levels of consumption were recorded in Greece (consumption reached
close to 90 percent of GDP) by the early 2000s, but investment went down (it
represented slightly over 20 percent of GDP). In plain economic terms,
"this means that Greek citizens were consuming more, while less was spent
on productive investment, such as factories and highways," according to
"The Economic Crisis in Greece: A Time of Reform and Opportunity,"
a report by
economists Costas Meghir, Dimitri Vayanos and Nikos Vettas.
Greece's participation
in the euro zone was imbricated in a host of other interesting and profound
contradictions. Capital accumulation, for example, proceeded during the first
five years of the country's entry into the euro zone "at a rate which is
equivalent to that of the growth of public deficit and debt rather than that of
domestic consumption."[1] Specifically, capital
formation grew by 89 percent when domestic consumption registered a 39 percent
growth. Thus, "this development deformed the real economy as capital
formation developed, not in relation to the domestic and global market, but on
the basis of the demands of finance capital." In a similar vein, while
labor productivity increased for the same five-year period by an average annual
rate of 3 percent, real average wages increased by only 0.8 percent. [2]
In sum, Greek economic
growth between 2001 and 2007 was largely based on overconsumption,
ever-increasing debt levels, and a capital accumulation process divorced from
the real economy. It was a period of economic growth in the midst of bubbles.
Moreover, under the euro regime, Greece's competitiveness declined by
almost 25 percent - the icing on the cake to the nation's participation in a
currency union that has so far proven itself to be a massive failure. [3]
The Greek Bailout Disaster
Greece's real problems
with its participation in the euro zone began with the so-called
"bailout" plan patched together by the European Union (EU) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) when the country was effectively shut out of
the international bond markets sometime in the spring of 2010 and faced the
prospect of a default. Rushing to the judgment that the roots of the Greek
financial crisis lay with a bloated public sector, the EU/IMF
"bailout" plan involved a massive loan package accompanied by harsh
antigrowth austerity measures at a time when the Greek economy was already
shrinking as it found itself in the midst of a recession.
Specifically, the
"bailout" plan that went into effect in May 2010 denied a bankrupt
country the opportunity to restructure its debt, offering instead a massive
loan package of 110 billion euros (at the usurious interest rate of 5 percent)
to the Greek government that included onerous demands: a rapid fiscal
consolidation program (intended to reduce deficits and the accumulation of
debt) that hadn't been seen in policymaking circles since the harsh economic
adjustment program imposed by Ceausescu on the Romanians in the 1980s and a
related set of economic policies based on long disproven assumptions (e.g.,
labor standards undermine competitiveness; flexible labor reduces unemployment;
austerity boosts business confidence and generates growth - and privatization
saves money). Accordingly, the structural adjustment and austerity programs
implemented in Greece by the European Union (EU) and IMF featured sharp cuts in
wages, pensions and social benefits; sharp increases in taxes; labor market
liberalization; the blanket privatization of public assets and state-owned
resources; and public sector layoffs.
Contrary to EU and Greek
government propaganda, the "bailout" plan did not constitute an act
of solidarity on the part of Greece's EU partners and its financial backers. At
stake were Europe's banks, which were overexposed to Greek debt, and the
stability of the euro. Even so, EU officials appeared quite confident in public
that the bailout agreement would help Greece put its economy back on track in a
relatively short time and allow it to return to international credit markets by
the end of 2011 or early 2012. Of course, most economists across the
ideological spectrum were not merely skeptical about the bailout deal, but
actually thought that the measures that came attached to the rescue funds would
sink the Greek economy into deeper recession.
The bailout agreement
covered three years, with the plan's primary objectives identified as lowering
the deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2013, restoring debt sustainability,
achieving internal devaluation for the purpose of reducing domestic demand,
improving competitiveness and increasing investments and exports. The fiscal
consolidation strategy aiming to lower the deficit and restore debt
sustainability involved a package of measures that amounted to 11 percent
of the country's GDP. With the corrections in place, the forecast called for
the appearance of a primary surplus by 2012.
According to IMF
expectations, the implementation of the structural adjustment program would
allow the economy to quickly regain some of the competitiveness lost due to
high labor costs and, after a slow increase, the debt would start declining
after 2013. In the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Greece and its EU/IMF
creditors, the Greek government was expected to carry out the required reforms
with lightning speed, and the "troika" officials responsible for the
supervision of the Greek structural adjustment program would review its
progress on a quarterly basis to determine when the next installment of rescue
funds (which were to be used exclusively for the country's debt obligations)
should be released.
This approach to dealing
with a nation's economic woes is rather typical of IMF thinking, which
envisions a national economy being like a ship that can change course almost
instantaneously at the command of its captain. As for the national culture,
there was no reason why it could not be taken apart like a car engine and
retooled in no time. The idea that the IMF has changed its philosophy and the
tactics it pursues is hogwash. In fact, in spite of the much parroted claims of
various senior-level officials that the organization has learned from its past
mistakes and has altered the way it approaches nations in need of economic
guidance and assistance, the mentality of the IMF (and its neoliberal acolytes
everywhere) is still stuck in the era of the Pinochet regime in Chile, when
guns and torture were widely used as means to enforce fiscal discipline and a
"free-market" utopia on an otherwise unaccommodating nation. The IMF
approach has failed everywhere it has been tried, in the process making a
mockery of economic science and shredding democratic ideals and values.
From Latin America to
Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, and from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s to
Europe's periphery today, the unfolding of the neoliberal experiment has
produced a social dystopia, leading to lower economic growth rates, rolling
back social progress and increasing inequalities. As was to be expected, the
bailout deal of May 2010 turned out to be an EU/IMF fiasco and a Greek tragedy.
Greece's deficit shrank, but so did everything else - and in much greater
proportions: employment, tax revenues, investment, consumer demand, and social
and human services. The public debt increased substantially, and so did every
index of economic misery and social malaise, including the spread of
anti-immigrant extremism and waves of suicides related to economic hardship.
But Greece's financial partners had no interest in the social and economic
consequences of the fiscal consolidation hoax they had perpetrated. All that
mattered was attaining fiscal balance - that is, ensuring that the banks would
keep on receiving payments for the Greek sovereign bonds they held.
The austerity-based
fiscal adjustment program began to show catastrophic effects within a few months.
Small-size businesses were shutting down at record levels, and unemployment had
begun its upward spiral. In May 2010, the unemployment rate stood at 12
percent; by May 2011, it had jumped to 16.6 percent. The austerity measures
were also having a major effect on tax revenues. In spite of repeated tax hikes
- including across-the-board sales tax increases, a reduction in nontaxable
income, and an emergency property tax on all homeowners - state revenues
declined, with the pension and social insurance funds taking especially huge
drops. According to the Greek Statistical Authority, state revenues for 2011
were lower than in 2009, "the year," as some commentators acutely
observed, "of the absolute fiscal derailing." [4]
The May 2010 bailout
agreement was to have been a one-time deal. Yet, even before the ink had dried,
everyone (except the EU officials) could see that it was not going to be enough
to help Greece overcome its crisis - and certainly not enough to stop the
spread of contagion. Accordingly, Greek bond yields kept soaring to ever
greater heights, freezing Greece out of the private financial markets for an
indefinite period of time, and the bond vigilantes went on a safari for more
fiscally wild "PIIGS."
Nearing the end of the
first two years of the bailout, euro zone finance ministers ended up approving
a new rescue package deal for Greece worth 130 billion euros. Without the new
bailout funds, the country would have defaulted. Interestingly enough, stocks
fell when the announcement was made, as markets were quick to realize that,
once again, the deal wasn't going to solve the Greek crisis. By that time,
Greece had already made the transition from crisis to catastrophe. Austerity
was crushing the Greek economy and causing a slowdown in every peripheral euro
zone economy that was implementing deep austerity measures in the midst of a
major recession. But dogma is dogma and, as such, it has to be reinforced
regardless of any empirical reality. Thus, the second bailout package included
even more budget cuts across the board, the reduction of public employment by
150,000 by the end of 2015, and a massive privatization project - essentially
an all-out neoliberal attack on public goods and all publicly owned enterprises
in Greece. "A Nation for Sale" is how many Greek citizens have come
to regard the terms and conditions included in the second bailout agreement. On
sale, among other highly valuable state assets, are the ports of Piraeus and
Thessaloniki; the Greek telecom OTE; the national lottery; prime real estate;
and the postal bank. All at fire sale prices. [5]
Greece's financial
backers expected the privatization projects to raise 50 billion euros by 2015,
revealing how wildly out of touch they were with Greek economic reality -
although a more likely scenario is that the urgent push for privatization was
simply a Machiavellian plan to transfer public wealth into private hands. After
all, it is beyond contention that the Greek debt crisis has been utilized as an
opportunity to dismantle the social state, to sell off profitable public
enterprises and state assets at bargain prices, to deprive labor of its most
basic rights, and to substantially reduce wages and pensions - all with the
support of a significant segment of the Greek industrial/financial class and
with the assistance of the domestic political elite, which, since the onset of
the crisis, has relied heavily on dictatorial action to meet the demands of the
country's foreign creditors and to institutionalize a much-sought-after neoliberal economic order.
For the first two years
of the first bailout agreement, EU leaders and the Greek government alike also
made a mockery of any suggestion that Greece's unsustainable public debt should
be restructured, a move that should have been undertaken almost immediately
after the crisis broke out. In May 2012, a debt restructuring deal was reached
with most of the private investors, who, after Germany and the EU used some
strong arm tactics, agreed to swap their government bonds for new securities
worth less than half the previous securities. Greek government bonds held by the
ECB were excluded from the "haircut." As it turned out, this was yet
one more move on the part of EU leaders to buy time, since the restructuring
deal still left Greece's debt at unsustainable levels (at around 132 percent),
while placing new Greek bond issues under British law (hence the Greek
Parliament cannot pass legislation refusing payment).
The terms of the second
"bailout" out package accelerated the free fall of the economy and
intensified the social decomposition that was underway, and, hence, Greece's
conversion from a fairly developed nation into a poor and dependent periphery.
Greek GDP contracted by 6.4 percent in 2012, and dropped by another 5.6 percent
in the first quarter of 2013. During the second quarter of 2013, the decline of
the GDP was not as sharp at -3.8 percent, mainly because of an improvement in
trade and tourism. Greek GDP is projected to post a decline of 4.8 percent for
2013.
In the meantime, the
upward trend in unemployment continued, climbing from 24.2 percent in 2012 to 27.6
percent in 2013, the largest unemployment rate in all of the euro zone and at
levels comparable to those that Greece had in 1961.
Thanks to the austerity
measures, wages were slashed by close to 25 percent in the course of the past
three years (purchasing power actually dropped by 37 percent), forcing in turn
a reduction in domestic demand of 31 percent.
As for the public
debt-ratio-to-GDP - which according to IMF forecasts would start declining by
2013 over its 2010 levels - not only did not shrink, but climbed to 170 percent
(at 330 billion euros) by the end of 2013, leaving the nation permanently
trapped in a state of peonage.
Primary Surplus: To What End?
The alleged Greek
"success story" behind the austerity experiment in Greece rests
exclusively on the elimination of the current account deficit and the recording
of a small primary surplus, which, as of this writing, has yet to be verified.
The attainment of a primary surplus is a key objective of the
"troika" since it will allegedly help speed up Greece's return to the
international private credit markets (recall that according to the forecasts of
the architects of the first "bailout" agreement, Greece was to return
to credit markets by late 2011 or early 2012). However, the real reason for the
"troika's" obsession with a primary surplus is purely political: It
serves as "evidence" that the austerity medicine works.
Greece's current account
began to decline by early 2012, and, by the end of that year, it had contracted
by an amazing 72.9 percent in comparison to 2011. In actual figures, this meant
a contraction of over 15 billion euros.
The bulk of the contraction came from major declines in the trade deficit (7.6
billion euros) and in the income account deficit (6.4 billion euros).
While not necessarily a
bad thing, ceteris paribus, the massive reduction in the current account of
Greece in 2012 is intrinsically related to the deteriorating economic condition
of the working people in the country, who have seen their wages slashed
dramatically and their purchasing power sent back to mid-1990s levels. The
alleged realization of a primary surplus for 2013 has been accomplished through
the further deterioration of economic and social conditions.
Indeed, this is the main
problem and the actual nature of the economic tragedy in Greece today. Instead
of pursuing pro-growth, pro-employment policies, which would stimulate economic
activity and put people back to work, the EU and IMF architects of Greece's
"bailout" plans opted from the beginning to impose draconian,
neo-Hooverian policies on a crumbling economy. Indeed, facing a financing gap
for 2015 and 2016, Greece will end up with yet another bailout agreement
sometime by late 2014. Therefore, what purpose does a primary surplus serve in
the midst of a crashing economy other than that of an ideological weapon to
justify the insane policies of austerity?
The celebration over the
primary surplus is nothing short of a desperate attempt on the part of the
Greek government to cover up the catastrophic failure of the austerity
experiment and hence of the bailout agreements with the European Union and the
IMF. The Greek economy is not recovering by any stretch of the imagination, but
remains under the firm grip of a major depression, though it is possibly
slowing down after six painful years, with 2013 continuing in the rhythms set
by the depression in 2011 and 2012, thereby proving how lethal the policies of
austerity have been for Greece. Exports, for example, which apparently were to
receive a major boost through the policy of internal devaluation, are
struggling to make any inroads: in fact, in September of 2013, total exports
amounted to 2.39 billion euros, while in September of 2012, they amounted to
2.44 billion euros, thus registering a decline of 2.2 percent.
The industrial
production index in Greece, as recently reported by the Greek Statistical
Authority, posted a decline of 6.1 percent between October 2012 and October
2013, while construction (one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy in the
pre-crisis period) dropped by 36.6 percent between September 2012 and September
2013.
In the meantime, because
of the severe budget cuts, the Greek public health care system has virtually
collapsed, along with the nation's public education system, thereby leaving no
doubt that a failed state has emerged in contemporary Greece.
Finally, another great
irony of the Greek "success story" is that the debt of the public
sector has spread into the banking and private sector as well. Having received
the sum of 50 billion euros in recapitalization from the government in order to
keep them breathing, Greek banks are still unable or unwilling to provide much
needed credit to businesses and consumers, claiming that they face a huge
percentage of non-performing bad loans, which according to most estimates
exceed 20 percent of all loans combined, and the figure is expected to rise in
2014-15. Greek banks will most likely need additional capital, and rather soon,
thus increasing even further the public debt and, with the further
deterioration of the overall economic climate, making it even harder for banks to
help spur growth.
In sum, the future of
Greek banks does not look any rosier than that of the overall Greek economy,
and the likelihood that they will eventually pass into foreign hands is a
rather strong possibility, although nationalizing them should be on top of the
agenda of any Greek government dedicated to getting the economy out of the
depression and avoiding the country's conversion into a peripheral colony of
the EU.
Future Prospects for Greece
Within the next 1-2
years, Greece may see the sharp and continuous decline of its GDP come to a
halt. It would be a sign that the economy has reached rock bottom - not a sign
of economic recovery, or that the path to growth has finally opened up. Any
growth prospects for Greece remain dim without the implementation of a
growth-oriented strategy. Some economists have proposed a new Marshall Plan for
Greece, which under current conditions would be the only rational strategy to
pursue for the sake of Greece and the future of the euro zone - but the current
political leadership in Europe is unlikely to adopt such measures - unless it
is politically forced to do so. However, the political situation in Europe is
anything but promising, and developments inside a single nation alone will
hardly carry enough force to compel a change of course inside the rest of
Europe.
Yet, an objective
observer would have a difficult time seeing how a nation like Greece can be
sustained and remain a member of the euro zone if the policies of the last
three-and-a half years continue. The stupendous rise in unemployment in Greece,
for example, is the result of crude neoliberal policies, and the problem of
lack of employment will not disappear with the refinement of these catastrophic
policies, but rather with their abandonment. Even with a return to growth, the
current levels of unemployment in Greece will never return to pre-crisis levels
without the implementation of serious government-sector employment policies.
Indeed, the structural
adjustment program underway in Greece will not lead to a growing and
sustainable economy, and the empirical evidence is nowhere to be found that
such programs have ever produced viable economies and decent societies. In
Greece, in fact, they have already produced an economic and social disaster of
historically gigantic proportions. One out of three Greeks is already near the
poverty line, and in a recent poll, almost half of the population expressed the
desire to leave the country. Greece is already on its way to resembling a Latin
America country of the 1960s, and its condition as such cannot be reversed
while the country is forced to go on carrying unsustainable government debt
loads. Today's European leaders are showing no sign of being willing to take
the necessary steps to help Greece reduce its debt burden. In all likelihood,
they won't do so until the looting of the nation's wealth has been completed.
Now, that would be a
true neoliberal "success story"!
Footnotes:
1. Costas Vergopoulos, The Looting of Wealth (in
Greek). Athens. A. A. Livanis, 2005, p. 75.
3. For a more detailed treatment of the political
economy of Greece leading up to the nation's financial crisis of 2010, but also
including the impact of the bailout agreement that followed, see C. J.
Polychroniou, “An Unblinking Glaze at a National Catastrophe and the Potential
Dissolution of the euro zone: Greece's Debt Crisis in Context,” Research Brief.
Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
September 2011.
4. Yiannis Malkoutzis and Nick
Moyzakis. Greece, Spain, Portugal Stare Into
Abyss. Kathimerini (English edition). July 21, 2012.
5. See C. J. Polychroniou, "The Tragedy
of Greece: A Case Against Neoliberal Economics, the Domestic Political Elite
and the EU/IMF Duo." Public
Policy No. 1, 2013, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute of
Bard College; and C. J. Polychroniou, "Failure By Any Other Name: The
International Bailouts of Greece."Public
Policy No. 6, 2013. Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute of
Bard College.
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